22 
LAND & WATER 
March 29, 1917 
to stand firm. If St. Quentin falls the projection upon 
Ihc lKif<l\ts of St. (iobain will be no longer a strength' to 
the ojiemy but a weakness. 
To understand the whole of this very interesting 
position, let us look at the Battle of St. Quentin, which 
IS now joined, in some, detail. 
The battlefield may be regarded as stretching from a 
little south of toucy, with its magnificent ruined castle 
on the edge of the great Hill Forest, Xo the railway 
junction of Koiscl upon the north, its total front as the 
crow Hies being from south-east to north-west about 
thirty miles. But its critical sector between the Somme 
and the Oise is not more than half that distance. The 
district is di\ided into two very different aspects by 
the marshy valley of the Oise river. To thq north of 
this \allev, after one has climbed the steep bank, which 
e\ery where runs along the Oise to the height of about 
150 feet, is a mass of almost entirely bare rolling up- 
lands. From any one of its flat-rounded summits one 
has a view for miles and miles over a sort of tumbled 
sea of plough lands. The sources and upper waters of 
the httle Somme make only a slight depression therein ; 
the general character of the whole country side is uniform, 
very well suited for manoeu\Te, and giving excellent 
obserxation everywhere. 
To the south of the Oise, on the other hand, and 
lietween that marshy flooded river (with its numerous 
channels) and its tributary the Ailctte stands the bold 
highland of the great forest, which is called in its northern 
part after tlie little woodland town of St. Gobain in its 
midst, and in its southern part after the village and 
castle of Gjucy. Its highest point reaches quite 350 feet 
above the river valley. We must add to these general 
elements other obstacles and communications. The 
main railway, which is the vital communication of the 
enemy, runs from St. Quentin to Cambrai, and so to 
Belgium and the great German works in Westphalia ; 
while St. Quentin is, at the same time, the meeting place 
of five great main roads and at least twenty smaller ones. 
Apart from this main railway to Cambrai there is a single 
line railway going to Cambrai by way of Roisel from 
St. Quentin ; *another single line railway leading to the 
Champagne districts through Laon (where it joins the 
main line), and several light railways which the enemy 
h.is, of course, largely added to during his occupation. 
The main obstacle in front of St. Quentin is the 
Crozat Canal, which unites the Somme Canal and the 
Oise Canal, the latter following the marshy main valley 
of the river from which it takes its name. The front 
of the battle has been as follows in the last few days : 
In the middle of last week, Wednesday and Thursday, 
the furthest British patrols and detachments of cavalry 
were feeling their way towards Roisel and Vermand. 
They linked up with the French somewhere south of 
Vermand, while the French had got their foremost caval- 
ry and advance detachments near Roupy about three 
miles from St. Quentin, near St. Simon, further south, 
and were approaching the Crozat Canal — they had even 
crossed it in places. It will be seen that the English 
advance was in line with the French, but the whole line 
lay south-east and north-west. 
So much for the positions north of the Oise. South 
of the Oise the French were back behind the fine of the 
Ailette river, and the reason of this formation was that 
the high forest land in front of them formed an im- 
possible obstacle. 
Observe the value of this high forest land to the enemy. 
As the Allies advanced upon the centre of their new 
hne (of which St. Quentin was the vital point), this 
high forest bastion stood more and more upon their 
flank. It could conceal any number of troops, and if 
the I'rench had crossed the Oise and attempted to hold 
the further bank, the attempt might have been dis- 
astrous. 
Therefore, the main French advance was kejit to the 
north of that broad, marshy and very efiicicnt obstacle 
which the Oise valley forms, and the main crfort was 
directed upon the sector which I have marked upon 
* Tlic i-iitting of this railway by the liritish ojcupiitiun of Kojsfl 
la^t week did not, as was sometimes ciiotidiiis.y premisi'il, ml Um 
main comnnmitation between Si. nuoiitin .uvl famljra. that is 
lound in thu doublu Uac running luilUer tifjl and atill <iuitc out of 
biuin'a way. 
