10 
LAND & WATER 
^la3 
i.ji/ 
Rights and Limitations of Small Nationalities 
By M. A. Czapliska 
WHEN (Icaliiij^ with the jirobk-ins of Eurojjcan 
iiationaUties which have to be liberated entirely 
or partly after this war, we must free ourselves 
from certain ]X)puIar errors which hamper the 
judgment, l-iri^t of all. the term " small nationalities " is 
rather misleadnif^, for on the list we ftnd Poles, a nation 
with a minimnni of 20,000,000, and Montenegrins, who 
number about _^iK),ooo. The name " dependent nationalities " 
is perhaps more appropriate, for tiiough some of them, such 
as Belgium and Koumania, were independent before the war, 
they are depciKlent now, not so much on the (iermans as on 
the ultimate triumph or defeat of the principles of justice. 
Hut it is chiellv the problem of the nations whose fate before 
the war was almost as bad as the fate of Belgium and Rou- 
inania at the present tiilie, which is taken into account in 
speaking of the rights of small nations, and of the fighting on 
their behalf. 
Whether this war is being waged on behalf of small natioii- 
alities or great Powers makes no difference now. Great 
and small Powers suffer alike, and for ail the only course left 
oj)en is to settle their differences on principles of truth and 
justice, and to face facts as they are. It has happened, as it 
ought to have happened, that out of the five States who were 
the chief oppressors of other nationalities within their bound- 
aries — Germany, Turkey, Austria-Hungary. Russia and 
Ital\' — only the last two ■were on the side of the Western 
Democracies. Of these two Russia has ceased to approve 
of this state of affairs, and Italy can scarcely be called an 
oppressor, though she has under her power a small number 
of Adriatic Sla\s, whose complete independence is merely a 
high ideal. 
The Slavs 
Because among the nations dependent un the ("entral 
Powers there were some who spoke languages of Slavonic 
origin, an idea has ari.scn that these nations arc akin to each 
other just as the Bavarians are to the Saxons, and that the 
Allies are fighting for a Slavonic world, and the nations 
dependent on the Central Powers' striving for a high ideal of 
Pan-Slavism. Whether ajjy idea included in a term beginning 
with Pan- and ending in -ism is a high ideal, remains to be 
seen in the futme. From the experience of the past we can 
judge that the one called Pan-Germanism has been a source 
of manv troubles and horrors for the non-Pari-German people 
of Europe, and even for the moral of the Pan-Ciermans 
themselves. So we may assume that ethically Pan-Slavi.sm 
is more or less another Pan-Germanism, only much more 
artificial, a kind of Pan-Germanism which would include the 
Scandinavian nations, and perhaps the people of the British 
Isles also. But if it does not stand a moral test it would still 
be a powerful agent if it were based on facts. Here comes in 
i knowledge of ethnology, which could usefully be made one 
of the chief compulsory subjects for intelligence officers as 
well as for consular or diplomatic servants. 
Out of the several nations whose? fate hangs in the balance, 
only three — Poland. Bohemia and Serbia — use languages 
of Slavonic origin. The fact of their so doing, however, 
does not create anv similarity in a cultural, national or 
ethnic sense, and these three countries would no more think 
of being united with each other than Scandinavia would 
dream of being united with Gennany and German-speaking 
Switzerland. Wiiere. then, is the basis for the so-much- 
talked-of Pan-Slavism, and have the Slavonic countries more 
in common among themselves than they have with their 
neighbours Greece. Koumania or Finland ? 
A League of Nations stri\ing for independence would be 
more normal under pre-war conditions, or during the war, 
than this re-birth of a Slavonic race, as fabulous in origin 
as the Celtic race is. But if unimportant and without his- 
torical basis, it is still a dangerous phantom, and most unde- 
sirable in association with the aims and war-programme of the 
Allies, for it will always arouse an echo in the German world, 
and if carried too far it may end in permanently uniting the 
two Germanic nations — Prusso-(iermany and Austria — who, 
until this war, kept their nationalities distinct. 
It is true that besides the Pan-Slavist propaganda there 
is another trend of extreme feeling in this country, one of 
benevolent indulgence towards Austria. It would seem 
that the only fair position is an intermediate one— that is, 
to work that her bureaucracy shall fail as the Russian bureau- 
cracy failed, and that her constitution shall be revised not 
only as regards the .Austrians and the Hungarians, but also 
as regards any small Slavonic remnant which may still remain 
subject to her. How blind Austria is to her true interests 
api)ears in her scorn of the oi)|)ortunity given her by Presi- 
dent Wilson of keeping the peace with America, while her 
offer to Russia of a jieace based on the sharing of various 
Slavonic territories is an offence to Russia, in view of the 
principles that country has won out of her Revolution. 
