LAND & WATER 
May J. 1917 
hciglits as tlioso of Moncliy and at Fontaiiu- by Croisilks, 
and so past QuooJit. between Kibetourt and, Miircoing. tlie 
cross roads u])on Hill iju, thence along the St. yuentin Canal 
by Vcndhuille, over the top of the canal tunnel, through 
Bony, then all ahjng the canal to Bellonglise and from 
licUinglise to Si. Quentin itsi-lt. From St. Quentin (south 
of which the British did not extend) the new line went on 
roughly in the same direction until it struck the Aisne near 
Soissons, a little west of Missy. There it turned a right angle 
and became the old matured line again which stretched all 
along the Aisne past Kheims and so to the chalky, rolling, 
bare land of the Camp 01 Chalons, and the Plains of what 
is called the " Dusty Champagne " and at last to the Argonne. 
The intention of the Allies was to pound both the old and 
the new line so that its foremost defences could no longer be 
hold. First, the British would do this towards the north. 
..■specially against the kev jwsition of \imy ; next the French 
>vould do it along all the Champagne front. They relied for 
:heir power to effect this upon the great superiority of their 
irtillcry. Their infantry following the artillery action would 
iccupy what had been the strong points in the originally 
•xistmg Cierman line. In so doing they would suffer loss. 
But they would com[)el the Oermans to counter-attack 
Continually and upon the largest scale, because it would be 
necessary for the enemy to cover his imperfect new lines 
iK'hind, and even, if he could, to recover the jwints of vantage 
such as the X'imy Ridge itself, the heights of Monchy, the 
heights by I.agnicourt, the heights above the .\isne ; the 
heights above. \Ioronvillers, which in a long chain would give 
observation and superiority of ground to the Allies should 
they be mastered in the hrst strokes. 
The value of the Allied action and the measure of its 
success could be tested in only one way : The proportionate 
loss of the two sides after the experiment lunl been tried. 
If in men and material, but parti<ular!y in men, the pro- 
jwrtionate loss — the loss in proi>ortion to what they could 
afford— was considerably greater upon the Cierman than upon 
the Allied side, full success might be claimed for the manoeuvre 
a- a whole. 
The sujxTiority of hre, perha()s of moral, certainly of 
numbers, would permit of similar blows being ilelivered again 
and agaJn as the figliting season advanced, and it might 
reiLsonably be hojx'd that the jH)wer of continued unbroken 
resistance would reach its term before the other limb of the 
(ierman scheme, the submarine campaign, had reached a 
critical point. 
Now the answer to this supreme question — tlie(i)roportionate 
losses of the two sides as a consequence of these tlucc great 
l>lows so far, is not befor^ us. We d(j not jiossess tlie know- 
ledge required for a com])lete answer. Xo one can give the 
losses upon the Allied side save the Allied Higher Command, 
whose particular business it is to prevent the enemy from 
knowing these. No one can tell us the exact tosses upon the 
enemy's side, save the enemy's Higher Command. We have 
nothing to guide us save the reconled nature of the lighting. 
Jt justifies us m believing that^ this initial experiment has 
succeeded and that the future of the tremendous offensive 
uixjn the West will follow successfully upon lines now laid 
down for it bv the results of the past three weeks. 
Let us summarise the reasons for this general conclusion : 
It is no more than a general conclusion, but the matters upon 
which the inference is based are worth examining and appre- 
ciating clearly. 
l-'irst, we have the fact that the enemy has without doubt 
been comix>lled to draw largel\- upon his new strategic reserve. 
It is not an exaggerated suggi>stion that souH'thing like half 
of it has already been drawn into the mill. Next, we have 
the fact that he lias DCen compelled to ceaseless counter- 
attack in very dense formations and in what observers describe 
as a " reckless " loss of life. 
The word " reckless " is not strictly accurate in its conno- 
tation. He has not wasted these great numbers of men from 
lack of calculation, but from necessity. Only so could he 
hope to recover what he has everywhere failed to recover, 
the vantage points of his own positions ; onlv so could he 
hold at all. WV" are justified in saying from the identifi- 
cations established on the .'Vllied front, that the rate at 
which he has been passing in new men to hold out is nearly 
if not quite half as much again as the rate at which he passed 
them in during the severest pressure upon the Somme last year. 
