LAND & WATER 
April 12, T017 
flank on the line south of Arras and compel its abandon- 
ment. Since surli progress could not be achieved with 
the strong point of Viniy Kidge in enemy hands, that 
l)iece of, ground was tlie liinge upon wliich all effort in 
front of Arras nuist turn. 
The point, then, is in every sense critical, and a success- 
ful attack upon it would be locally decisive. It would 
compel -a general retreat. The enemy has a prepared 
line some way back covering Douai and Lille itself. But 
thatJine is not one to which he can retire in security under 
a vigorous pressure. He will do everything he can to 
maintain himself where he is, and if he loses the Vimy 
j)ositions and a further belt of a few miles behind, he must 
go back altogether. 
Finally, let us remember that success or failure is 
much less to be judged by contours and ground than by 
material and moral. It is a siege war. It dejX'uds upon 
destroying and advancing over works which, though called 
field works, are miich stronger under modern conditions 
than the old permanent works of the past. (Jur power so 
to destroy them and to advance over them depends en- 
tirely upon those two factors : the moral value of the 
infantry as compared with the enemy's, and the mechanical 
superiority given by the now prodigio\is output of muni- 
tionment and pieces and indeed of ever\r form of material. 
For two years — up to the Somme offensive— we lacked the 
required superiority in material, though the moral 
superiority was assured. That material superiority has 
increased very largely since the Somme ofiensive began 
nine months ago, and the Alliance is trusting in this for 
other ofiensive work which we arc imdertaking upon the 
West, and upon the fact that it has now reached and 
passed what was for long the only asset of the en'emy 
against it, liis superior production of machines. 
The Turkish Retreat 
The escape of the two Turkish divisions which had been 
sent up into Persia from the base of Hagdad after the 
capture of Kut last yea.v is now certain, \\ith the ex- 
ception of a fraction who were away in' the north at 
Sihna and were driven by the Russians back into the 
hills with the almost certain loss of what guns they may 
liave had, this force has escaped, and the better part of 
tlie two divisions are now upon their way to safety. The 
whole mass of them must be by this time at Kirkuk or 
(•\en beyond. The nature of this escape and the con- 
dition which made it possible we are now able to describe 
in some detail according to the accounts which ha\ e 
reached us from this front during the past week. 
The enemy's successful operations took place during 
the last week of March. The Russian force, of which we 
do not know the precise composition, but which we know 
to ha\-e been a weak one and mainly composed of cavalry, 
had followed up the Turkish retirement as far as Karind 
and had occupied that town though the enemy had partly 
destroyed it in his retirement. Meanwhile they had in 
front of them the Pass which separates the basin of the 
Diala and that of the Karun. The torrent which falls 
through the \allev of Karind and bears the same name 
as that town is an uHimate tributary of the great Karun 
river which does not reach the Mesopotamian \alley 
until a point close to the Persian Gulf. The Alvvand 
Torrent,which is a tributary of the Diala, rises immediately 
on the other side of the "divide, and the pass or saddle 
between the t*-o sources' is known as the Piatak Pass 
from the name of the village which lies at its foot on 
the northern side. This Pass is not very steep or rugged. 
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nor very high compared with the ground immediately 
below it upon either side, but it is well suited for defence, 
especially against a comparatively small force, because 
it cannot be turned save by a ^'ery wide sweep round 
through difficult mountains. Upon either side of it 
and towering above it rise the parallel ridges of the ' 
Karind range to the north and^ the Kulhinua to the 
south, the first nearly 1,300 feet, the second nearlv 
3,000 feet above the saddle. The Turks, therefore, left 
a strong rearguard upon the Piatak and behind that 
screen retired the mass of their forces down the Alvvand 
valley through Kasrishirin to Khanikin. 
Meanwhile, the force which General Maude had detached 
from his main body at Bagdad and pushed up the Persian 
road, was held up two days' march south of Khanikin 
by another Turkish flank guard which jxirformed against 
.the British for the general retirement of the Turkish 
army the same function as the rearguard at Piatak was 
performing against the Russians. It acted as a screen 
behind w^hich the main operation of the enemy could be 
conducted in security. 
The condition which enabled the Turks to establish 
this screen in the shape of a flank guard agamst the 
British was the ridge known as the Hamrin Hills. - 
This ridge runs perpendicular to the Diala, which cuts 
through it by a rather narrow gate at Mansurie, two 
full days' march north of Bakuba. This ridge was held in 
force by the Turks upon either side of the Diala and 
could not be captured by a detachment of the strength 
which General Maude had sent into this region. The 
Turks seem, according to the accounts received, to be 
particularly well provided with artillery upon these hills 
which rise abruptly from the plain, especiall}- upon the 
eastern side of the river. They are even reported to 
have held the position with something like a third of 
their total forces. 
While these two screens, the rearguard at Piatak and the 
flank guard on the Hamrin Hills were thus shielding 
the main operation of the enemv, that operation pro- 
ceeded apparently in good order and, unfortimately for 
us, with complete success. A pontoon bridge was tlirown 
across the Diala where the Alwand torrent joins it 
about 10 miles above Kizil-Robat. By this bridge the 
guns and wagons crossed while the infantry w-ere ferried 
across separately in boats. The Diala is here quite a 
formidable obstacle, deep, swift, and xmfordable, but 
there was no one to put that obstacle to its value beOausc 
the Hamrin Hills prevented any approach to it. 
When the mass of Turkish 'forces had thus got across 
the river they found themselves upon a circular enclosed 
plain about ten miles wide, along the further side of 
which ran the main road and telegraph line through 
Kifri to Kirkuk (see Map III.), a very considerable town 
well out of reach of the British operations and now 
probably the base from which any further concentration 
of the enemy against the British advance from Bagdad 
will take place. It was presumably when the mass of 
the Turkish force had reached this high road near Karatepe 
that the screens began falhng back. The Piatak Pass 
was abandoned and the Turkish rearguard there made 
a very rapid retreat down the main road and across 
the river in oerhaos thrpo forced marches, while the men 
