LAND & WATER 
May 3, 191 7 
Wearing Down the Enemy 
By Hilairc Belloc 
THIS 1^ perhaps that moment in the war when tlic 
most critical events are in process of development, 
and when at the same time we have less ability 
than at anv other moment to describe them and 
perhaps less abilit\- to judge them 
We know the elements of the problem -we have known 
then) for many months, and as the oftensive in the West 
develops these known elements are our guide. But there is 
necessarilv wholly concealed from us the principal factor of 
solution- which is the numerical strength of the Allies in the 
West, meaning by this tlieir strength in metal and mobilit\ 
as well as in men. And there is to a great e.xtent concealed 
from us the second factor, which is ilu; proportionate in- 
feriority of the enemy. ' 
Let us re-state the problem in .its simplest terms. It 
involves repetition of very much already said, but a sound 
judgment of land fighting at this moment wlien tlie position 
at sea is so grave, is essential to the balance of public opinion, 
and iteration of the fundamental truths governing the situation 
is necessary and valuable. 
The forces of the Central Empires and their ,\llies are 
necessarily composed of two equal halves. One half is based 
<>n the recruitment of the tierman Kmpire : the other half 
on the remainder of the group. 
The remainder of the group can lend no aid to the German 
Empire in its own front. All the resources of Austria-Hungary 
are pinned ; all those of the Turkish Empire ; all those of 
liulgaria. So long as any effective Russian pressure is kept 
np. so long as Italian pressure is kept up, so long as the 
forces based on Salonika inmiobilise the main part of the 
liidgarian army, so long as the Russians in Armenia and tlie 
liritish in Palestine and Mesopt)tamia contain the Turkish 
divisions. 
These things being so, the German half of the combination, 
which is also the directing half, and has much the best material, 
human and other, at its disposal, must tight its own battle.' 
If the .Alliance against us holds to the end, the decision will 
fall with the power of this (lerman half to hold out. It is the 
action against this German half and its fate which will be, 
decisive 
this (German half may be most usefully regarded under 
the following aspect. It is in two great groups, the army 
as it was before the creation of the last strategic reserve on 
th^ one hand, and this last strategic reserve itself on the other. 
The first of these groups, roughly speaking one-third, was 
on the East watching the Russians ; twxj-thirds were on the 
West against the French and British. The one-third that 
was on the East watching the Russians might be regarded as 
imiiiobilised. So long as Russia's determination to continue 
the war and her ability to do so should remain, no appreciable 
depletion of this Eastern front by Germany is possible. \or, 
on the other hand, is an\- decision to be expected there through 
an enemy offensive upon that front. There remains the 
Western front, and upon the Western front the Germans, 
though they had to keep there two-thirds of their army, were 
badly out-numbered in men and suffered from a still graver 
superiority of the French and English in the output of guns 
and munitionment. 
To this superiority, in the shape of constant pressure of the 
most severe kind, exercised by an opponent who could choose 
his time and his place and completely possessed of the 
initiative, the Germans were subject. Their subjection to 
it moulded the character of the whole war. 
The Somme offensive, imdertaken not where they chose 
but where the Allies chose, hail compelled them to throw 
into the process of rapid wastage much more than one 
hundred divisions and to suffer a total loss, first and last, of 
700.000 men. ThcV had to face the renewal of this process 
on a certainly more dangerous scale in iqiy. ■ They created 
a considerable strategic reserve and prepared * plan which, 
so far as we can judge, was intended to help them ii.se this 
strategic reserve on their own initiative. -'' 
Here again with this second part of their force, the nej^ 
strategic reserve, we have round tigures to guide usJ**' ~> 
The German Empire had in sight as nnc material of all 
kinds, counting returns from hospital, for the fighting .season 
of 1917, roughly one million men. Most (jf if was worse 
material than the old, but that was the rough total. This one 
million men Was not immediately available. In the first 
months of the year, roughly speaking again, about one-half 
were available for training, an' vvould be ready^cithoe-to put^ 
into the field imnudiaiely or to lill up the gaps wiien lighting 
begii\s. The other half would come in gradually as time 
]iassed in the shajv of the very last exempted men and 
the hospital returns. 
