l6 
LAND & WATER 
May 10, 1917 
and who was on his way home to take another command, 
trotted lip to our rather mournful group, his face all one smile.. 
I say trotted, for we all of us raced and jmnjied to 4ieep our-' 
selves warm. One word, and we rushed to the other side of 
the boat. There it was, only a shadow on the liorizon at 
first, and then as we watched, clearer and clearer, a range of 
smiling grass-covered cliffs flanked by a lighthouse, our first 
glimjise of Europe— the coast of France. And I shall never 
know a fairer landfall than that earliest sight of the broad 
helds of Normandy, between the blues of sea and sky. 
We were speeding merrily across the Ch;uinel, the .sun 
tlancing on the ripi)les, the sharp air singing past our ears, 
depression fallen from us like a cloak. Incorrigible invalids 
came up f)Ut of their cabins and skipped al)out the deck ; 
individuals \vho had been at loggerheads the whole voyage 
leant together o\er the rail and exchanged confidences. We 
thought ourselves safe ! And then all in a moment a voice 
said, " What is that ? " Over the horizon had popped a 
long grey boat ; then another, and another ! In an in- 
credibly short time it seemed, the hrst was alongside us. 
She slid across our bows like an eel, and up ran a signal. 
We seemed to turn on our track like a hound and in 
scarcely more than a few seconds were scudding, all steam u]i 
in the opposite direction, towards that friendly shore. .\nd 
as we steamed, the little destroyers circled around and about 
us like terriers conducting a mastiff, not going over the 
waves, but cutting straight through them, the sun glinting 
on their silver-grey armour, while every time one came near 
enough, we cheered and shrieked almost hysterically, waving 
caps, handkerchiefs, mufflers, sewing, knitting, anything, at 
the men in oilskins and queer I'Vench Tam-o'-Slianti-rs, 
standing on the little drenched deck. On our notice-board 
appeared : " We have been ordered to put irfto pi 11 We 
lay in port three o^: lour hours, among a ])enect'fleet uf aiiiafor 
ciiaft, eachutf which, like us. had evidently befiii war.ned ;Ai<l 
fetched back from the path of danger We vvatcli^f a^conwv 
depart. A line of rtve or six ordinary transports- " three 
island boats" they are called, because wljon first sighted ,at 
sea, the bows. poop,.ajid stern. look like three .islands sticking 
up upon the horizon. Two fussy little tugs towing as many 
sailing ships, graceful beauties, most of their sails now sadly 
furled, as though in mourning for the fate which had befallen 
so many of their comrades. Our captain had come half round 
the world alone, and he said he would linish his journey un- 
protected, save by his skilful .seamanship and his confidence 
m the gods of his ancient people. We slipped away under 
cover of darkness. 
By nightfall we had passed through " the Gates," and 
were safely anchored. The pilot had come on board and the 
captain was in bed. Ne.xt morning we glided up Channel 
with the crowd of transports, crui.scrs. destroyers. ])atrols, 
minesweepers, and trawlers that throng here like traftic in 
Kegent Street on a May afternoon — for the Germans have 
still left us a few ! And, oh, it was good to have exchanged 
translucent tropic seas for our own grim pitchy waters. We 
also saw at least three of those sea-batteries called " monitors," 
in which all is subservient to the one huge gun, guarding the 
mouth of the Thames. 
Next day we were riding in omnibuses and sliopping in 
Oxford Street. That London life which our men at the 
Front and on the Fleet have enabled to roll on almost as 
smoothly and unconcernedly as ever, had absorbed us, 
exiles home from India. We were already beginning to 
forget our peaceful voyage home in war-time. 
Campaign of the Marne 
MAJOR WHITTON'S book upon The Marne 
Caml>aipi (in the series of Camf>aigns and Their 
Lessons, edited by Major-Cicneral t'allwell, and 
published by Messrs. Constable and Co.), has been 
welcomed as the first professional account written for soldiers 
and by a soldier in this country, of the great action which 
decided the form of the war. It is by far the most important 
book which has yet aj)peared upon the subject, and merits 
a close examination. 
The key to the book is the thesis that the I'.attle of the 
Marne was essentially a retirement foiced upon the tkrmans 
by the menace to their extreme right under von Kluck. 
There are two schools witli regard to the Marne. two 
theses, the rights and wrongs of which will hardly be kiK)wn 
until, if ever, we have authoritative evidence enabhng us to 
decide between the two. 
