May 1/ , 1917 
LAND & WATER 
II 
Land and Water and the Admiralty 
Genesis of the Changes at Whitehall 
THE INDICTMENT 
Land & Watek, April icjtli. 
■' The Chiefs of the greatest navy in the wurld have simply 
failed in so crucial, yet elementary, a duty as protecting the 
sea borne commerce of a sea-girt people." 
Land & Water, — Feb. 8th, 191 7 (page 7.) 
" In August 1014 people asked how Germany's invincible 
land army could he balanced by Great Britain's invincible 
sea fleet. It is ])art of the topsyturvydom in which we 
li ve that the greatest land force and the greatest sea force 
in the world have achieved everything expected of them— 
except victory. The failure to achieve victory has given time 
to each side. Time, in which we have been able to produce 
a new kind of army that Germany will not be able to resist, 
time for Germany to produce a new kind of navy which we do 
not seem yet able to light." 
Land & Water, — Feb. 15th, 1917. 
" The Admiralty's two immediate functions have during 
the last two months been made the care of an organisation 
very greatly extended from that formerly charged with it, 
and the' direct head of this organisation is the First Sea Lord 
himself. The two main aspects of the submarine campaign 
then are, and for two months have been, directly imder Sir 
John Jellicoe. He has, to carry out the policy resolved on, 
an oiganisation of captains and commanders directed by a 
n.'ar-admiral." 
Land & Water, -Feb. 22nd (page 12.) 
" The chief vice of the Fisher system was this. The First 
Sea Lord was to be an autocrat. He was surrounded by 
advisers. Controller. Director of Naval Ordnance, etc. ; 
each of whom was an autocrat too, so long, of course, as he 
did not interfere with the major autocracy of his chief. The 
elfect of this was to create a special caste quite distinct 
and, with one or two notable exceptions, (juite foreign to the 
naval service. It could only continue by the suppression 
of all independent thinking in the Navy." 
THE REASONS FOR FAILURE 
(1) The Personnel of the Higher Command 
" Mr. Balfour has hitherto thought it premature to change 
(his advisers), probably for the reason that the course of 
the war has not indicated with sufficient clearness those 
who are marked out to succeed them. This vagueness 
as to the fitness of men is part of the penalty we pay for 
the fact that, in the ten years preceding the war, naval 
administration was entirely in the hands of one school of 
naval thought which had held the study of the principles 
of naval war — as exhibited by history and analysis — in 
absolute contempt. This predominance had the result that 
almost all officers who had less faith in mere material than 
in military principle, who beUeved that war could be trained 
for by scientific methods, were ostracised both from high 
' commands and from posts of administrative responsibility. 
What may be called the historical and technical schools of 
thought, therefore, never had a chance of achieving that 
welding of past experience with modem weapons on the 
achievement of which, as everyone can now see, the suc- 
:essful use of new material can alone be based. It was the 
proscription of these officers that really explains the anar- 
:hy of thought that prevailed at Whitehall in the closing 
years of peace, and it is no wonder if it is a difficult thing 
now to pick out the men who best combine personal ability 
with the grip of the right principles on which their energies 
should be employed, Mr. Balfour, having once found that the 
situation had not been met by the blind acceptance of the 
advisers he inherited, may now find that it may not be his 
first or even his second cJwice of advisers that will meet the 
case. But the past at least has this lesson, that, could a new 
occasion for revising appointments arise, it may be acted 
on with great alacrity." — Land & Water, Nov. 30th, igi6. 
(2) The System 
" The function of the Admiralty is to produce and command 
a purely military force, the fleet. The production and admin- 
istration of this force constitute, no doubt, a colossal task, 
but nine-tenths of it is purely civilian in its character . . . 
I believe that the real reason why the Admiralty has broken 
down in this war, is, first, that we have jumblcr' all the fur.- - 
tions, civihan and military, together, and sliu\ed them on to 
a single Board. 
