April 12, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
about the same proportion in cruisers from three to five 
knots faster. But of the cruisers really useful for ifeet 
purposes, that is, vessels fifty per cent, faster than battle- 
ships, we had but one cruiser to two battleships.' This 
deficiency we, of course, to some extent, made up with 
destroyers. A£;ain, coiuiting in the oldest of those built, 
we had in 1014 seven destroyers for every capital ship. 
Putting then all light craft together we nught say that 
for e\'ery two battleships we had three slow cruisers, two 
a trifle faster than the battleships, two twenty-five per 
cent, faster, one fifty per cent, faster, and fourteen 
destroyers. Half of these would be twenty-seven knots 
or less, but others would run from thirty to thirty-five. 
If we take the completed American I'leet as it stands 
to-day, to the fourteen first-class battleships there are 
only twenty-eight cruisers of all classes, and only three 
of these have ever had a speed of twenty-five knots, and 
they are oldish ships now, and ten of them belong to 
that quite useless breed, the armoured-cruiser class. 
Of destroyers there are thirty-eight in the commissioned 
fleet, eleven with nucleus crews ; twenty in the second 
reserve, and one out of commission, making seventy in 
all. Thus, while we had four cruisers and seven 
destroyers to every battleship, the Americans have two 
cruisers and five destroyers. What would have 
been the value of t.ie thirty-eight coast and fleet sub- 
marines, could that be represented to-day by fast light 
cruisers or by ocean-going anti-submarine patrols ? 
The great programme of 1916 was intended to include 
four scout cruisers of very high speed indeed. In these 
were particularly emphasised the ocean-going and fuel 
endurance qualities exacted by American conditions. 
To be equal to high seas work and to run the required 
distances at the necessary speed, these were to have been 
of a displacement necessitating an outlay of over 
£1,000,000 apiece. Compare this ^yith the £250,000 
to £300,000 spent by this country and Germany on the 
typical fast cruisers needed for North Sea work. It 
is not extraordinary that this type has proved so exacting 
to the firms asked to tender for it, that so far, not a single 
acceptable tender has been made for one of them. It 
remains then that the strength of the American Navy 
lies in its capital ships and its weakness in its want of 
fast light craft of all descriptions. 
Not in full commission there are the ten pre-Dread- 
nought battleships, vessels individually more powerful 
than any European pre-Dreadnoughts, excepting possibly 
the Kin^ Edward class, seven armoured and ten other 
cruisers, eleven destroyers, and a few various. In the 
second reserve are one cruiser, the twenty destroyers 
already mentioned, and a dozen torpedo boats. There 
are finally a few battleships, cruisers, torpedo boats, 
gunboats, converted yachts, etc., not commissioned at 
all and probably quite useless for fighting purposes ; but 
for many of them no doubt patrol service or other work 
of the kind can be found. 
Personnel 
Next to the poverty in light craft, the greatest weak- 
ness of the American Navy is lack of numbers in per- 
sonnel. Mr. Daniels has stated that to put every 
usefulship which the United States possesses into full 
commission, the Department would need nearly one 
thousand more officers, over nine thousand more regular 
seamen and other ratings, and over twenty-three thou- 
sand reserves, after drawing upon nine thousand militia 
and such fleet reserves as exist. This is a shortage 
which obviously must increase with every ship com- 
missioned to meet the exigencies of the war. In other 
words, America's entry into the war will bring about 
another drain on the trained officers and trained men of 
the merchant marine. But it is not these alone who 
will be drawn in. One of the fortunate results of 
America's colossal advance in wealth in the last two de- 
cades has been the possibility this wealth has given to its 
very sporting-minded people to indulge' in the sport of 
yachting. We all know how the yachtsmen in these 
islands have applied for commissions both in the Naval 
Volunteer Reserve and in the Royal Naval Reserve. 