Map III, with a bracket running from the Somme to the 
Oise. a distance of about ten to eleven m les. The 
first considerable German effort to check the Allied 
advance was delivered upon Wednesday last. Upon 
the Tuesday the French had reached and were attemjHing 1 
to cross the Crozat Canal, which the enemy was defending 
in force, and upon Wednesday and Thursday, the 21st 
and 22nd of March, he counter-attacked. This counter- 
attack was very violent ; it was indeed violent in pro- 
portion to the peril to St. Quentin, which the forcing of 
this last obstacle would develop, and the enemy's 
despatch emphasised the importance of the action by 
telling us that this counter-attack had succeeded and 
had thrown the French back behind the canal in the 
neighbourhood of Jussy, with a loss of over two hundred 
pris9ners and several machine guns. 
But the counter-attack in point of fact failed. The 
French carried the Canal ; upon Friday they got the 
enemy back as far as Seraucourt, and by Saturday they 
occupied the whole line of the canal, and were on the 
heights behind it and overlooked La Fere. 
On Sunday the consequences of this success were 
apparent. The French during the Saturday and Sunday 
pushed right on until their advanced right wing between 
the Somme and the Oise had actually reached the Oise 
above La Fere, and their most extreme patrols had 
occupied Vendeuil. It is clear that if that advantage 
could be maintained the road communication between 
St. Quentin and the south was cut : and the Germans 
in the course of that Sunday retired to their main en- 
trenched position marked by a line of crosses upon Map III, 
where they had prepared strong defences and were holding 
the crest which runs from Castres upon the Somme through 
Essigny upon its high bare flat plateau, to the slightly 
higher point called Hill 121 (it is imperceptible as a 
summit, but it forms an horizon hiding St. Quentin). 
The French despatch sent late on Sunday night informs 
us that at some late hour upon the Sunday the enemy 
was thrown out of this prepared position, presumably 
on to a second line just behind it. Meanwhile, 
the English had pressed forward and occupied the rail- 
way junction of Roisel and were apparently upon the 
outskirts of Vermand, a great Roman-road jimction which, 
in the Middle Ages, gave its name to the whole district. 
The line ran, therefore, on the Stmday night somewhat 
as is shown by the line of clashes on Map 111 ; ha\ing 
advanced to this in the course of the week-end from the 
line of dots, which it had occupied three days before. 
By this time the German position in the great wooded 
hills to the south, originally intended for a flanking 
bastion protecting St. Quentin in continuation of the 
obstacle of the Crozat Canal, had become untenable, 
and his troops were withdrawn from the extreme horn 
of the woods, so that the line on the Sunday night appears 
to have run south of the Oise somewhat as the line of 
dashes shows it upon Map III. On Monday nothing 
more was done. The, French consolidated the crest 
Castres— Essigny — HiU 121, which they had carried, 
and were bringing up material. On their left they had 
pushed up as far as the outskirts of Savy, and there 
found the Germans entrenched on what was certainly 
their principal line. Beyond Monday night the des- 
patches received at the moment of writing do not carry 
us. The immediate future will show whether the enemy 
can hold this centre of his new line which covers St. 
Quentin or no. If he cannot the whole of that new 
intermediate line upon which he has retired by so short 
and insufficient a movement, is in peril. The battle 
is (for once) a battle for a definite place with a well- 
known name — for a town. It is a battle for St. Quentin, 
and on the retention or loss of St. Quentin by the 
Ciermans it must be judged. 
Meanwhile — since so very, small a retirement does 
nothing to sohe the problem of the general salient, there 
is another critical point at B in Map I., where the new 
apex lies, and there a fierce str\iggle is in progress, the 
successful issue of which would be advantageous to the 
Allies as the fall of St. Quentin itself. 
The coimtry is difiicult : ravined and wooded ; and 
the task of the attack very heavy. So far the l-it ik ii 
have fori ed their way u\> on to the plateau abo\e the 
Aisne, but we do not know whetlier they lut\e yet reached 
the main German line there or no. H- Bi:lloc 
