8 
LAJNU & WATER 
^fny in, 1917 
raised in " FlaR-OfTiccr's " letter have Beon doak witli- at 
length in tlu' columns of the Tiiiii-s by Professor S]>enser 
Wilkinson. I>v Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, by Admiral 
Henderson, Mr. Winston Chvir.iiill, Lord (icorRe Hamilton 
anil others. .A distingnished French writer, .\dnnral Di^otiy, 
lla^becnputtint; forward ^onie very stronj; views on the situa- 
tion in France. These contributions to the discussion in- 
clude a great variety of opinions that may be summarised 
as follows : ^ 
As to the first two, which were the burden^of the Prime 
Minister's and Lord Curzon's speeches, and the King's Pro- 
clamation, there is no disagreement. Whether the submarine 
campaign increases its efficiency, maintains it, or falls away, 
the utmost economy in foodstuffs is the obvious duty of 
evtfy individual. Next, whatever the qualification of our sea 
command now sho\vn to exist, there is no alteration in the 
prospect of ultimate victory. The naval failure does not 
ensure a military failure. On this point the Prime Minister's 
speech at the (iuildhall is conclusive. It cannot be denied that 
we are far nearer to danger than we were — but there is no 
evidence that danger is near enough to be alarming. Our 
losses, as a distinguislied Admiral has said, may indeed be 
" apj)alling." but they are a long way from indicating either 
immediate or ultimate failure. It may Ix' somewhat reassur- 
ing to remind the reader of a fact quite largely, but perhaps 
not generally known. It is that the rate of insurance over 
the worst and most dangerous channels to British jrorts Jias 
not yet passed 10 per cent. — which is itself 50 per cent, 
lower than was the rate from Gibraltar for a very long period 
between 1S12 and 1S15— and as this rate is naturally made 
in favour of the underwriter, it is probably true to s;iy that, 
at the utmost, we are not now losing more than one cargo in 
any twelve destined for this country. 
.\ third line of discussion has been directed towards 
enquiring whether our whole, pohcy in the matter of the sub- 
marine menace has not been entirely too defensive and — 
lor various reasons all connected with the character of the 
command — unnecessarily inefficient even in defence. On 
the first of these points the Daily Chronicle, tlie Sfycclaloi- 
and other journals of repute, have for some time lieen urging 
some scheme of offensive operations against Zeebrugge antl 
other (Jerman bases, a matter often touched ui)on in tliese 
columns and at length in the earlier months of this year. 
The advocacy of such an oflensive has been greatly strengthened 
by Admiral Degouy's recent pronouncement. The weakness 
of these lay recommendations is that they ignore the existence 
of the High Seas Fleet. But it is certainly 41 matter which 
the (iovernment will have to consider very closely. 
On the second point a great variety of criticisms have 
been made. The following are only selected as chance ex- 
amples. It is said that too many of the bases from which the 
anti-submarine craft work, are under the control of retired 
oflicers, who have, in the matter of technical familiarity with 
the craft and devices now in use, too little in common with 
those to whom the actual employment of these craft and 
devices is necessarily entrusted. " It is also said that the 
central authority is in some matters over-centralised, so that 
the local initiative is checked ; and in others lacking in wide 
enough powers to secure the co-ordination of all the forces 
that must be combined for the attack both on submarines 
and on their bases. It is, for instance, asserted that the com- 
mand of the destroyers, the trawlers and slow craft generally, 
of the monitors and airships and seaplanes, is so divided 
and cross divided, that at critical times it is impossible to get 
co-operation tor a common purpose. Then, too, it has been 
questioned whether the anti-submarine craft as a whole are 
rightly distributed in the various areas, in proportion to 
the intensity of the submarine attack in those areas. Such 
criticisms, it will be seen, touch almost every aspect of the 
constitution, co-ordination and command of the forces en- 
gaged in this vastly important business. 
