Tune'7, 1917 
r.AND & WATER 
II 
The Policy of the War— IV 
By Hilaire Belloc 
Victory or Defeat 
THE war ripens. It is in the consciousness of all 
Europa that its turning point is at hand. The length 
of time already past, the doubts of international finance 
upon the fortunes of further loans, the pouring out of 
lives, and the staleness of the strain, are bringing us to the 
]()int where the exhausted enemy can, for the first time in 
• the long process of his agony, play a strong political 'card, 
lie is piaying it with all the energy remaining to him — he js 
jilaying it not only in Russia and at Stockholm, but in public 
statement through the suggestion and the repetition which 
he hopes may shake resolution even in France and lingland. 
It is the moment, if ever there was one, in this great busi- 
ness, when opinion must make itself secure once and for ever, 
l)()tli by memory and by anticipation, of what the core of thiS 
great conflict has been and must continue to be. 
We have before us now, as the summer of 1917 opeus, very 
plainly contrasted, Victory or Defeat. If we refuse the first 
in any degree, we accept the second. 
The will is the same as ever, but the intellectual confusiort 
is greater. We must reduce that confusion if wc are te pro*- 
ceetl. 
The will, 1 say, is _______ 
sountl enougli. 
With tiie exception of 
a tiny group of men, 
every individual in the 
Allied Western nations is 
])erfectly clear in the 
matter of the will. Tiic 
enemy must suffer mili- 
tary defeat. The Alliance 
must be mihtarily vic- 
torious. For that the 
l>lain man who is the 
i^:p? of the nition has 
already sacrificed very 
much indeed, and for 
that he [is as ivmW as 
ever to sacillicc all the 
rest. It is a mere accident 
of our time, with its 
absurd exaggeration of 
intellectual tccentricities, 
and its vile professional 
politics that the insignificant number (they arc ihs'ghiiacafit 
ill character as well as in number) wh<' fear or oislike or 
are for reason of parliamentary intrgje opposing the idea 
of victory, sjiould have been lieard at all. Tiie masi is 
absolutely sound. ' -n' 
Hut the moment it comes to a delii.ition of what victory 
means it is curious to note what a hotchpotch of clelinitiohs 
you receive. For one man the definition involves a lot of 
htrange abstractions ending in " ism." We are to majce 
" nationalism destroy militarism," and so forth. For another 
we are to free millions of Germans who are panting for a thing 
called Democracy, and to relieve them from their crUel 
taskmasters who. it seems, are called Junkers. Many another 
well-meaning man will tell you that th<: whole war being due 
to a person called " the Kaisfr,-' the object of the- war is^to 
dethrone that wicked man. Yet another will assure you tljat 
this country is fighting for no sfnmd concrete object bot 
merely from indignation a,gainst evil at large. "*■ 
'Iherc is no real discic])aney between these various defini- 
tions, because they are each of tliem but portions of a general 
spirit which all men share.' One iriafi may be- wrofig about 
the personal causes of the war, another about the constitution 
of the enemy's society, but all are at liottom agreed that they 
are f-ghting something which is deadly ' to the continued 
haj)piness and greatness of this nation. 
To clear up this sort of confusion and to get our minds 
steady upon the issue is exceedingly important. For if we 
are not clear upon it we shall have no determined goal to which 
the whole national energy may be set the moment victory is 
in s'ght. • . • 
The enemy has such a goal, and has always had one : It 
IS the expirision of the German-speaking tribei their preserice 
abroad, their acquirement of wealth and their power of control 
\er subject; races at the expense of our ancient European 
civili.sation and particularly of this country. Failing to attain 
this by his first attack, in spite of long secret and treacherou!^ 
preparation, he is condemned— for the moment,, and under the 
hard pressure of necessity — to self-defence only, and to 
saving as much as he can save of his national power. He 
still believes his aim must ultimately prevail ; if not in this 
war then in some future war. If not by war then by industry 
and organisation during peace. 
