April 26, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
organs, that the retirement upon the St. Ouentin line was 
expected thoroiighly " by the (lerman commanders to 
pc^stppne the Allied offensive for many weeks and to restore 
t" themselves a full initiative of attacking where and when 
tliey might •choose. The retreat could not, in the con-' 
caption of the (ierman Higher Command, be followed with 
sufiicient rapiditVito restore the power of offensive action to the 
French and British, and it was to be used for the purpose 
of recovering initiative for the enemy and the inception of a 
war of movement in which the form of battle should be 
decided by themselves. 
But these phra.ses written by men, who had not openly 
acknowledged authority, might always be disavowed by the 
enemy's command, and it might be argued by those who do not 
know how the German Press is worked in such matters, that 
the error was no more than the error of journalists un- 
acquainted with military problems. 
Unfortunately for this view, something or other made the 
Chancellor himself insist upon the pronouncement as official, 
and give it to the world within ten days of \'imy. It was 
actually as late as the 29th of March that Bethman-Hollweg 
told the world that : 
"On the Western front the operation of retirement continues 
according to plan and is giving a lilierty ol action vvliicli in- 
creases .with every day that passes." 
A list of this, sort is exceedingly important and it might 
be indefinitely extended, I believe, by a further seardli through 
the German I'rcss at the time. It enables, us to judge the 
extent and nature of the superiority which the French and 
Jjritish Higher Command have established ; for the great 
test of superiority is the power to impose will. 
With so much quoted from the German Press by way of 
digression to illustrate my point, I will return to the main 
argument. 
We have .seen what the plan of the German retirement 
was. That plan went wrong in s^everal important particulars. 
In the first place tlie retirement had to begin earlier than 
was intended and not quite in the form that was intended. 
There is the clearest possible evidence to show that it was 
intended to pivot ujpon the Bapaume Ridge. The Bapaiime 
Ridge was lost simply because the enemy was shot off it. 
Such wholly new works as were constructed for its defence 
and yet abandoned would never have been constructed upon 
any other theor\'. Further, the enemy had no time to destroy 
the most important of all the areas subjected to his original 
plan — the area iH and around Noyon. It was the most im- 
portant because it was the threshold of the French pursuit and 
a check here would have prevented that pursuit from 
achieving the rapidity it did. 
The riext point in which the plan went wrong was a mis- 
calculation, closely connected with this interference with the 
enemy's time-table, of the rapidity with which the pursuit 
would bo taken up, an error whicli was also supported by a 
miscalculation of the rate at which reconstruction of roads 
and bridges would be possible. 
Lastly, the plan was marred by an error as to the rate 
at which, and perhaps as to the exact places in which, the new 
concentration of men and material would be made for the 
renewed attack. Instead of a respite of two months there 
was no real respite at all, but contmuous fairly hard fighting 
and only an interval of three weeks between the main retire- 
ment and the first great bombardment of the renewed 
offensive. 
To what this last error was due it is difficult to guess. One 
can hardly be'lieve that -the-, enemy was. ignorant of such 
great concentrations us were necessary to the.task undertaken, 
but perhaps one mav suggest an under-valuation of the Allies' 
enormous and increasing resources in nnmiti<mment. Von 
can find out from the air that a concentration is taking place. 
You cannot find out within any degree of accuracy its mag- 
nitude. At any rate, the great offensive began after a fashion 
that clearly showed therGerman forces to be taken. at.a dis- 
advantage by it. The counter-concentration to meet it did 
not develop upon the north until it was too late and, as we 
know, the strongest ■ and pivot position of the northern .end 
of the new line was lost by the Germans to the British in the 
course of Easter week, from the 9th to the 14th of this 
month. 
Against the second blow, which was to come on the other 
limb of the great salient along the front of the Aisne and in 
Champagne, the enemy had prepared a very considerable 
concentration, and was able to put up a proportionately 
strong resistance. Nevertheless, he lost entirely one of his 
key positions (as will be described in a moment), and partially 
lost the second, suffered less in guns by far than, he had 
suffered in the north, but more in prisoners, and altogether 
by the time the second blow was completed he had lost in 
valid prisoners alone, infantry to the equivalent of nearly 
four divisions and guns numbering perhaps an eighth of his 
total original equipment upon these sectors. Before the third 
week of April ivas over the enemy had already clearly begun 
to draw upon his strategic reserve, and that we have compelled 
him so to do at such a date is the capital point of all. 
Now it must honestly be confessed, dull and disappointing 
as the confession is, that the answer to the main question, 
the degree which this process has already reached, cannot 
yet be given. If it could, the process of ascertaining it 
and the proof of the numbers suggested would certainly 
form the thesis of my whole article this week, for it is a point 
of capital importance. But though no doubt there is con- 
siderable evidence already accumulated by the Higher 
Command of the Allies, the moment has not yet come to make 
it public, and therefore we are left unable to give the reply 
which the main question demands. What has been made 
public, liowever, is sufficient to show something of the suction 
that is taking place. For we can tabulate a certain number 
(of necessity much le^ than the total) of new divisional 
movements, that is, of divisions appearing in the line which 
have hitherto been absent, and though we cannot postulate 
as yet that any one t>f these is specifically a portion of the 
strategic reserve that has been formed, we can be certain 
that some considerable portion of the newly-arrived forces 
must have come within the framework of this new reserve. 
Two divisions counter-attacked at Monchy on the third 
.day of the renewed offensive ; four divisions in the main 
effort against the Australians and the centre between Lagni- 
court and the great Havrincourt Wood ; ten da\s later, that 
is, in the fighting of last Monday, at least three new divisions 
had appeared upon one point alone— the Valley of the Scarpe. 
Upon the French front 19 original divisions took the shock 
of the second week ; two fresh divisions counter-attacked on 
the third day of the French battle in the plain just below 
Craonne ; a force of unspecified strength but of at least one 
division counter-attacked on the same day twenty miles or 
more to the east beyond Rheims. On the fourth day of the 
French battle there had already been identified no less than 12 
new German di\-isions arriving to support the imperilled line ; 
