May 17, 1917 
XAND «& WATER 
The first of tiicse I'vcnts is tlic Russian Revolution ; the 
bccpnd IS the. dcterhii nation bl tiie American Goveniinent and- 
people to Join the Allies. . . 
The Rusisian Revolution is still , passing through very 
rapidly changing phases of development. Those who know 
tin; country best cannot pretend to judge what the next phase 
will be. They can do no more than state each position as it 
arises and leave the future f|uite dark. But in spite of 
this there are certaiti main features produced- by this enormous 
change which we all recognise. Unity of direction is for 
the nionifnt jeopardised. Varying views of the political 
end which tlie Russian pcojile now set before themselves 
each have weight and are each in conflict witli the rest — from 
a powerful section wliicli desires to change the old formula 
of the Allies to the still maintained official programme, a 
repetition of which was definitely pledged only the other 
day by one of the most powerful of all the Russian leaders. 
At the same time there has necessarily been considerable 
disorganisation in the Russian armies, and a rearrangement 
is still in progress in the various conunands. . • 
All this does not concern Russia alone, nor even Russia 
and her Allies alone. It reacts upon- the whole field of war. 
To take two opposite poles of its effect : It suddenly 
weakens, in Sweden, a deeply rooted historic mistrust of her 
eastern neighbour; it changes, in some degree at least, 
the nature of any negotiations which might be undertaken 
with the Turkish Government. . . 
Meanwhile the entry of tlie American Republic does- this : 
It ehminates from the list of neutrals (and the neutral attitude 
towards our blockade of the Central Empires was of immense 
importance) that one which is by far the chief of those neutrals. 
The effect of this is already felt not only upon the policy of 
blockade, but also upon the whole of Allied finance. Later 
it will be felt in the department of man-power as well. Further 
it is felt in all the present discussions upon the chances of the 
enemy's submarine programme. 
Those two prime changes, however, altering- though they do 
the whole political face of the war,' are not the only matters 
which have produced the critical political character of the 
present moment. We have added to them the fact that 
the next few months are the height of the season in which 
military action can be_ developed with the greatest intensity, 
in the West at least ". better visibility, longer dayhght, drier 
ground, less sickness. i 
Add to this the fact that these very same months are also 
those in which the strain for food will be especially severe 
in all belligerent countries. Add as a last isolated point -of 
great importance, that this is the moment from which onwards 
the original fully conscript belligerent Powers, and in par- 
ticular the Central Empires, necessarily decline in. numerical 
strength, leaving the Powers which came later into the 
struggle or developed their military resources later, to throw 
in their decisive weight. 
The Two Policies 
r: 
All these considerations being passed in review, and each 
given its due weight, there has arisen — on account of their 
number and complexity — a division of general opinion. There 
has arisen (1) a group of opinion wlrich looks to a deliberate 
prolongation of the war — what is called in the shortest 
terms " marking time " ; and (2) there is another group of 
opinion — which is also happily that of all those responsible 
for our pubhc action — ^which has decided that the present 
season determines the result of the war. 
These words do not mean that anyone is so, foolish as. to 
prophesy an actual decision within ■ such and such limits of 
time, but that the school of opinion here cited has no doubt 
whatever that, according to the vigour of the effort in this 
summer of 191 7, will be the degree of the final victory.. In 
other words, this second school says to the first : " Marking 
lime, in spite of your ar<;uments in favour of it, is throwing 
away the war." 
At this stage it is very necessary to distinguish between 
the proper function of journalism and the exceedingly im- 
proper and fantastic functions which journalists have ^00 
often undertaken since the outbreak of hostilities. A writer 
following and commenting upon the campaign is merely 
impertinent when he pretends to give advice to soldiers. VYar 
cannot possibly be conducted by opinion. It is necessarily 
conducted by the men in authority over it, by the men who 
actually experience each of its reactions, and by the men 
who alon(; arc in i>osscssion of that huge complex of iuforniatiou 
without which the pretence, to plan any movenient is the act 
of an idiot. When any man, even were he possessed of great 
past experience, proposes topiaise or blanie or even support, 
let alone to ciiticisc, without some knowledge of existing 
(and recent) conditions, he is necessarily incompetent, Jhe 
atteini)t to act in this fashion by men who ha\c no pretence 
even to general principles in war is ridiculous. 
