April 
1917 
LAND & WATER 
xr 
extraordinarily short period. Those who imagine that 
no American expeditionary force can take its place in 
the European field of war in less than twelve months are, 
I believe, profoundly mistaken. 1 set n thing improbable 
in supposing that not one but sever. 1 army corps may 
be landed in France before the autumn is over. 
Be this as it may, however, there is obviously no 
;idequatc military force immediately, available. How 
do things stand with the American Fleet ? The American 
Navy, in commission, could add two squadrons of eight 
capital' ships each to the Grand Fleet, with twenty 
modern destroj'ers in attendance on each. There are 
roughly as many old destroyers in reserve and a fleet of 
battlesliips of older type, unsurpassed for individual 
strength and gunfire.' If we assume that the deficiencies 
of the personnel — in numbers — have been made up, a 
sea force is thus available for battle purposes such as 
would inake any German hopes of breaking out into the 
North Sea simply hopeless. Will this force be so used ? 
Or will the destroyers be detached from the battle fleet, 
the battle fleet put into reserve, and the Americkn Navy 
reorganised with extemporised craft, so that the Republic's 
action at sea shall be limited to combating the sub- 
marine ? This is a nice point of policy, and, America 
once pledged to war, it is to be presumed that the AlHes 
will be consulted before a decision is come to. It is 
tempting to assume that the American Battle Fleet is 
not needed in our waters. The necessity of protecting 
merchantmen seems, at first sight, to be Very much the 
more obvious task. Rut it will be rash to prejudge the 
decision. If, as seems certain, the German position is 
hopeless on land, if the spirit of the people and of the 
army is getting feebler, if the ruling caste are already 
conscious that the armed nation, long since thwarted of 
conquest, can now no longer successfully defend itself, 
it is, of course, possible that every remaining eleiru'nt of 
strength may be devoted to a last desperate throw. A 
blow may be attempted that is, which, if successful, would 
end the war in Germany's favour. Tiiere is only one 
such blow cfinceivable. It would be an attack upon 
these islands by all arms. Who could say what th^ fate 
would be of an expedition in which every Germari sub- 
marine, every German warship, every German a^ship 
and aeroplane, and every German merchantman, carry- 
ing every available German soldier, took part? A 
week or two ago, we were somewhat startled to findjthat 
])reparations seemed to have been made for meetmg a 
laid of small dimensions. It would have to be something 
far more- ambitious that would be worth attempting 
and, iniiriitcsimal as its prospects of success may seem, 
it is to be remembered that where people are desperate 
there may be no limit to the hazards they will face. 
Certainly if such an attack Were attempted, it would 
manifestly be the duty of the Grand Fleet to prove itself 
the "sure shield" of these islands, and it is probable 
that it could only take its share in their defence at a risk 
from mines and other forms of under-water attack, com- 
pared with which the destroyer menace at Jutland was 
negligible. Would it mtan little to us in such circum- 
stances to know that, if a dozen of our greatest ships 
were lost, there were a dozen American ships of equal 
fighting strength available to take their place ? Pressing, 
then, as is the need of defence against submarines, it is 
conceivable that there may be other needs more pressing 
still, and that the American Fleet might have a great and 
decisive role in helping the Allies in the North Sea. 
The Chief Command 
The very uncertainty as to which is the best use 
to which America's only complete military force can be 
put, emphasises what is, after all, the main question in 
considering the value of any military force. Just as it 
is a profound mistake to estimate the worth of America's 
intervention solely by her possible direct military ser- 
vices, so is it a profound mistake to estimate the value 
of the American navy solely by enumerating the ships 
and the details of their armaments, armour and speed. 
The vahie of the American fleet will depend entirelv 
upon the quality of mind and resolution with which 
It IS commanded and directed. Of the efficiency of 
each ship we need hardly be in doubt. But . as we know to 
our cost, officers and crews mav be of the highest merit 
and of the greatest courage and gallantrv and ^■et be cruellv 
mishandiea auu misused by the Higher Command. 
