LAND & WATER 
May 17, 1 91 7 
The Political Factor 
By Hilaire Belloc 
IT is plain to every observer that a critical moment of 
political character lias come upon the war. It was 
inevitable that such a crisis should come coincidently 
with, or very nearly coincidently with, the military 
crisis which we are already rapidly approaching. 
All that has hitherto appeared in these studies of the great 
campaign in Land & Water, has dealt with the military 
aspect alone. It has been a chronicle of the military vicissi- 
tudes of the war. The task has been confined to the 
elucidation of movements by maps, tbe pointing out of alterna- 
tive routes and movements ; most important of all, the 
estirrtatc of numbers. This last, as it is the only secure basis 
for any judgment, has also, I am glad to say, been proved 
constantly accurate by the event ever since fairly full evidence 
was available. 
Now in all this the political factor has been postulated as a 
constant ; not because that factor was really constant, but 
because one must eliminate it in order to present the purely 
military side of any campaign. It is impossible to describe the 
military effect of a particular movement save under the 
supposition that the two parties are each occupied in attempt- 
ing the military destruction of the other, and therefore all 
such descriptions presuppose a given political condition. 
The aims of the existing opponents, the character and 
numerical power of the two warring aUiances, are taken for 
granted. But at the same time, we ^11 know that the pohtical 
condition of any great campaign, though more stable than 
the military, is not really a constant by any means. It 
•changes slightly from month, to month with the temper of 
■ each alliance, etc. There nearly always comes a moment 
before the close of a war (there has always — throughout 
history — come such a moment before the close of a 
complicated, widespread and prolonged war) — when the 
change is rapid and very great. At such a moment the 
new condition of the pohtical factor must be noted lest one's 
further study of the purely military side should lose all touch 
,with reality. 
■, Take the following historical instances : . . 
. The Prussian General Staff in 1870, laid a p'.an to destroy 
the military jwwer of Nappleon III. They were more 
successful than had been any of their predecessors in modern 
European war. Within a few weeks of the first actions all 
■the regular forces of Napoleon III. were, in a military sense, 
out of the field. The arrnv in Metz was securely contained ; 
..tlje only other army, that of Sedan, had surrendered in its 
entirety. 
;.A rnan following from week to week the process of that 
■campaign would have had a right to say, on September 3rd, 
1870 : " Victory has been achieved : it has been achieved 
at such and such a cost in men, and at such and such a cost to 
.the -enemy." Indeed, if I am not mistaken, negotiations for 
peace were suggested immediately after these decisive Results. 
.Jftut the political factors which such a student would neces- 
isarily have taken for constant up to that date — it being a 
necessity to eliminate political variation if one is to con- 
centrate upon the military problem of the moment — suddenly 
changed, and that in so drastic a fashion as would have 
compelled the student to revise his terms in speaking of the 
war. The Kmpire was overthrown ; a provisional govern- 
ment of Radical barristers took its place. From mamly or 
partly dynastic, the war became entirely national, and the 
student of its further phases had to consider such factors as 
the military value of raw levies, the chances of the country's 
holding out ; the state of the opinion of Paris under the new 
condition of affairs ; the possibihty of civil war among the 
•French themselves, etc., etc. '.,"/ 
Here is another historical example of which we know mxich 
.less, but which js more applicable to the present great cam- 
paign — the close of the Second Punic War. The Carthagmians 
iai that great effort put themselves at the head of a very 
mi.xed Alliance, which was wholly dependent upon their '6ne 
strict command. The nucleus of their armed force %as 
'Carthaginian : the rest Gallic, Numidian, Iberian. "Their 
oltject was to destroy the rising European civilisation of 
Italy under the headship of Rome. In the earlier part of 
-the war they succeeded after a fashion which probably snr- 
•pfised themseh'es and certainly surprised all onlookers, and 
no one more than their opponents. The tide turned — largely 
Uirough the gradual wearing down of the invader's effectives. 
At last there came a moment when Rome , could be 
certain of imj)Osing some peace, but had to decide what sort 
of peace she would aim for. There came a moment, that is, 
when it was no longer doubtful that Carthage must abandon 
all idea of success, and could, for the future (like Prussia 
to-day) only hope to save herself in some degree, greater or 
less. In other words, ther6 came a moment when the original 
jx)htical factors, to wit, the determination on either side for a 
complete victory, were in process of change. Rome — 
happily for us — decided for continued effort and for- the 
greatest result obtainable. The war was carried into Africa. 
The power of Carthage was destroyed for ever, and with 
this event ti e civilisation which we have since enjoyed, was 
saved. Europe had conquered Africa ; our gods had thrown 
down the gods of T'ear. 
In this critical moment when alternative policies for the 
end of the war lay before the Roman mind, no one could or 
did survey the merely military aspect of affairs ; all were 
compelled to consider first the pohtical change that wa& in 
progress. • . • . 
Here is a third instance. 
T multiply these instances because no one historical example 
will ever fit the present, and because a number of them, 
therefore, provide better counsel than an isolated one. 
Napoleon invading Russia in 1812 could take as a political 
constant for his military plans, his own hegemony over the 
whole continent west of the Niemen. He could take as a 
constant the continued hostility and vigour of Great Britain, 
whose maritime power defied his efforts. After his declara- 
tion of war against the Czar, he could also take as a constant 
the determination of the Russians to withstand his invasion 
as best they might, though at first badly handicapped 
numerically, and to support a very heavy strain before he 
could force them to yield to his will.' Napoleon could further 
take as a constant his own well defined political object, 
which was not the conquest of Russia — an impossible task — 
but the acquirement of an agreement with Russia to stand 
by him against England and to share with him the mastery 
of Europe. 
Very welU With, these political factors, regarded as con- 
stant he undertook and carried out the campaign of 1812. 
Even after it was clear that he had failed to reach his political 
object in Russia ; even when the retreat from Moscow had 
begun, a contemporary observer would have been justified 
in reckoning the continued hegemony of Napoleon oVer 
Central and Western Europe as a jiolitical constant in the 
military situation. A student could still, on November 1st, 
i8i.>, have' said with justice: "Without discussing the 
political situation we may contrast the Emperor's recruiting 
power of such and such numbers per annum with that of his 
opponents." In this recruiting power such a student would 
have properly counted very much more than the French 
recniiting field. He would have included the Allied German 
States, the Italian Kingdom, etc. 
But long before the retreat had ended in its final disasters, 
a continued purely political calculation of this sort would 
have lost touch with reality. No analysis of contemporary 
military events would have had value which did not envisage 
a change in Napoleon's old ppsition. It was clear that 
certain Allies would be temptetl to abandon him, and that 
their example might l)e followed by others. As a matter of 
fact, the Hohenzollcrns, while outwardly professing to keep 
' their treaty with Napoleon, secretly joined his enemies, and 
there were other changes culminating in the famous volte 
^'Tacc of the King of Saxony at l.eipsic. Within 15 months of 
"'"the Be'resina thepolitical situation had so comj)letely changed 
'"Jthat Napoleon' was left dependent upon little more than the 
'French recruiting field for his further supply of men. 
Such instances of a critical political change in war might 
"be added to indefinitely. Every great campaign supplies its 
'■''owrt example of the kind. 
This, the greatest 'of all wars, has now clearly reached a stage 
in which the original political circumstances must be revised 
' if we are to estimate the actual military situation. 
Two political events of capital importance have just come 
into play almost at the same moment. Each of them 
suddenly creates a great military factor which was absent a 
very short time ago. liiach of them creates a new set of 
political conditions. 
