April 12, lOi^ 
LAND & WATER 
accumulation of munitionment for them, their cahbre — 
indeed, all the mechanical side of war still found them at 
a disadvantage compared with the encmj', although they 
liad succeeded i)y the victory of the Marne in pinning 
liim to earth. 
The second great attack upon this vital point was that 
of the autumn of i()i5, coincident with the great English 
effort at Loos and the French attack in Champagne. 
This effort reached the summit of the Vimy Ridge at 
rcrtain points, but failed to obtain any complete grasp 
of the whole positions, and even such success as it did 
attain was followed by the most furious efforts of the 
enemy to recover the whole of the advantage which he 
had partially lost. He did not succeed in that complete 
recovery. The end of his counter-efforts still found the 
Vimy Ridge just bitten into by the French lines, and 
there were observation points, if I am not mistaken, 
from which the French observers could just see eastward 
over the hill as long as their occupation of these 
trenches continued. 
After this portion of the line had been taken over by 
the British the enemy, rather more than eleven months 
ago, launched a very violent effort for the recovery of the 
whole ridge and succeeded. He has been in possession 
of it ever since the end of May 1916. 
All this is past history and no more than a preparation 
for the great struggle w'hich we are now witnessing, but 
it serves to emphasise the very high value which both 
sides have set to so very critical a piece of ground. 
Iri order to understand what value the position has, 
we must next proceed to describe it in some detail, with a 
particular note of its contours and soil. 
The Vimy Ridge is the last promontory and cape of 
those chalk hills which stretch down southward from the 
Channel right to this point. The rise to it from the 
west and the south is gradual ; it is also bare, so that 
there is an excellent field of fire against an advancing 
enemy. The fall from it to the north and to the cast 
is very rapid and this gives it a peculiar value in obser- 
vation. From the gap where the little Carency brook 
and, as it is later called, the Souchez river, flows through 
between the height of Notre Dame de Lorette and the 
northern edge of the Vimy Ridge down to its southern 
point above Bailleul (not the Bailleul familiar to British 
soldiers further north, but another village bearing that 
common name), the escarpment runs for five English 
miles like a wall, and overlooks by a little more than 
200 feet the great dull plain, or rather basin, of Lens, 
which is a mass of coal pits and industrialism such as we 
know in Southern Lancashire. 
This Vimy Ridge is not, of course, absolutely even. 
It has two prolonged summits ; the first, on the north 
is called after the farm of La Folic ; it is highest at its 
extreme northern end, where point 145 was held by the 
Germans last Monday long after the rest of the ridge 
had fallen ; the second summit is called after the tele- 
graph, that is the old semaphore post upon it. The 
two between them take up something like half the length 
of the ridge. Between them runs the great Roman 
road which shoots out northward from Arras to Belgium ; 
going over a very slight saddle upon the ridge, while the 
village of Vimy, from which the whole formation takes 
its name, lies on the plain below. Upon the escarpment 
or slope leading down to the plain there is a certain 
amount of wood, by this time very heavily knocked 
about, and not interfering at all with the view. The 
possession of the Vimy Ridge, therefore, gives complete 
observation ovei" the whole basin of Lens, northwards 
and eastwards. Southwards and eastwards it gives com- 
plete observation over the plain of the Scarpe river, and 
in clear weather one can even see, almost due eastward 
from Telegraph Hill, the lump of houses which is Douai. 
Now the value of the Vimy Ridge in the present con- 
dition of the Western, war may be summed up in three 
statements : It is of chalk (and the last bit of chalk for 
a long way). It is exceedingly valuable for observation 
(and the last piece of abrupt high ground of the sort for 
several days' march), and it is the one piece of strong 
ground defending the northern -pivot or jtmction-link of 
the new line ivhich the Germans are attempting to hold. 
All the strategical value of the Vimv Ridge lies in 
those three points — but they are considerable. 
The fact that the wall of hills 4s of chalk means that 
it is dry, very easily worked for profound defensive 
formations, with very warm, well-drained dug-outs, etc.; 
and drained at once everywhere by nature. The only 
drawback of field works upon this sort of formation is 
the conspicuous way in which the trenches stand out in 
white against the general soil. But that has long ceased 
to be of the importance it was before photography from 
the air was originated by the Allies. 
But this is the least of the three points ; of much 
more importance was observation. The value of direct 
observation in this war has been perpetually insisted 
on and is now of common knowledge. Such ob- 
servation at close quarters is immensely aided by the 
possession of ground higher than that which one's enemy 
occupies. For distant observation the various forms 
of flying machines and stationary gas balloons are 
more relied upon, and observation, of course, is the 
determinant of eft'ective artillery work, especially with 
the heavy pieces at long range. Biit an abrupt wall of 
considerable height gives observation of a general value 
far exceeding the direct value of immediate observation 
upon positions close at hand. You watch from it in 
security all movements by day over the plain at your feet. 
You see the movements of trains and even of columns. 
You have an asset of a dift'erent kind from that which 
is given even from aeroplane photographs. 
But the last point is by far the most important of all. 
The Vimy Ridge, if it be retained, and used as a- line from 
which further extension can be made, is vital to the 
Northern junction-link upon the holding of which the 
whole security of the Arras-St. Quentin-Laon line 
depends. ' , 
If that link can be broken or shaken the whole of the 
line which we call to-day the St. Ouentin line, goes, and 
that is the real'meaning of the attack. Subsidiarily, the 
attack as it progresses creates a very dangerous salient for 
the enemy all round Lens, and Lens is the centre of a vast 
coalpit which it is of real economic value for the enemy 
to maintain. Again, progress here ultimately threafens 
Lille behind Lens and the political and economic ad- 
vantage of holding Lille is obvious. But the chief value 
of the .\rras region as a point of attack is this junction 
which the new (ierman line here makes with the old. 
So long as the enemy held Vimy Ridge progress to the 
south of it along the great roads from Arras to Cambrai 
and Douai was impossible. But progress along those 
roads (as at A in Map 1), ii it could be achieved would 
do two things. It , would ultimately bring the great 
trunk railway line, St. Ouentin, Cambrai, Douai, Lille, 
under fire, and it would immediately create a sharp 