The enemy, 1 say, is m no doubt upon the goal of his efforts 
at all, and npver has been. His Allies, who are also his 
servants, may have their divergent views. Hut he, the Prus- , 
sianised German, is perfectly simple in his ends. If he cuts 
down his programme at all it is simply because he must for 
the moment cut it down. He in no way abandons the spirit 
or even the ultimate scope of that progiamme. We canno,t 
read a typical modern German book or even a typical modern . 
newspaper article without seeing that this is the case. 
Well, we must meet that determine^ act of will" on tlye'' 
enemy's part, based as it is on clear thinking,.hy an ,equalU' 
definite act of will based on an equally clear state of minj. 
To arrive at it we ?hall do well to isolate for the moment the 
particular necessities of this jiatioji. — Great Britain and all 
her system — from the 
gmeral necessities of the 
•• F-uropean Alliance as u 
whole,, Let us considcj- 
'^at is, meant for 
lingland .by Victory anU-. 
Defeat. ' _ ' . ' 
The word " victory," 
as - applied to the actio(i 
of itrmics in the fieki, • 
signifies the putting uf 
one's oppiment's army 
out of action. Whether 
this be by disintegratioji 
or bv surrender, or by 
exhaustion, or even by 
e.\terminati,on, ■ that fs 
wl,iat victory in the iielil 
means,- ~\'-ou disarm yoiir 
enemy. And in pr*;- 
portion as you_ disan^i 
■ . j_; tiim in that propbi;tion is 
your victory corriplete. • 
• But victory in the fiefd 
is only tlie preliminary and • the me^ns to full victory. 
Victory in the full sense of the word is a political thing; 
' it is defined as tiio imposition of the will of the victor 
lipon the vanipiished. Victory is achieved wlipii what 
: the victorious party desires politically is accomplished. If 
it is only imperfectly accomplished in the political sphere, 
then-, however complete the mU'tary victory wliich preceded 
it, the^ real victory is incomplete: ; But if after the success 
of the armiestthe political, A^bj^ct is attained, then you have 
. true victory.: .■:.'■,-(-)-;?". 
:lu)r instance, Prussia, fifty years ago, desired to put undcf 
-her own guidance all who spoke the German tongue: To.des- 
. tnoy the power of foreigners, against suclj aunifijCation of 
the : (icmians under her .hegemony, to hold alien . frontier 
• ])opulatif)ns ;is,a safegimrd.agrt'nst future enemies, ^ and ^0 
develop by her own methods tiie asitftte so acquired. 
Her military victories were -complete ; first against other 
Gi'ilTians, thi'n agcrinst .tJir mixed powers of the limpire, then 
against Uic French. Hut if (»h.e had not,, under the inspiration 
of Bismarck, proceeded -tu .translate military, victory into 
political achievement, isiic'iwould I not have l>een truly vjc- 
toricHus. ■ She. was ttruly . vjctoriou^, with all ,thc enormous 
consequences tliat.iollowed uix>n her victory, because lier 
political aims were well .defined yiuj carried out. She took 
over just what slie.'intefrdcd/ (and mJ more) of direct political 
control nn North Germany. ; She maxl^^'^ubseryient to her, 
though- in part' autonomous, M4iat she knew she could not 
directly absorb. She" retained the military power over, and 
the inspiration , of, the ndw German Empire. Slie. treated 
defeated Austriaf ini.just that fashion >vhich made it most pro- 
hablf that the future. -would .see all the German-speaking part 
gradually turn into her .own, orbit , and the rest. Magyar and 
SlaV^,' remain - sufficiently -attached to the German-speaking 
part to prevent disruption, and to form a secure alliance. 
Wc have the honour to publish the following 
messiige from H.E. the Anwricah Ambassadors'^ 
TIT'ITH all Americans, I appreciate 
the courtesy of Land & Water in 
publishing a special American edition, 
which is still another evidence of the 
British welcome of the United States 
" into the war to save the world. 
.: WALTE% H: "PAGE 
