TO 
LAND & WATKR 
April 12, 1917 
pany ot the young than of the old. full of good stories, 
\ery ready with sympatliy and witli a weakness for 
j'igarettes. His connnands alloat haw bet'u \ariod 1)\' 
two short spells of shori- duty in the Naval ^'ard at 
Mare Island, and one short course at the War College, 
Newport. But his relations [with that centre of iia\al 
tliought has not been limited to this. 
The American War J department have wisely placed the 
War College at the headquarters of the sea-going fleet, 
and between both the authorities and the students of 
the College and the officers of the l-'leet afloat, the inter- 
change of ideas has been as constant as it must prove 
to Ik! fruitful. Particularly has this been the case with 
the flag officers of the l^leet and the chiefs of the College. 
The Commander-in-Chief, therefore, enters on the most 
momentous command any American sea officer has 
held since the days of Farragut, in thorough touch with 
the outcome of the best organised centre of naval studies 
in the world. It is no small thing for a man to know the 
best thought of his time. Perhaps it is only in a country 
like America where junior officers can express themselves 
with the completest freedom and independence, not only 
without fear of offence, but with the certainty that all 
sincere c(jiitributions to clear thinking will l)e welcomed 
and examined, that this advantage can exist. But that 
it is an advantage can hardly be disputed. And this 
too. must be remembered. The American Commander- 
in-Chief is not merely the recipient or partaker in the 
advanced thought of a centre specially devoted to think- 
ing and to study. The conjunction at Newport of the 
hTeet Headquarters and the Naval College makes the 
officers of his own Fleet perhaps the principal contri- 
butories to the deposit of thought to which I allude. 
It means, then, that there is a Commander-in-Chief with 
a following to a large extent inspired and informed by a 
common doctrine of war — a state of affairs we have never 
attempted to bring about in this countiy in peace — 
though do\ibtless we are liaving it forced upon us in 
war. .\nd this being the state of affairs in the American 
Fleet, it will be surprising if its cmplovment is not marked 
both by originality and effect. 
Arthur Pollen 
In the Spring of 1917 
By H. Bidou 
Professor Bidou is the dislinguished French mililary 
critic, who cotttribuies regularly to tlje " Journal dcs 
Debuts." This article was written for the Western 
Armies special number of " Land and Water," but 
was unfortunately delayed in the post. 
THERE is a popular saying in France that " one 
can't see the wood because of the trees." In 
the same way ojie cannot see the general progress 
of the war becatise of the daily fighting. Yet in 
the conflict of nations in arms it is only the general 
progress that matters. The old terms, victory and 
tlefeat, have lost their meaning ; the war is a total sum 
of advantages and reverses which ultimately will place 
one of the antagonists in a position of inferiority. 
The general march of events is matter of common 
knowledge. There are only two means by which the 
jnass of the Central Powers, beset on all sides, can emerge 
\ictorionsly from the war : the first is by dissolving by 
political measures the. coalition which has been formed 
all round it ; the second is by defeating its enemies 
separately, one after the other, in successive theatres 
of the war. It is also possible to contemplate the con- 
tingency of its displaying such obstinate resistance, 
and exercising that resistance so economically, that the 
whole world would be worn out by it and grow tired of 
attacking it ; in that case, the war would come to an end 
with a period of decreasing military activity, marked by 
battles occurring at ever longer interx'als and of ever 
less and less importance. 
Almost all the great wars of the old style came to an 
end like this. The wars of the Spanish and the Austrian 
Succession, the Seven Years' War and many others 
dragged on and on and their last years were marked 
by no decisive operations. In this case, the conqueror 
loses much of the benefit of his \ictory. A strikmg 
instance of this is furnished by the War of the Spanish 
Succession, in which Louis XIV. was much less decidedly' 
beaten in 1713 than he had been in 1706, although in the 
meantime there had been almost no engagements of the 
first rank. In the present instance, and from the military 
])oint of view exclusively, it would be much to Germany's 
interest to end the war by creeping jiaralysis of this kind. 
There remain the two other means ; the first — namely, 
the dissolution of the hostile coalition by political devices, 
does not enter into the military domain, and we need not 
discuss it here. The other — namely, defeat of each 
adversary separately and successively, has been the 
great means adopted by (lermany. 
The initial plan was to crush l-Vance before Russia 
or Iingland could take the field in their full strength. 
This plan was checked first at the Marne in Septemfjer, 
1914, and finally sj^)oiled before Ypres, on November 
12th. (iermany then tried a second plan, the precise 
opposite of the first one — namely, to crush Russia, while 
remaining on the defensive in the West. This plan. 
which opened with the battle of Gorlicz on April 30th, 
1915, gave no decisive result ; the Russians, however, 
were thrown back to the Riga-Czerno\ itz line. Germany 
then reverted to her first plan, of crushing France. But 
now time was pressing ; for on the one hand, the British 
armies were increasing to a formidable extent, and, on 
the other, the resources of the Central Powers were 
becoming exhausted. She had quadrupled the number 
of divisions with which she began, but there was need 
for her now to make haste. Hence the Battle of Verdun. 
The resistance of the French at Verdun spoiled the 
third German plan. On July 12th, General Nivelle 
officially declared that the attempt had cost the enemy 
500,000 men ; and in addition, it had failed to 
jjrevent what Germany feared above all : the combined 
offensive of the Allies. 
Throughout, the Allies had tried to co-ordinate their 
efforts. In the beginning of the war Russia, with the 
object of relieving France, threw Samsonoff's and 
Rennenkampf's armies against East Prussia. In Maj', 
1915, when Russia was hard pressed in her turn, France 
and England launched the battle of Artois, on the 9th. 
On the 23rd, Italy entered the lists, immediately drawing 
upon her front 200 Austrian battalions instead of the 
45 that were there before. The Russian campaign in 
Armenia, at the beginning of 1916, had helped to paralyse 
the menace against England in the East. At the time 
of the Battle of Verdun, Russia again took the offensive, 
in March, in the region of Lake Narotch. But all these 
were but first attempts at co-ordination. The combined 
offensive of the summer of 1916 was to have a very much 
larger scope. But it is easy to see that that again was 
very far from perfect. The entry into the field of the 
^•arious Allied armies was echeloned over three months : 
obviously an excessive time. 
Nevertheless, towards the middle of August, 1916, the 
situation of the Central Empires was extremely critical. 
Austria-Hungary had not a single other fresh division 
to bring into the line, and in order to defend the Zlota 
Lipa it was necessary to bring the 15th Turkish Corps 
to Galicia. On the Somme front the German divisions 
were wasting rapidly. Of a total number of 128 divisions 
engaged on the Western Front it was necessary to place 
113 between Gommecourt and Chaulnes. But it was 
too late. One by one the Allied offensives came to an 
end by exhaustion ; the Russian offensive terminated 
at the end of August ; the Somme offensive in the middle 
of September ; the Roumanian offensive was crushed 
and Bukarest was taken on December 6th. 
The summer campaign of 1916 may therefore be 
regarded as the still uncompleted trial of a manoeuvre 
which, very far from perfect as it was, placed the Central 
Powers in the most cruel difficulties. The 1917 cam- 
paign must be a manoeuvre of a similar nature, but ordered 
with a precision which will double its force and with 
nuich more formidable means. The increase of the 