And to some is known the amazingly excellent work 
that these self-trained seamen have done. It would be 
surprising if the yachtsmen of America, being very much 
more numerous, do not volunteer in vorv much larger 
numbers and thus supply an immediate reinforcement 
to the depleted ranks of navy trained officers. Then 
there is also a very large coastal trade, whose personnel 
can, without serieus national loss, be diverted to war 
purposes. Above all, we must reiriember that there is no 
naticm which contains so large a number of young and 
middle-aged men accustomed from almost earliest 
manhood to try first one calling and then another, so 
that the reserve of men with a great versatility of accom- 
plishments, and thus easily trained to" new duties, is 
greater there than in any other community. 
The Greatest Asset 
If these are the American Navy's worst shortcomings, 
its greatest asset is untjuestionably the high spirit and 
the equally high professional attainments of its officers 
and trained men. In no navy are the three elements, 
practice, scientific theory and naval doctrine more 
sedulously cultivated. And it is distinctly fortunate 
that the command of the Atlantic Fleet should now be 
in the hands of so good a type of officer as Admiral 
Mayo. Admiral Mayo was born in December 1836, and, 
according to our standards we are inclined to think an 
admiral in his sixty-second year rather old for his job. 
Our own Commander-in-Chief is, if I mistake not, about 
twenty years younger. And in this matter Admiral 
Mayo is in every respect an exceptional man. He has 
the eye, the carriage, the mind, and the manner of one 
a little more than half his age. It is not that he lacks the 
knowledge and -authority which only long experience 
can give. It is more that these are employed with a 
swift decision and command — and these do not always 
survive length of years. The American Navy is not 
likely to forget that in 1914, when the Mexicans offered 
an affront to " Old Glory," the present Commander- 
in-Chief — then a rear-admiral and third in rank in the 
Atlantic Fleet — delivered an instant ultimatum and, 
when his conditions were not fulfilled, proceeded to 
execute his threat — the first without asking for authority 
from Washington, and the second without waiting for 
its confirmation. All this was in the palmy days when 
Mr. Bryan was Secretary of State, fortunately before a 
large section of the American public had got so accus- 
tomed to their fellow aliens being murdered as to be 
incapable of any generous pride in national dignity. 
Admiral Mayo had hardly acted before immediate 
pressure was brought to bear upon the Navy Department 
to punish him for his unhesitating initiative by removal 
from the command. But the opinion of the Naval 
Service, backed by the pubhc, was too strong for those 
timorous pacifists and the Admiral was left where he 
was. He has duly passed from third to second and 
now to the chief command. 
In his younger days the Admiral was a noted navigator 
— in a sense the only specialised branch in the American 
Navy. He saw, I believe, no fighting in the Spanish 
War, being then in command of a gunboat — the Ben- 
nington, a vessel of about 1,700 tons, on the Pacific coast ; 
so that it is to be assumed that he. never came under 
Admiral Dewey's command, nor was engaged in any of 
the primary operations in the actual field of war. He first 
Hew his pennant in the Albany — this also on the West 
coast — and it is not without interest that it was while he 
was her captain this vessel carried off the gunnery trophy 
of that section of the fleet. In the armoured cruiser 
' California he is reputed to have had the happiest, 
because the smartest ship, in the American Service. 
His secret, it is ^.aid, lay in working both his officers and 
his men to the very limit of their capacity and delighting 
them by their discovery that it was so far greater than 
they supposed. It is a thing that can only be done by 
those who are born organisers, who know exactly what 
should be done and how it should he done, so that while 
the effort is continuous and unrelenting no effort is 
wasted. It was one of his officers who said that if he 
was an exacting captain, in nothing was he more exacting 
than in his example. Born governors and leaders of 
men like this are rare. But amongst them it is not un- 
usual to find that an insistence upon the most precise 
discipline, and the most meticulous obedience go hand 
in hand with an extraordinary personal kindness and 
affability. Admiral Mayo is said to be the most accessible 
man in his fleet, if anything, more at home in the com- 
