12 
LAND & WATER 
March 29, 1917 
of Germany and the pro-Moslem vaunt of her Kaiser at 
Damascus, future historians will reveal. For the present 
we may plausibly conjecture that at this point as at so 
many others, the blustering policy of William averted 
all chance of an Anglo-French conllict. Thus, the triumph 
of Lord Kitchener, and his tactful restraint in the hour 
of triumph, ended the long struggle for supremacy in 
Egypt which the great Corsican had inaugurated. 
After 1899 
After the year 1899, all important considerations of 
policy pointed to friendship between the two democratic 
nations of the west. The Parisian Press might greet 
with frenzied joy the news of Boer victories ; the London 
Press might retaliate with acidulous comments on the 
Dreyfus case. These episodes were like a surface tumble 
of wind against tide ; a resistless undertow made for union. 
British statesmen had at last come to see the hollowness 
of the talk about " splendid isolation." In 1901-2 
Germany repelled their offers of friendship. Japan accepted 
them. But England needed a friend in Europe. France, 
too, now that Russia was plunging ever deeper into her 
perilous enterprises in the Far East, required more 
support against the rapidly increasing German Navy. 
Further, in 1903 the German-Turkish scheme of the 
Bagdad railway, with its subsequent branch southward 
into Syria and the Hedjaz, threatened the Levantine 
interests of both the Western Powers. French ascendancy 
in Syria, and British ascendancy in Egypt, were alike 
menaced by this eastern thrust of the two Central 
Emrii^es Only by common action could the overland 
menace be adequately met. 
French charm and British good-humour soon clinched 
the union which the dictates of sound policy so clearly 
indicated. Commerce and Internationalism had already 
prepared the way. The International Exhibition held at 
Bordeaux in 1895 furnished the occasion for a visit of the 
Lord Mayor of London, which aroused very cordial 
feelings and thus realized the hopes of that ardent friend 
of France, the Prince of Wales. M. Leon Say, for France, 
Sir Roper Parkington for Great Britain, contributed to 
the success of that visit. The Count de Chaudordy and 
MM. Trarieux and Lanessan thereupon advocated a 
good understanding, which the Times and the Standard 
warmly approved. President Felix Faure, Sir Edward 
Monson (British Ambassador at Paris), and Sir Thomas 
Barclay (President of the British Chamber of Commerce 
at Paris) contributed in various ways to the formation 
of associations for I'Entente Cordiale on both sides of 
the Channel. For details I must refer my readers to 
Sir Thomas Barclay's Anglo-French Reminiscences (1876- 
1906, Constable and Co.). Sir Thomas worked hard, 
both for the Entente and for the great principle of arbitra- 
tion ; and his Memoirs bear witness to the beneficent 
influence exerted by his late Majesty, Edward VII. 
Thwarted for a time by that bitter interlude, the period 
of the Boer War, His Majesty resumed his efforts at its 
close, and on May-day 1903, realized that long-deferred 
hope, a visit to President Loubet at Paris. It is an 
open secret that the authorities and the friends of the 
Entente were apprehensive as to the reception likely to be 
accorded by the Parisians. But the King's bonhomie 
appealed to the crowds, which greeted him cordially — 
" without exaggerated warmth, without any cries which 
could provoke a counter-demonstration." Later on. 
Lord Lansdowne wrote to Sir Edward Monson, " The 
King's visit gave a great impetus to the (Entente) move- 
ment." Undoubtedly it also helped the conclusion of 
the Anglo-French Arbitration Treaty of October 14th, 
1903, which gave effect to the promises of the two Powers 
(and practically all others, except Germany) at the First 
Hague Conference (1899), to submit their disputes to 
arbitration. The treaty is simple and tentative in 
scop<. and character. It pledged Great Britain and 
France to refer to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
then established at the Hague, all questions which they 
could not settle by diplomacy, provided that these con- 
cerned neither the vital interests, " nor the independence 
or honour, of the two contracting parties," or the interest 
of third parties. It held good only for five years. 