Fourthly there has been a general question asked, whether 
the creation of a submarine department at the Admiralty 
is not itself the admission of a wrong view of the situation, 
and simply because, if once we suppose the function 6f 'the 
(irand Fleet to be defined and its command and supply pro- 
\ided for, tliQ protection of our shi])ping, and all in the way 
of offensive and defensive that this implies, is really to-daV 
the main, if not the sole business, of those responsible for the 
military control of our sea forces. 
The fifth and si.xth groups deal with matters arising oiit of 
" Flag-Officer's " letter of the 25th. And here it seems t6 be 
universally admitted that a separation of the military fi^om 
the civil side of the Admirahy is an immediate necessity,' 
and for that matter the unofficial communications that have 
been made to the press seem to promise that this separation 
was one, if not the chief purpose of the Prime Minister's 
intervention. This, of course, is an admission that the failure to 
deal properly with the submarine is not inherent in the nature 
" Gifts " 
I'-V N. M. F. CORPETT 
ENGLAND hath givrti me these ; 
To know, to love, to keep : 
Wild sweet song of a tlirush 
Sprung from his dewy nest ; 
Frail April primroses ; 
F'ragrance of pine woods deep. 
Faint in the twilight husli 
As the sun sinks to rest. 
Pale flames of daffodils 
That burn amongst the trees, 
Kosy and white with bloom ' 
Down in the orchard close ; 
Misted blue of the hills ; 
Slumb'rous murmur of bees ; 
And the warm, rich perfume 
Of June's deep-hearted rose. 
Glory of golden fields 
Of tall wheat gleaming bright: 
Silence of Autumn woods. 
Crimson, russet, and brown 
When tender Twilight yields 
Shy lips t' oncoming Night ; 
And the deep peace that broods 
Over the dreaming Down 
Knglaiid hath given all these ; 
Gifts beyond dreams, without price. 
Nought we can suffer is vain 
If by our pain we ensure 
There shall in England be Peace. 
Who counts the sacrifice ? 
So that we know these again 
Gifts that shall ever endure. 
of the prol)leni. but arises solely from a defective command 
— though it supposes thatthe defect is one of system, and 
not of military principle in those that have tried to work 
it. We arc assured on many sides that now that this system 
has been, or shortly will be, changed, there need be no fur- 
ther occasion for anxiety, and for the sufficient reason that, 
once the First Lord's chief j^rofessional adviser is freed from 
all extraneous duties and, on the purely military side of his 
duties, has the assistance of a staff of his own selection, an 
entirely new level of efficiency may confidently be expected. 
But to the exponents of the sixth form of opinion, these 
assurances are apparently not convincing. These seem to follow 
more what "Flag-Officer" implied than saidj namely, that it 
was less the actual effect of a bad system ^ the Admiralty 
than the working of a vicious system by th&se whose minds 
were warped by wrong military principles, riiat has brought 
our naval misfortunes upon us. This view is very apparent 
in the second of Professor Spenser Wilkinson's letters and 
both of Sir f^eginakl Custance's. It is also implied in the 
letter from the distinguished naval officer who WTites to us this 
week. It is almost a summary of their case to say that, 
had any of the members of the group that have controlled 
the navy since 1904 been conscious of the true military mission 
of the fleet, they could not have been content that the fleet 
should l>e commanded — either in peace or war — through an 
organisation manifestly incapable of allowing the fleet to realise 
that mission. To these critics, therefore, the contentinent 
during the past five months of the present directing minds 
of the navy with the .\dmiralty system, as it was and as they 
had always known it was. is evidence of the rest of tlieir 
quarrel with the group from which these advisers are taken. 
.-Xnd their (luarrelis just this, that they have always failed to 
realise the main purpose for which the fleet shouJdbe used. 
Had this pur]iose been realised, it must have been found that 
the existing system was prejudicial to its attainment, and 
then nothing could have been simpler, for men who possessed 
the full confidence of their civil chief, than to have altered 
and reformed it out of hand. That the system should not 
be shattered on the strength of three or four articles and letters 
to the press, seems to these critics therefore no proof that the 
essential matter is secured, namely, the devotion of all our 
iiaval forces to the attack and defeat of the enemv. 
Arthur Pollen. J 