.-••Wlrat "the- journalist can ■uscftflly and ', dutili^ly, jlflws 
to inform— v,ithin the limits that lin|it all .public"*-! j- 
formation. The value of such a task is that- it supp^ is 
- and confirms civilian opinion during the strain. It hasj 10 
other value ; but that work, if it is properly undertal^ n. 
may be justly regarded as a contribution to the forced' qj[ a 
nation at war. •' , , . \^' 
In the matter, therefore,- of these two policies,' aih'km.t 
journalists can effect of a u.seful kind is to support the 
determination which the, authorities have clearly undertattn 
to make the effort of 1917 the supreme effort of the war ; ^o 
point out why such a decision is necessary and vital anAo 
show how it fits in with the various conditions under wl»;h 
this last phase of the great series of campaigns is being fouglit 
out. 
The school which would spsak of " marking time " is, 
happily not in power and cannot, in the nature of things, 
Ix; in power. None of the men actually at grips with the 
strain would tolerate it for a moment. " But though we. .all 
feel instinctively that this concentration upon the effort of 
1917, upon the present fighting season, is an absolutely 
vital matter, we shall be the. better p/epared to comprehend 
the few months before us if we analyse the conditions that 
make it so. 
Arguments for the Right Policy 
There is, in the first place, the political or psychological 
effect of time. The war has already lasted close upon three 
years. It has lasted far longer than any commander, ':siave 
one, had thought possible when it broke out. It has developed 
wholly unexpected and novel conditions of fighting, which 
may yet be added to before its close ; above all, it has allowed 
us to judge of how rapidly under the pressure of intense 
emotion a political situation can develop. ; 
I will illustrate this factor of time and its effect on policy 
by the example of Poland. Many others might be chosen, 
but it is the clearest of them all. We arc assisting at 'the 
recreation of Poland under our very eyes. I will take that 
one point and examine it thoroughly, making it serve the 
place of a wider survey, for it is a sort of test of the policy 
of which I speak. ■ - 
When the war broke out, and for many months after it 
broke out, the reconstruction of Poland was a pious hope, 
or a vague formula, or — worst of all, a taboo. Men dated 
not define their policy for Poland in either camp. It was 
certainly still in this condition when the great Russian retreat 
through Poland began. I think we may say that it was 
still in this condition even some weeks after the advance' of 
the Austro-German armies had reached its limit and was 
stayed. 
Look at the poUtical position to-day, and observe the 
tremendous change which the last twelve months have wrought. 
There is now a clean cut opposition between two political 
objects in Poland and it is the strain which 1917 shall impose 
upon the enemy, the result attd success of that strain, which 
'will decide ivhich object may be attained : our enemies' or our 
own. ■'' ■ :'■ 
On the one hand you have the plan, formulated, con- 
crete, '' in possession " so to speak, which suits the Central 
Powers. A Poland is to be. The Prussian crime of the iSth 
century, the mere murder of a nation, has failed. Althoiitgh 
America has now entered the Avar, and although therefore -the 
authorities at Berlin have less need than they had to oon- 
sider the American ideal of freedom ; although Berlin can 
profess to feel the Eastern menace less ; although the scheme 
for a Polish recruitment has broken down — yet the Central 
Empires are constrained to recreate Poland in some fashion- 
&at what is that fashion? It is proposed to erect, an 
autonomous inland state, monarchical, mutilated, restricted 
to the boundaties of the so-called "Russian" provinces, 
.with the Prassian and Austrian provinces retained as hostages. 
.', .'fwo things the Central Empires cannot give consistently 
with their dynastic and national objects in continuing their 
defence. They cannot give unity to Poland, that is completion 
' arid restoration of the whole Polish soil; they cannot give 
^'"t>^^izic and the door upon the Baltic. A Poland that was 
"vipfv" great would, in proportion as it was great, menace the 
, ,,vevy heart of Prussia, whose role it has been to crucify Poland, 
and the very meaning of Hapsburg Austria whose role it 
,,'lias been to lead or to group — at any rate to bo the political 
liead of — the Catholic Slavs, and whose method (if she is to 
cojiiinue at all) is to divide tlie races ruled. 
,, As against tiiis clear, concrete and afmost detailed con- 
ception of the Polish solution — which is the enemy's ton- 
ception actually at work to-day — you have the ob-vious cout»tcr- 
policy of the Alhes ! A completely united and strong Poland 
with full access tu the Baltic and with Dannie fur its pbft ; 
