10 
LAND & WATER 
iuan 11 
J.jl/ 
Germans in Turkey 
By Sir William Ramsay 
THE newspapers in general Iiave rightly insisted 
on the immense importance of the capture of 
Bagdad in its effect upon the Arab population. 
Tln' Arah-speaking races form distinctly the 
larger half of the population of the Knipire. They have 
all been always at heart strongly opposed to the Turks, 
and the racial and intellectual antagonism has been 
extremely strong. It w.is only by force that the Arab 
races of Syria and Arabia were kept in the Turkish 
Empire, itgypt has long been practically independent. 
Syria and Egypt were not conquered by the Turks till 
the sixteenth century imder Selim II. Arabia has always 
been in a state of war with Turkey, and the Yemen 
has long been the grave of the Turkish soldiery. Since 
the ^'oung Turks came into power, rumours were fre- • 
quently circulated in Constantint)ple about the inmiinent 
danger of an .\rab revolt in Syria. Now, after the 
raptme of Hagdad, long the capital of the Arab-speaking 
world, it is difficult to see how the Turks can succeed 
in holding the .\rab races in allegiance. 
'Ihere is, however, another aspect of tliis most brilliant 
success. The course of the operations suggests tiiat tlu' 
(ierman officers have been withdrawn from the Mesopo- 
tamian army. A Swedish newspaper mentions that some 
of the ("icrman papers have been laying emphasis recently 
t)n the i)art which (iermauy was taking in the Mesopo- 
tamian operations, but there is a great deal of difference 
between officially authorised statements in (ierman 
newspapers and real facts. The Turkish army officered 
by Turks is able to conduct only one kind of opcraticm 
well, which is to stand a siege or .hold a fortified line. 
The siege of Plevna is a proof both of what the Turks 
with very few European, officers can do, and of what 
they cannot do. There ought never to have been a siege 
of Plevna, as the Turkish army ought to have retired at 
the proper moment. 
Now compare the progress of the operations on the 
Tigris. The Turks were able to put up a \ery strong 
resistance at the lines which had been prepared, but 
they did not -know when to retire and how to retire. 
1 hey held on until it was too late, and there was aft 
alternative presented to them of a hurried retirement or 
enduring a siege. , It seems quite evident that the 
retirement was so conducted as to degenerate into 
night, during which all order was lost and the army be- 
came a Heeing mob. This is exactly what tak';s ])lace 
when the officers are unfit to control and lead their 
men. A Turkish army officered by Europeans may be 
made into one of the best, but a Turkish army officered 
by Turks can never become a trustworthy force. 
In the Crimean war the Turks were a laughing-stock, 
excej>t at Kars, where the personality of General W'riliams. 
almost unaided, enabled a small gairison to hold out 
a^ain.st strong Russian forces in a way that remains 
memorable in history. In the last Russian war, the 
siege of Plevna, while memorable for its obstinate 
resistance, only proves how ignorant and incapable 
the supreme command was. Osman, in spite of his 
proud title, (ihazi (the ("oncjueror), was a typical and 
stupid Turk, singularly corrupt in respect of bribes, 
but able to sit still and maintain resistance to the last ; 
and thus he deliVered o\'er the one great arniy which 
the Turks still possessed into the hands of the Russians. 
But it is not merely generals that the Turks want. What 
they need even more is officers of every rank. They 
cannot supply men who have at once education and the 
will to work hard : they cannot learn the art of modern 
war, and they therefore are unable as officers to direct 
and use their men, while they rarely possess the moral 
jiower to control them. 
.S) far as can be judged from the little that is published, 
the operations seem to pro\e that the (ierman officers 
had been in very large degree withdrawn. For this two 
reasons may suggest themselves. Either the need in 
(iermany was too great and too pressing to allow them 
to maintain a sufficient number of officers with the Turk- 
ish army, or they believed and hoped that the Turks had 
been trained suthciently to be fit to keep up the defence. 