In nothing do the new navies of to-day dift'er from the 
old more than this ; that the change in malerid has made 
a new technique of naval fighting necessary, and so made a 
new element in its supreme direction necessary that 
was not necessary before. For this new technique is 
the possession of the young and not of the old, and 
central' naval administration is generally in the hands 
of the older men. They nejid therefore an organisation 
at the head to check tlieir decisions. Our own naval 
misfortunes derive solely from the fact that the know- 
ledge of how naval weapons should be used — possessed 
amply by the service — -was not shared by the Chief Com- 
mand at Whitehall. 
The American Naval Department was until recently 
organised on the ba,sis of the Secretary solely being 
responsible for everything. The work of preparing and 
administering to the fleet was divided amongst eight 
bureaus, each under a separate chief, each working with 
out reference to the rest, each responsible for its own 
work to the Secretary. Last year, this system was 
modified by a special extension of the powers of the chief 
of the Secretary's naval advisers. But the changes made, 
though significant, were not drastic, and it still remains 
true that the ultimate control of this great military 
weapon is in the hands of one member of the President's 
Cabinet, who, in turn, i? responsible to the President 
only. There is thus in the Chief Naval Conunand no 
presumption of any necessary deference to professional 
opinion, such as in theory there is here. We know, of 
course, that in fact the responsibility of the Board of 
Admiralty did not exist in the crucial first year of this 
war. But in theory it did. And the point" is that the 
Arnerican Navy Department is free even of the theory. 
In the \\'ar of Independence, as Captain Mahan points 
out, the accidental appointment of an ex-naval officer 
to assist the Secretary did ensure naval policy being in 
consonance with the expert naval opinion. The accident 
was a fortunate one, and the thing was possible only be- 
cause Mr. Fox was. a man of rare genius and because 
naval materiel had made no such advance, since his train- 
ing ceased, as made him unfamiliar with the employment 
of the weapons of the day. No such fortuitous help is to 
be expected now, and everything, therefore, will depend 
upon how professional and lay talent are combined at the 
present junctuije. 
The interesting suggestion has been made that the 
President should appoint a national cabinet with Senator 
Root as Secretary of State, General Leonard Wood as 
Secretary of War, and Admiral Bradley Fiske as Secretarv; 
for the Navy. Admiral Fiske's qualifications for the post 
are acknowledged and undeniable. He is one of the 
rare exceptions to the rule that modern technique is the 
property of the young only But the difficulties, of 
putting him into Mr. Daniels's position are hardly less 
obvious. He was at one time Mr. Daniels's chief naval 
adviser, and they parted with grave differences of opinion 
as to naval policy. Mr. Daniels too, who is a man of very 
great ability, of singular personal charm, and of 
lofty principle, has provoked more personal attacks 
from political opponents than any other member of 
Mr. Wilson's Government. And Mr. Wilson is not 
the kind of man to present his antagonists with the 
kind of victory that would be implied by the Secretary's 
supersession. Still, .something will certainly have to be 
done and it is possible that a solution may be found 
in some further extension of the powers of the Secretary's 
aides for operations, and so the reform be achieved liot 
by a change of persons but by a change of system. 
Arthur Pollen. 
We regret to announce the death of Mr. John Robertson, 
one of the greatest gunmakers of his generation. A quarter 
of a century ago he acquired the well-known firm of Boss 
and Co., and gave to their sporting guns and rifles an out- 
standing reputation. For Mr. Robertson was not only a 
thoroughly practical workman, but blest with originality 
and initiative, and was constantly experimenting in order to 
produce the very best weapon possible. During the last 
two and half years he has utihsed his exceptional experience 
in the construction of military arms. The late Mr. Kohertson 
was in his se\-enty-eighrh year. He has left behind him 
son* interested in the firm of Ross and Co., and the reputation 
which their father built up is safe in their hands. 