These figures giye us the nature and extent of the probable 
(ierina n strategic reserve. > 
Tlie new small Geiman divisions counted g.ooo bayonets, 
and rather more than 1.5, too men all told. Som(^ are now 
even smaller than that,, but this was the new establishment 
early in the year. Half a million men could, if thev weie 
entirely used (or forming divisions, add the equivalent, 
therefore, of some 3.} new divisions. Of -course, they would 
not all be used. A \ery large proportion would be kept 
back for drafts. On the other hand, during the time that 
has elapsed already since the early ]>art of the year, ;i number 
of the remaining half million have crfme in from hospitals 
and from exenyited men. We are fairly safe if we talk of 
^ the numerical equivalent of this strategic reserve as some 
25 divisions. It may be less ; it may be as low as 20. It 
can hardly be more. 
Remeiuber that all this is mere inference, but it is inference 
based ujwn certain known tigures. It must not be imagined 
that the process is the simple one which this cough sketch alone 
might suggest. It is obvious you do not take your half million 
available men and t\nn them into brand new divisions. Vou 
mi.x old material with new ; you take certain units from old 
divisions to build uj) new ones j you re-shuffle and all the 
r^st of it. But the numerical effect is what I have said, and 
you will be able, by such a process as I ha\e described, to have 
in hand the eiiuivalent of say, 25 divisions, or a little less, 
over and abo\e your armies alread\- pinned to the two fronts. 
You also have behind them ample drafts to fill up the gaps 
in at least the first few weeks of the fighting, and you have 
behind these again a dwindling stream of recruitment which 
dribbles in from the men you squeeze in from the last ex- 
emptions and from the hospital returns. •« 
Let me rejieat what I was saying last week, for it is the 
kernel of the whole matter. A strategic rcser\'e of this kind 
formed at the expense of the future and destined to. effect 
something final during the lighting of iqij, or to lose the war, 
in other words a gambling as.set, must imperatively be in the 
hands of a commander possessing the initiative. That is the 
whole point of forming it. 
We do not know indeed where it was to be thrown or where 
a part of it was to be thrown. There vvere probably altcrna- 
ti\e plans. But -.we know with regard to tlie West what the 
general line was, because the enemy's Government openly 
proclaimed it, with a domestic political object in making the 
proclamation, and they would certainly not' have done this 
if they had thought it jjrobable that their expeciations would 
be disappointed. 
The plan was, hrst, to gain time bv an unexpected retire- 
ment coupled with an unexampled devastation of "the field 
oyer which the pursuit must pass. Secondly, to use the 
lints so gained for ohtainiha a great and increasing advantage 
hver the Allies through the progress oj the submarine campaign. 
Thirdly, while the progress of the submarine campaign was 
gradually paralysing the power of munitionment and supply 
enjoyed by the .-Mlies, to keej) the war going without a decision 
against fiermany either (a) by creating a sudden new offensive 
in an unexpected field with the aid of the strategic reserve 
in hand ; or (b) reverting to open warfare as much as possible 
in the West ancj using the strategic reserve there for checking 
the .Mlies in such warfare ; or (c) a combination of the two. 
We know, as a matter of fact, that the second of these 
tbj. was certainly contenqilatcd, for the whole German public 
was told to expect it and even had it described to them in 
some detail. 'Ilie German retreat was to give the German 
army "elbow room" from wliich it could strike with new 
forces. As to the third idea, the use of part of the new reserve 
in the \y est and part of it in some other field, it is the most 
unlikejy of all because the German Empire has hardly the 
^riengili, reniaining. f or such a double purpose. 
•^ .'Vt any rate, what happened and that is the capital point 
in the present situation -was something verv difiercnt from 
what the enemy had planned. In some points his plan 
matured successfully. In others it failed, and the combination 
is what we have before us. 
The submarine programme was, in the main, successful. 
The pressure which it ,was intended to exercise upon the 
AHies-iilwjuld niature this sumineror some date not verv much 