Unless we lay aside all sentiment —Germanic as well as 
Slavonic — we can never even ap])roach the solution of the 
problem which awaits us after the war — the problem of ' 
setting in order the eastern part of Europe. It is only natural 
that people should be sorry for Serbia, Koumania or Poland, 
bat this interest does not imply either that these countries 
present the same. problem, or that what would be good for, 
.say, France or Cireat Britain, would be equally beneficial if 
applied to, .say, Serbia. 
What makes nationality ? It is not numbers which 
matter. Numbers neither confer special rights nor limit 
them. We must, then, tuni in our search for a decisive factor 
to questions of quality. A certain gradation must be recog- 
nised if misunderstanding and confusion are to be avoided. 
The sentimentalists who would .see in every nation of Europe 
and perhaps of the wyrld, equally good material for immediate 
indey)endent existence, render as bad a service to the caus(! 
of a just settlement as do the autocratic i)owcrs who will not 
admit the principle of the possibility of cultural development 
for " inferior " nations. Thus the old regime in Russia would 
constantly place the national claims of Finland or Poland 
on a level with those of the Bashkirs of the \'olga or the 
Tartars of the Crimea. And, again, we find that the very 
few people in England who know anything about the Near 
East, are too apt to minimise the ditlficulties which would 
attend the foundation of, for instance, a Southern Slav 
State, or an enlarged Ifehemia. 
In an attempt to estimate the claims of nations to inde- 
jiendence, three aspects presents themselves for considerati(.)n 
which should make it possible to determine whether a given 
nation is in a condition to enjoy Lndcpendence at once, or 
whether it would ])rofit by Ijeing gi\en a kind of Home Kule . 
under a more enlightened state for a period of education. 
First of all, we must consider whetlier it has territory be- 
longing to it which it has occupied since, say, the beginning 
of the modern period ; second, whether it has its own culture, 
expressed in political and social organisation, science and art. 
trade and industry ; third, whetlier the wish for national 
independence is common to all the classes contained within 
its boundaries. 
With regard (u the territorial quest ion. E.xc'ept 'the Jews 
we find no nation in Europe which is without its own terri- 
tory, but there are some countries, such as Dalmatia, Bohemia, 
and Silesia, which have always had some " Ulster " of their 
own, consisting of one or more nations which have never 
amalgamated. This is probably the reason why such coun- 
tries have seldom been independent of their stronger neigh- 
bours in the past, and will have to look for the support in 
one form or another, of those nations in the future. 
The easiest to deal with are those territories which can be 
called " national," in the sense of belonging to one nation, 
such as Bulgaria. The most puzzling are the lands which 
play, as it were, the role of " colonies " to several " national " ' 
territories. Such are Macedonia, Transylvania, and to a 
certain extent Ruthenia and Lithuania. There will be no 
difficulty in returning to Serbs what is Serbia proper, to 
Bulgars what is Bulgaria proper, or to Roumanians and Poles 
what is strictlj- Roumania and Poland. But it is quite 
another matter when we come to deal with the strips of 
territory dividing these countries. Here there is not only 
opportunity, but necessity, for international intervention, 
and either the neutralisation of the given territory or the 
di-sposal of it by a plebiscite. If, as is the case with Trieste, 
for instance, this non-national territory happens to be an 
important port, neutralisation seems to be the fairer course 
for the comfort of all the nations of Europe. Yet it needs 
very strong moral force to refrain from disposing of these 
important " colonies " to the interest of one's own friends, 
if opportunity offers. 
.'l.s to the culture of the people whose claim to independence 
is in question, it may be argued that the most primitive 
peoples always produce a sort of culture of their own, but of 
course, |in dealing with the nations of F^urope we must demand 
from them a European standard of culture which is something 
more than romantic ballads or peasant art. If the nation is 
without its own cultural organisation, a sufficient number of 
its own schools, universities, professional guilds, of its own 
doctors, chemists, manufacturers, merchants and traders, will it 
. be wise to let it struggle alone against the powerful comi)etition 
of a better organised neighbour, once its sovereign ? This is 