" It remains to j)oint the moral of this experience. If we 
wish our sea forces put to their proper use, it is an indispensable 
first step to arrange that the chief command shall be organised 
on scientific principles. This is impossible without recognis- 
ing two axioms. First, we must distinguish absolutely 
between the authority responsible for the military handling 
of the navy, and the alithority responsible for its material 
supply. Unless this is done it is hopeless to think that the 
fighting instinct of the navy can be given its full expression 
or scope. Next, in arranging for its military direction, we 
must recognise what the wisdom of our ancestors discovered, 
to wit, that the employment of sea force is surrounded by 
so many and such subtle problems that the supreme con- 
trol .cannot be entrusted to a single individual, but must be 
carried on by a Board, the chief professional member of which 
though the chief, is only primus inter pares. 
" The application of these principles to present circum- 
stances would necessitate the partition of the work of the 
Admiralty between two bodies — one a Board of Admiralty, 
the other a Board of Supply."—" Flag Officer " in Land '&. 
Water, April 26th. 
(3) The Voice of Authority 
" The chief department of any figliting oiganisjition sliould 
surely be that which designs and directs the fighting. What I 
understand " Flag Officer " to desire is that the duties of military 
design and direction, with all that properly belongs to them, 
should be grouped into one department, at the head of which 
should be placed an Admiral selected fur his capacity as a 
iisar' commander or director. That arrangement wottkl leave 
the supply of the navy,' with its materiel, to the Third Sea 
Lord, or Controller, the manning and discipline to the 
Second Sea Lord, and the supplies and transport to the Fourth, 
while it would provide the Government with a qualified 
adviser in regard to the strategical distribution of the Navy 
in the person of the First Sea Lord ... 
" What 'Flag Officer ' now asks the members of the Cabinet 
to do is to fill up a gap in the organisation by appointing a 
special officer to take charge, under their own authority, of 
the conduct of the naval war. The moment they decide to do 
that they will see the advisability of selecting for the task 
some officer who has taken the only means of acquiring 
mastery of that particular business — has devoted his life to 
nothing else." — Professor Spenser Wilkinson in the Times 
on May 4th. 
" Out of twelve and a half years immediately preceding 
the war. Sir John Jellicoe spent nearly eight at the Admiralty 
and more than six in taking care of materiel, which is cer- 
tainly not the best training either for a Commander-in-Chief 
or for a First Sea Lord in war time, when our first considera- 
tion is not so much the preservation of our own materiel 
as the destruction of the enemy's at a legitimate cost." — • 
Truth, May 2nd. 
" The Prime Minister, in his recent speech at the Guildhall 
is reported to have said that one way to deal with the sub- 
marine was to destroy it or to render it innocuous. He added 
that ' the best brains available in this country and America, 
and to a more limited extent, in France, are applying their en- 
ergies to that problem.' This seems to meah that rehance is 
placed on some mechanical invention to soh'e the present 
difficulties. May I be permitted to point out that, while it is 
most necessary to make the utmost use oi all mechanical 
ability in the Allied countries, no mechanical invention will 
be of any avail if the military policy is unsound ? The problem 
is essentially mihtary, and not mechanical. Its .solution 
depends upon the correct military use of the naval armed 
force. Is the Prime Minister quite sure that the great naval 
preponderance of the Allies has been, and is being used to 
the best advantage ? " — Admiral Sir Reginald Custance in the 
Times of May 4th. 
" The cause of the tactical failure to take aclvantage of 
the opportuinties to destroy the German armed ships was ex- 
plained by Admiral Sir John JelUcoe in his speech at the 
iMshmongers Hall on January nth, 1917. He is reported to 
have said that ' the torpedo, as fired from surface vessels, is 
effective certainly upt6 10,000 yards' range, and this requires 
that a ship shall keep beyond that distance to fight her guns.' 
This is the logical result of the doctrine that the destruction 
of the enemy's armed ships is only of secondary importance. 
.V superior fleet, however favourable may be the opportunity. 