The one thesis maintains that the decisive act was on the 
extreme west, where von Kluck at the head of the 1st German 
Army, on the extreme right of the Germiin line, suffered a 
surprise which he very rapidly met, but the consequences of 
which he could not undo, lie found himself attacked in 
ilank by larger forces than he knew were there, lie recalled 
his troops rajjidly from bey<md the Marne river, to meet the 
menace. The liritish and the French 5th Army followed 
u]) and after three days' fighting, he could not hold and had 
to go back, coming to this decision in the afternoon of Wed- 
nesday. September qth, and actually effecting his retreat 
in the night between the ()th and lotii. He fell back to the 
Aisne, and his necessity so to do compelled every t)tlier (ier- 
man commander all along the line right away 'to the Argomic 
to keep in step and rt!treat by varying degrees also. 
The other maintains that the decisive act came in tlie 
centre. It holds that tlie suri)rise effected against vtm 
Kluck was well met by that General, but that in meeting it 
he was compelled to draw so many troops towards the right or 
west that the whole German line grew thinner, and wa's hi 
danger of disruption. This process continued thro'uf^h 
three days, and on September 9th gave an ojiportunity for 
F'och, in the centre, to get in between two j>arts of the 
Prussian Guard and throw the German centre into confusion. 
When this had happened to the centre, an immediate retreat 
there was necessar\-, and orders had to be sent t<> all the 
(ierman (ienerals, including von Kluck, to retire in conforrtuty 
with what had ha])i)ened in front of Focii. 
This dispute with regard to what happened at the Battle 
of the Marne could be settled for good if we had one clear 
bit of evidence before us, to wit, at what hour von Kluck 
gave his hrst orders for a retirement, and the relation of this 
liour to the position upon the evening <j^ Wednesday, Sep- 
tember 9th of the French .(jnd Division near La Fere Cham- 
penoise. 
Major Whitton, after consulting all available authorities, 
decides clearly for the theory that von Kluck had already 
i^ivcu the Older to retire before anything decisive happened 
in the centre. L'pon page 200 of this book it is suggested 
that von Kluck came to this conclusion shortly after noon 
on Wednesday, September 9th. Major Whitton points out 
that the definite orders for a retreat were not issued until 
somewhere about H o'clock in the evening, but he says (pago 
201) these orders were "anticipated by instructions for tlie 
immediate withdrawal of troops not actually engaged, and 
that during the afternoon the F'rench Air Service had reported 
a full retreat of dense columns and transports north-eastwards 
by the roads behind von Kluck's army." The author also 
says with regard to the complementary jxiint (the condit ion 
of F'och at the same time, and particularly of the 42nd 
Division) that the latter was " probably by this time " (that 
is, at nightfall of the yth) " somewhere on the line Connantrc- 
Corroy, or in front of it." 
The conclusion, therefore, would be that the 42nd Division 
had not yet effected anything decisive when darkness fell on 
the gth. In other words, that Foch's army in the centre had 
not yet turned the scale when von Kluck had already deter- 
mined to retreat many hours before. 
Itverything turns upon these two bits of evidence and the 
whole of the very valuable and scholarly work su])porting the 
j)osition taken up by Major Whitton depends upon the presence 
or absence of this evidence. If it can definitely be proved by 
documentary and ])ersonal evidence after peace has come 
that the 42nd Division was not in the middle of the Prussian 
Guard in the later afternoon of Wednesday, Sei)tember qtli, 
that on the other hand, Kluck had made arrangements to 
retreat at the latest early in the afternoon of that day, then 
what may be called the " Gallieni thesis " is sound. The 
Battle of the Marne was won upon the west, andever^^thing 
that happened in the centre was only a consequence of the 
victory in the west. But if the confusion into which the 
Guard fell in the centre (and that confusion was so grave 
that a great number of guns were captured from this corps by 
the F'rench) had taken j)lace by the late afternoon of Wed- 
nesday the 9th, and if there is no indisputable evidence that 
Kluck's order to retreat came earlier, then we can only con- 
clude that it was F^och's army which determined the final 
result. 
The strongest piece of evidence produced in Major Whitton 's 
book is undoubtedly the reports of the F'rench .Air Service 
with regard to the initiation of the retreat behind von Kluck's 
army during the afternoon of Sej)tember qtli. 
No notice of the book, even one as brief as this and only 
dealing with its main ])oint, would be complete without due 
praise for the very full bibliography which Major Whitton 
has added a* the end. It is tlie more valuable because the 
writing upon the Marne, let alone the documentary official 
evidence upon it, as yet publicly available, is still astonishingly 
meagre. The index also is excellent and the maps very clear 
and sufficient. The large pocket ma]) at the end <)f the 
\ olunie, which gives the details of the battle, is a particularly 
i^ood conspectus. 
J 