The treaty was the expression of a pious wish for 
peace ; but in practical politics it amounted to very little. 
For what important question would not concern either 
the interests or independence or honour of either France 
or the United Kingdom, or of some third party ? Ob- 
viously, this compact needed supplementing by some 
more business-hke arrangement which would remove 
certain dangerous questions from that very ample list 
of excluded topics. This was the task to which the 
friends of the Entente now directed their efforts. Details 
of the negotiations are, of course, unknown. But it is 
known that Lord Lansdowne and M. DclcasseM,(eff ac- 
tively aided by Sir Edward Monson and M. Paul Cambon) 
were chiefly instrumental in overcoming the many diffi- 
culties arising out of the Egyptian and Moroccan ques- 
tions, and other topics such as the " French Shore " in 
Newfoundland, the control or ownership of the New 
Hebrides, and certain French claims on Siam and the 
British West African possessions. These complex discus- 
sions occupied'some six months after the signature of the 
Arbitration Treaty ; and only those who were well 
versed in the history of each dispute could possibly 
have come to a practical solution. Therefore, the credit 
of that satisfactory liquidation, called the Anglo-French 
Entente, was due primarily to the two Foreign Offices, 
to the Ambassadors and expert advisers. 
King Edward's Part 
King Edward, President Loubet and M. Cleraenceau, 
doubtless helped by maintaining the goodwill without 
which the skill of experts is exerted in vain. But to 
hail King Edward as chief author of the Entente is 
unjust to Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcasse, on whom, 
ultimately, lay the burden of responsibility. Lord Esher, 
in his work The Influence of King Edward and other 
Essays (John Murray, 1915, p. 58), states emphatically 
that the King always observed the limitations of a con- 
stitutional sovereign, and, while strongly approving and 
encouraging the Francophile tendencies, both of Sir 
Edward Grey and Lord Lansdowne, cannot be considered 
the initiator or contriver of the Entente. That his 
tact and graciousness helped to smooth away the 
asperities of the years 1898-1902 was in itself a great 
achievement, essential to the success of the final com- 
pact. The treaty of April 8th, 1904, which formed the 
quintessence of the Entente, was a series of friendly bar- 
gains between the two States, far too complex to be 
outlined here. We gave way re Morocco ; France 
gave way re Egypt ; and so on. As always happens in 
such cases there were loud complaints that we had 
bargained away essentials for non-essentials. Sir Charles 
Dilke and Lord Rosebery voiced those criticisms, though 
approving the end of the long tension with France. 
Strange to say, the German press, on the whole, wel- 
comed that happy ending to Anglo-French disputes. 
The semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemiene Zeitung ex- 
pressed satisfaction at the new arrangements respecting 
Egypt and Morocco. The Liberal Frankfurter Zeitung 
was even more friendly ; and the German Chancellor, 
Prince von Biilow, uttered these words in the Reichstag 
on April 12th : " We have no cause to apprehend that 
this Agreement was levelled against any individual 
Power. It seems to be an attempt to eliminate the points 
of difference between France and Great Britain by means 
of an amicable understanding." Soon, however,'-'"- the 
note of suspicion was heard in the German press. Certain 
organs started the theory that England (King Edward in 
particular) was seeking to " encircle " Germany and 
her Allies ; and obsession by this theory soon became a 
mania. With later events we are not here concerned. 
But it is clear that the Entente with France and that with 
Russia in 1907, were peaceful arrangements aiming at 
the solution of longstanding disputes, and in no way 
directed against Germany. The overweening pride of 
that nation, however, took offence ; and on several 
occasions Kaiser William manifested his annoyance so 
openly as to endow the Entente with increasing vitality. 
He, the Boreas of the political domain, compelled the 
Entente Powers to cling more closely together. Finally, 
his Levantine policy (supplemented by the invasion of 
Belgium in August, 1914). revived the aims of Napoleon 
the Great, with the result that, in the very lands that 
long bred discord between Great Britain and France, 
there were found bonds of common interest and 
sympathy which braced up the once loose Ententes into 
the closest union recorded in history. 
