May 
ICJ17 
LANU & WATER 
later tluiiv.lhHt wliidi, the tjrvcyivv ,Ija4 bauHpd upun when 
l^.\Hng liis schewL' for tlic hist tigliting srasoii of igij. 
fevijrytliing, therefore, wouhi depend upon whether the 
pressure to whijch he would be sul^jected in. the \\ est and his 
lX)wer to use his bijrrowed strategic reser\e in his o\\ ji time 
and his own way. should also develop as he intended. As 
a fact it has not develojjed as he intended. 
(i) The pressure has been greater than he expected — that . 
IS, the rate of loss has been greater than lie exjiected. 
(2) The pressure has come much earlier than he expected. 
(3) As a consequence of i and 2 his strategic reser\'e is 
already engaged and he has lost the initiati\-e in the use 
of it. 
The whole great drama, tlicrefore, now turns upon the 
answer to a tiuestion which the future hides from us : W'liclhcr 
Ihe cnemv's dimppointtncnt in the second, or land, pari of his 
plan and his Jailnrc in it <c'ill proceed at such a rale as lo 
neutralise his comparative success in the first part of tiis plan, 
Ihe submarine campaign ? 
So far as my studies in these columns are concerned I 
can only deal with th? land side of the ])roblem and attcm])t 
to estimate — thougii the elements for such a judgment are as 
yet exceedingly meagre —the extent to which the plan by 
land has failed. 
We know by the enemy's awn declaration and by what 
the German public was told, with perpetual rejietition and 
,in considerable detail, that the novel tvix* )f retirement eliected 
from the Noyon salient in March was expected to destroy 
the Allies power of conducting a spring offensive. Some- 
times the thing was put as the destruction of the power of 
offensive in general — which was, of course, an exaggerated 
way of putting it — somptimes it was jnit in a more soldierly 
manner with c ilculations and th? delay to be gained was 
estimated — a matter of two montlis. The effect of the retire- 
ment^would be a postponement of se\-ere ])ressure upon the 
(ierman line in the West to sometime in May, the early part 
■ of the month, or even th? very beginning of it, at the worst ; 
much later even, towards the end of the month at the best. 
The dela}' prolonged even for the later period, would gi\'e 
the enemy the time U) gather his reserve so as to use it in 
his own fashion, and it would advance by so much more the 
moment when the submarine campaign would begin seriously 
to hamper the supply of the .\ihes. 
As a matter of fact this time- table went wrong by any- 
thing between three and six weeks, and the reason it went 
wr<nig, as,L.ha.ve had frequent occasion tot liojnt out-,; W^s 
manifold. The enemy had to gi\e up the , screen o^ Wie 
Baj^aume Ridge earlier than he intended— how much carher\4;e 
do not know. Consequentij-, his retreat was more hurried th^n 
he had intended ; consequently, again, his arrangements JUttv 
devastation and for renewed lines was not complete ; thottgh 
the former part of the programme was more complete than the 
latter. Again, the })acc at which the roads were mtn^J 
and the guns and munitionment brought up and th<! power of 
the pursurers to maintain themselves in the devastated tract, 
were greater than the Germans had allowed for. Lastly?- the 
weight of their attack, when it came, that is the number of 
pieces sent u]) and the munitionment for them, was more than 
the enemy iia'l thought available. 
Tiie consequence of this was that the great spring offensive 
of the Allies opened, so far as the bombardment was con- 
cerned, anything from three to Ine weeks earlier than the 
enemy had cxjwcted. The first intensive fire on the north, 
that of Sir Douglas Haig, began between the 7th and the 8th 
of April and the British infantry were launched in the main 
attack upon the qth. This blow covered the better part of the 
first week. At the beginning of the second, the correspond- 
ing French action was undertaken, not against the new line 
but against the other line of the salient, the old line fi^om 
the Aisne to the Plains of the Canip of Chalons. This blow 
also covered about a week. With the third week came tln^ 
development of the third lilow. which we have just witnessed 
immediately in front of Arras, occupying a restricted sector 
and drawing down upon it with very heavy losses, great masses 
of enemy reinforcements. 
Now what is the nature of this (from the enemy's point 
of view) premature attack ? We are only at the beginning of 
Mav. \\"hat has ahead}- been accomplished, and what is the 
scheme upon which the thing is developing from the point of 
view of the Allies ? 
Let us summarise the elements. The enemy stood partlv 
upon a new line which has often been called the Hindenburg 
line, and which it is perhaps more accurate to call the St. 
Quentin line; partly upon his old matured defences, with 
more than two years preparation behind them. The old 
matured defences, represented on Map I by a solid line 
ran in the north round Lens, reposed upon the Vimv 
Ridge and so came in front of -\rras ; thence they 
turned into the new St. Quentin line (represented on Map I 
by a dotted line), the solidity of which depended upon such 