That is the first point. The general estimate that he has 
been losing at a proportionately much heavier rate than the 
atta'ck is testified to by the sacrifice of the initiative in the 
use of his reserve. He is being compelled to pour it into the 
battle in very dense bodies by the destruction (through 
.Mlied superioi-ity in artillery) of his established fortifications, 
etc. 
Next, we have the undoubted fact that the proportion of 
ammunition measured in weight and time shows a heavy 
sujjeriority u]>on the Alliecl side. It is true that in an action 
of this kind the attacking troops also are subject to heavy loss 
before they can consolidate their new positions. They come 
under the' renewed bombardment of the enemy before they 
can protect themselves against that bombardment. That is 
the one as.set the defensive has. .\s against this, if the offen- 
si\e has a much superior weight of artillery it destroys whole 
units behind and in the enemy's lines before they come into 
action at all. We have actual evidence, for instance, of/ine 
(jerman division, which lost something like half its effectives 
without having come into action. 
.\nd this leads us to the third consideration. The Allies 
maintain their s\i|)erioritv in the air. 
This third point should be remembered with some shame 
here at home when we cousitler the base attacks which have 
been made upon the British Air Service by men who have 
no motives but personal motives at conflict with the good of 
their country. Mainly from a difference in" national tempera- 
ment, jiartly from a superiority of organisation, the superiority 
of obse.'-vation from the air lias been thoroughly maintained 
throughout all these, great battles, and upon it has hinged the 
effective use of a superior artillery. 
From this element alone, it would not be credible, apart 
from any other elements, that the effect of the Allied fire was 
not far more destructive to the enemy than his to the Allies, 
let alone his gravely inferior supply of new pieces and of 
munitionment. 
It is perfectly clear that a ii;ituation of thi.s sort cannot be 
judged during this, which is still the initial phase of the 
1 91 7 offensive, by tlie mere graphic test of advance. There is 
nothing to preveiit the enemy, if he would sacrifice the men. 
checking our advance up(jn a given narrow sector for as long 
a time as his stream of reinforcements holds out. But he 
docs so at a price which no one knows better than himself. 
The compelling of him to these tremendous counter-attacks, 
some of which must necessarily attain a measure of success, 
is the very heart of the Allied i)lan. 
It is in this light that we must read the account of last 
week's fighting between Croisilles aixl .\rleux. A mere recital 
of the fluctuations of battle upon that comparatively narrow 
sector would mean nothing. But grasp what has happened 
as part of this whole scheme, and it is very significant, nor is 
the least significant part of it the extraordinary way the 
Ciermans ha\'c interpreted each successive e\ent to their owu 
people. 
The Week's Fighting 
On Tuesday, April _'4lh, an action which, too late for in- 
clusion in last week's article, but which had been initiated 
upon the day before, ran all the way from Croisilles to (iavrelle, 
a distance of about 15,000 yards." Of what nature was this 
action ? It was, as a matter of initiative, a British 
attack following upon intensive bombardment and supported 
by considerable masses of infantry. It was developed, 
as the map shows, in that breach through the original (ierman 
line which the main fighting of the previous fortnight had torn. 
But its most striking characteristic was the enormous expanse 
of the German counter-attack. .\11 that night between Monday 
and Tuesday and all the Tuesday morning, the counter- 
attacks continued over and over again. No less than seven 
German divisions (a little more than a mile to each division) 
attacked and counter-attacked, the line fluctuated con- 
tinuall\ ; a number of British wounded were i>icked uj) by 
the enemv during these fluctuations. (.-M the end. not of this 
day of fighting, but of several days, the enemy claimed somo- 
Ihiiig like ()3o prisoners) and by the night of the Tuesday 
all one could say was that the positions taken by the British 
in the first attack were held with the exception of a small 
group of ruins ^o the east and north of Koeux. 
' Now what is the les.son of a business of that kind ? What 
does it mean ? It means that the ga]) haxing been torn in 
the German line the enemy had to pour men in ceaselessly to 
^ave himself from disruption. It is not true to .say that it 
was a fluctuating combat between equal forces. It was a 
combat initiated by the British offensive, maintained by it 
and comf)elling the enemy to the most expensive form of 
re- action. The number of prisoners, for instance, was 
nearly five times as great in British hands as in German, but 
quite apart from that, which is a subsidiary point, the essential 
thing to grasp is that the enemy's enormously exf)ensivp 
counter-action was a maiineuvre to which he was compelled 
by his opponent and not one i)roceeding from his own will. 
Wednesday saw a diminution of fighting, but towards the 
