y\pril 19, T917 
LAND & WATER 
marked by another bound forward which gave tlie British 
occupation of Fampoux, and this action, upon, which not 
sufficient stress has been ilaid, had a very great tactical im- 
portance. We liavc already seen that at once the test and 
the core of the action was the Valk>y of the Scarpe, and this 
occupation of I'ampoux down that valley in the course of 
the second day, Tuesday, was the proof of how far things 
had gone. It would never ha\'e been possible, save for the 
holding of the Vimy Kidge, but the Vimy Ridge once held, 
the valley below was oix?n, and Fami)oux dug a great dent, 
more than 5,000 yards deep, into the whole German line. It 
flanked the height of Monchv ; it passed the axis of the Vimy 
Ridge itself and began that bad threat to the Ilindenburg 
Line on the south, into the Lens salient vn the north, which 
we have since seen develop so rapidly. Underneath the 
Vimy Ridge Farbus was taken before nightfall, and the 
line at dark of that Tuesday, April loth, ran from just outside 
Givenchy and Little Vimy, round Farbus and its wood (but 
missing the station, I think), missing Bailleul, and then 
taking a sweep out round Fampoux coming up the Monchy 
heights but missing that village, then sweeping round far 
westward to St. Martin on the River Cojeul, where the old 
Hindenburg Line was reached. 
It will be seen that by this Tuesday evening, what may be 
called the Fampoux advance along the Scarpe, had provided the 
test and measure of success. The Hindenburg Une was now 
defmitely turned and the creation of two dangerous salients 
north and south was effected, with consequences that would 
be immediately apparent in the next few days. There 
remained, however, threatening the point of this Fampoux 
advance from the south, and still solidly in the enemy's 
hands, the small town and hill of Monchy, and until that was 
carried the Scarpe advance could not be called secure. The 
men who had gone through the terrible trial of the first two 
days here lay out in the snow over the Tuesday night prepared 
for the attack upon Monchy on the morrow. They had 
already felt the outskirts of that position and had found it 
very heavily' guarded indeed. 
Before night a general count was made of the prisoners 
now in British hands and of captured guns. The former were 
11,000 in number, including 235 officers; the latter were 
already over 100. But it was certain that there were many 
more guns to come in because reports were continually being 
received of half buried pieces having been come across and 
even of pieces in good condition being on their way back to 
the British lines. 
Wednesday, April, 11th 
Wednesday, April nth, was marked by the carrying 01 
Monchy, which may properly be regarded as the climax of 
the action, after which it remained to reap the fruits of the 
victory. 
Episode of Monchy 
A good test of the truth that the whole operation was one 
of surprise and its result, even in its lirst development, the 
(hsclocation of tJie enemy's plans, is this ])articular episode 
. of Monchy. It was believed by the enemy that Monchy 
could be held and with it the threat to the Scarpe Valley 
held up. The loss of Monchy was destructive to the enemy's 
retention of his fortified system for a long way to the south. 
Monchy in German hands would prevent the British holding 
the jiosition of Fampoux, advanced along the Scarpe, and 
would largely neutralise the advantage of having taken the 
Vimy Ridge. Further, Monchy, wlien lost, gave observation 
over everything that is vital in the approaches to Douai. 
In order to understand this let the reader look at the 
accompanying sketch. 
On this sketch the water levels of the Scarpe and the Sensee 
with its tributary the Cojeul River, are indicated. These 
streams have a very slight fall. Their general level may be 
taken as approximately the same in all the district covered 
by the map, and they form the base line from which heights 
can be counted. If we draw a contour line showng about 
100 English feet above the lowest water levels of this plain, 
and marking the spurs thrown out from the watershed on to 
this plain, those contours will come much as the lines marked 
100 come on the map. If we sliade heights from about 60 
or 70 feet higlier, we get the shaded portions shown on the 
map. It will be seen that tlie spur on which Monchy stands 
is thrust out higher than the rest, right into the plain, giving 
observation to the north by two and four miles away over the 
railway and the road which permit supply from Douai 
and an uninterrupted view all over the plain as from a sort of 
watch-tower : the expanse being diversified, but not hidden 
in any way by the accident of the small hill of Bellone, a 
little lump distinguishable on a clear day to the right of the 
very distant irregularity which is Douai, ten miles off. 
But Monchy has not only this advantage of being tlius 
thrust out towards the plain. It is also higher than anything 
anywhere in its neighbourhood. It overlooks the ground 
from which the British were advancing as well as the ground 
eastward, and it blocks in flank the Scarpe Valley to the 
north. For the summit of its knoll is nearly 240 feet 
above the lowest water levels of the plain, and a good 60 feet 
above the approaches from the west. The little town lies 
covering the summit and sloping down south-eastward from 
it. The Chateau and its park are built on the steep north- 
eastern slope from the summit. It is further evident fhat if 
Monchy could be taken by the British and securely held by 
them everything in its neighbourhood would go. There 
would be created a sharp flank running past Wancourt and 
Heninel, and the salient to the south of it could not be 
maintained. 
The action had been in full progress for two days, all 
Til' 
^LUU ^ne/ntjs III 
Iku7htsabo\^80nwGre3 
Hetgh& above joomefivs 
