LAND & WATER 
April 
UJ17 
The Battle of Arras 
By Hilaire Belloc 
THE launching of the fust great Allied offensive 
of this year has fallen at such a time in the week 
that it is unfortunately impossible to deal with 
at all thorouglily in the presenOmunbcr of Land 
cS: WaiI'K. The advance following the preliminary 
bombardment took place just at davvji of Monday last, 
and the operations of this tirst day alone, the Monday, 
are known in London at the moment of writing. They 
arc covered by two despatches received from Sir Douglas 
Haig, the one sent just before mid-day of the Monday, 
the other on Monday evenuig, and any analysis of the 
position will be impossible until it has further developed. 
What we can do, after very briefly describing the general 
situation (with which I think most opinion in this country 
is already fairly familiar) , is to analyse in some detail the 
position known as the Vimy Ridge", the capture of which 
on Monday was by far the main feature of the operation, 
and upon "the retention of and progress from which every- 
thing \\'ill depend. 
The general position which makes an offensive in this 
particular region of such higli, strategic \alue, is that 
which we have been following uninterruptedly for nearly 
two months since the (Germans were first shaken back 
towards the Bapaume Kidge. A straightening of their 
line, which eliminated the Noyon sahent, took them back 
to positions running more or less directly from the eastern 
suburbs of Arras to the Aisne above Soissons. 
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^ These two points, the region of Laon and the old trenches 
still maintained in front of Arras were the two points of 
junction between the new line and the old. These 
points of junction were the two links upon wliicli the 
whole of what may be called from its central i)oint the 
St. Quentin line, depended. The advance of the Allies 
over the destroyed belt of the German retirement pro\cd 
more rapid than the enemy had alIo^ved for. The French 
pushed forward to the Oise above La Fere and came 
within Fange of St. Quentin in (piite the first few days. 
The British, who were hampered by the impossible 
ground of the Somme battle, came into line later, but 
brought up their heavy pieces and the munitionment 
for them at an astonishingly rapid rate, considering the 
circumstances. This rapidity of ad\ance prevented the 
enemy's line from settling. It kept it, as the term goes, 
" lluid." Every day the enem\' lost some new set of 
his advance positions and the Allied progress, though 
slow, was uninterrupted. 
The consequence of this was that the (iermans were 
compelled to concentrate local reserves upon special 
points of the line which they saw to be of capital im- 
})ortance, to make counter-attacks at some e.vpense, and, 
in general, to draw down uj)on this new line more men 
and guns than the original calculation Iiad allowed for. 
This was particularly true of the region of St. Quentin, 
and as the battle for that exceedingly important nodal 
point developed it is clear that the enemy was compelled 
to send to it a greater and a greater number of men. 
There came a moment at which the effect of this " blister " 
gave an opportunity for action elsewhere, and at that 
moment the strong offensive action in front of Arras was 
launihed. In other words, a blow was struck at the 
northern junction-link of the new line. 
The thing, of course, had been of long preparation ; 
it had not escaped the enemy's knowledge, and the in- 
tensive bombardment of Saturday and Sunday last, 
which was only the culminating point of the artillery 
preparation, was a direct announcement of what was 
coming. But in all this trench warfare the apparent 
absence of an element of surprise is counterbalanced, as 
we have often had occasion to show in these columns, by 
the power to exert superior pressure. The enemy knew 
perfectly well, of course, that the threat to the St. Quentin 
lines was not the only menace under which he lived, and 
that his concentration to save them would necessarily 
expose him to attack elsewhere. But he had no choice 
in the matter. He could not afford to lose his centre of 
St. Quentin. He must concentrate there and run the 
risk of his links standing the strain elsewhere. The 
whole interest of the present movement is the experience 
whether the northern link at present attacked will hold 
or no. And the answer to that question turns, for reasons 
that will be apparent in a moment, very largely upon 
the retention of, and progress from, the Vimy Ridge. 
The Vimy Ridge 
It is a matter of common knowledge that the 'Vimy 
Ridge has been properly regarded by the enemy through- 
out all these two and a half years as one of the capital 
points upon his whole western line. This position has 
been at once the main objective of three great Allied 
movements made with the object of seizing it, and the 
main test in the enemy's mind of his power to hold. He 
has attached to it a x-aXwt and measured that value in an 
expense of men not paralleled upon any other point 
between the North Sea and the Alps. 
The first great effort made by the French to shake off 
the German hold upon this height was made almost 
exactly two years ago in the late winter and spring of 
1915. It gave the Allies the height called after the 
Chapel of N. D. de Lorette, which is slightly higher 
than the 'Vimy Ridge, and stands Jto the west of it, 
and it gave them certain very strong positions in the 
dejjrcssion between the two hills. But it failed to carry 
the Vimy Ridge itself. The French attack was held up 
in the depression after carrying a portion of the very 
strongly defended area called the Labyrinth. It did 
not ]>rogress on to the opposing slope. 
We may here pause to remark that the cause of the 
check was tiiat imi\ersal one with which all of us are now 
familiar, the disproportion between the mechanical 
advantages of the enemy and of the Allies throughout the 
earlier part of the war. The older civilisation of the 
West had not yet de\cloped its enormous resources 
as it has now developed them. Its number of pieces, its 