It is quite possible that both reasons co-operated in pro- 
ducing the result : the Germans needed all their officers, 
and they were too ready to believe that the Turkish 
army could maintain its discipline and manage itself 
without European officers. I have known more than 
one case before the war in which the Germans seemed to 
believe more than was safe in Turkish capacity and 
intellectual power and in which they had an unpleasant 
awakening. In th6se older cases "they were able to 
change their principles of action ; but in war changes 
are apt to come too late. The (iermans seem to have 
staked too much on the capacity of the Turks, and they 
have lost. With this loss it is safe to say that the scheme 
of a great Turco-(ierman army has been wrcciced, 
because for such an army European officers are essential. 
The (iermans have tried the experiment, and the result 
has been ruin. This seems to me almost a greater 
cause of satisfaction than any other aspect of Sir Stanley 
Maude's splendid victory. 
If the whole Arab-speaking population sliould now 
be disjoined from Turkey by revolt against a domina- 
tion which has been disliked for three centuries, the 
racially Turkish part of the population of the Empire 
is too small to furnish an army. Moreover, it is among 
the Arab-speaking population that there has always been 
superior intellectual power, and those who were 'Turks 
by race are seldom tit to rise above the ranks of the lower 
order of non-commissioned officers, and not often fit 
even for that humble rank. Circassians have the brains 
but rarely possess the education that is needed to make 
officers ; nor have they ever been, as- a bodv, con- 
spicuous for loyalty to the Turkish Sultans. 
The holding of Bagdad not merely destroys the scheme 
of a Bagdad railway-, but also ruins for the moment, if 
not for ever, the army which was to control the country 
and to be a menace to other nations. Can Germany 
send back to Turkey the Turkish forces, with their 
German officers, who have strengthened their army on 
the Russian frontier, and enabled her to conquer and 
hold most of Roumania ? Or can she supply officers 
enough at this stage to give cohesion and vitaf power to 
the Turkish army ? It is difficult to think that either 
course is jwssible without bringing collapse \cry near. 
Value of the Mark 
In L.\Ni) & Water for February ist an article 
on the " Value of the .Mark" appeared, in which 
attention was drawn to the importance of exchange 
quotations' as indications of Germany's, .increasing 
economic exhaustion. It was pointed out that the 
lovyest point was reached about December qth, after 
which, as a result of the Kai!<er's peace overtures, a 
sharp rise took place. 'The subsequent 'course of the 
exchanges is indicated in the following table : 
Rates are for Denmark Sweden Norway Holland Switz'ld 
loo Marks. Kroner Kroner Kroner riorins Francs 
Par of E.xchange iSK-8.S 88-88 88-88 59- 26 123-44 
Lowest point in) „ 
December, 1910 ( ^^ 54 --25 57-40 
Limit of recovery 61-50 57-05 61 
Kates on Feb. i 61 -.40 57- 05 bo- .\o 41 37 84-50 
,. Mar. I 58-80 55-15 58-80 40-45 82-15 
.. Mar. 8 55-60 54 54 75 40 02 Si 
,. ,. -Mar. 15 56-50 .53-50 55-75 39-20 80 
I'resent extent of\ ,0/ -o"' -^8"/ -^so' ^6«'^ 
depreciation about; -'7,o 40, 30 .0 35, o i» ,a 
A careful study of these figures leads to the conclusion 
that the depreciation in the value of the mark still con- 
tinues. The recovery in December last, due to prospects of 
an early peace, lasted to about the. beginning of February. 
Since then there has been a steady decline which the 
confidence of some neutrals in the German submarine 
blockade has not, apparently, been able to counteract. 
The first half of March has seen a still more rapid fall, 
with the result that in the three Scandinavian countries 
the current value of the mark is even lu'low the lowest 
]X)int formerly reached. 
A 
38 -8^ 79 
42-45 84-65 
