1-4 
LAND & WATER 
June 7, 1917 
also meant that a larger prtiportion of German divisions were 
present upon comparatively quiet sectors at any moment, and 
the shrinking of the size of the divisions meant, of course, that 
the using up of so many chvisions was not equivalent in men 
to the using up of a simiUir number last year. Thus the rate 
of wastage, therefore, is. not three, nor anything like three 
times what it was last year ; though it is probably not double 
what it was last year, it is still very much higher. , It is 
certainly more than 50 per cent, and ]ierhaps nearer 75 per 
cent., and it is this enormous new rate of wastage which 
conditions the whole military problem in the West for the 
enemy during the summer of 1917. 
We all know the uncertain factor in the business. It is 
the Russian situation. 1 showed last week what that situa- 
tion was numerically I mean the situation of the enemy upon 
till- Eastern front when he had reduced his cuitain of men there 
to a minimum, and I said. I think rightly, that so long as the 
]x>litical situation remained what it n(jw is, this minimum 
could hardl\- bi^ reduced. It is clear that this great " if " 
dominates the whole thing. 
If the enemy must remain at least watching a still doubtfvd 
situation in the East, if he is compelled, say throughout June 
and July, to maintain a continuouf^line. then his rate of wastage 
which will continue upon the West is of the very gravest 
character for his fortunes. Hut if in tiiat ])eriod things change 
so th;tt he can seriously reinforce from the East, it will be a 
very «Iit?erent matter. 
Meanwhile, everyone at home ought to understand clearly 
that these apparent lulls of which that of the last fortnight has 
been the most conspicuous, look very different indeed at the- 
front from what they do at home. The Allied bombardment is 
continuous ; the shells that strike at once the moral and the. 
numbers of the enemy are delivered against him in over- 
whelmingly greater numbers than his against our lines. There 
are many now writing in the Enghsh Press who have seen the 
sight for themselves- I saw it last week — and it is conclusive. 
All day and all night this terrible shelling continues, and the 
pressure in mere weight of metal is wholly against the enem\ . 
Hut more important even than this preponderance in weight 
of metal is the accuracy with which it is handled, and that we 
owe to the continued, ami let us hope, invincible superiority in 
the air which has long been attained by the Allies. 
To take counter-battery work alone, that is, the work of 
tlie gutis wcupied in destroying or sih-ncing the guns of the 
other side. It would not be an exceptional day in which twice 
as many shells sought the enemy batteries from the British 
side as sought the British batteries from the enemy's side. 
It would not be an exceptional day in which the two-fold eftort 
of the British counted 50 per cent, successful hits, that is, the 
striking of the gun pits aimed at, or, at any rate, the silencing 
of their pieces, as compared with a 25 per cent, measure of 
success on the ])art of the enemy. And that sort of superioritj* 
is cumulative in its effect and is going im day after day, though 
there is no appreciable movement upon the map, anil the 
despatches leave us hardly anything to record. 
II. Bfiloc. 
The U.S. Navy in the War 
By Arthur Pollen 
THOSE that follow the German press closely remem- 
bering, as, of course, they do, that nothing appears 
there, whether on one side of any particular con- 
troversy or the other, unless it serves directly or 
indirectly the various pobcies of the Higher Command, 
gimerally learn more from noticing the subjects which 
may not be mentioned than from particular statements of 
tact or opinion on the subjects that may. For many weeks 
now, in fact ever since the last mention of it by the Chan- 
cellor in the Reichstag, German public speakers and writers 
have been almost entirely silent on the part our new Ally is 
to ]>lay in the war, with the single exception of Harden, 
who has been allowed to warn his countrymen that to under- 
rate American power will be as foolish a blunder as was the 
original behttling of Great Britain. This boycotting of the 
subject is significant. There is manifestly a strong pohtical 
reason why the change created by American intervention 
should not be too early brought home to the people of Ger- 
many. Many explanations occur to one, not the least pro- 
bable is that the Central Powers are likely to make an early 
•liter of peace, that they \^s1j tji^ President and Congress to 
be on their side when the offer is made, and so are wisely 
abstaining from discussions which might lead to provocative 
and insulting language, and so to a further exasperation of 
American sympathy. For a similar reason no attack of any 
kind has yet been made upon any American seaboard town. 
Whether or not American shipping is being deliberately 
omitted from submarine attentions we can hardly judge ; 
for we do not know the facts, nor how the policy of secrecy 
is being applied to them. But it is certainly significant that 
we have heard of so few American ships and so far no liner 
being sunk, or even attacked, by submarines. 
It is then a possibility of the situation that the Germans 
for the moment are domg all they can, not, of course, to 
keep America out of the war, but to prevent Americans from 
being spurred on to make greater efforts in it. Now what 
is the most natural deduction ? It is that the enemy is 
none too happy with the possibihties of the situation. These 
may develop in two directions. The Conscription Bill has 
])a.ssed both Houses — and the machinery for raising the 
hrst half-milhon is being set up. Eong before the snow- 
is off the ground next spring, the first American armies, of 
100,000 men each, will be taking their place with their arms, 
pfjuipment and reserves complete ; and a second half million 
will be getting ready to support them before summer passes 
into autumn. This is not a prospect that can be faced with 
any equanimity. If the numl^ers and tenacity of the older 
Allies are not equal to inflicting a final military defeat on 
tiermany before the first of the American armies take the 
field in ic)i>'. that these armies can secure t.hat military defeat 
before wmter comes, must appear even to the most sanguine 
of Huns a mathematical certainty. But this is only one of 
the possibilities of the situation. 
The iikiinate sliaro of the .American iia\y in the wnr ni.nv 
seem to be only less obviously decisive, because we b.ave got 
used to looking upon the preponderance of the British flett 
in the North Sea as a thing so well established as to need no 
reinforcement. This general view of this question is, how- 
ever, based on rather too .simple a view of the existing political 
situation. It certainly does not take account ot changes 
which are far from improbable. For example, we have 
learned in the last fortnight certain facts about the Nor- 
wegian losses by submarines, which can hardly be added to 
without effect on the attitude of that country. Since the 
beginning of the war Norway has lost over 5<jo ships, dis- 
placing approximately 750,000 tons. It represents a diminu- 
tion of the mercantile marine by over a third, and half ot 
this loss has been incurred in the first four months of this 
year. That country has, in fact, been lo-ing ships since the 
beginning of the ruthless campaign at a rate exceeding 50 
per .cent, per annum of their peace-time tonnage. There 
may bi^ ten thousand reasons why Norway should keep out 
of the war. There is here manifestly one reason why she 
should come in. And if it is emphasised by further losses 
the argument it ])resents may, be irresistible. It has con- 
stantly been pointed out in thest: columns that the (ierman 
effort to cut our sea communications is just as directly a 
declaration of war against Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 
Holland, Spain and Greece, as it is an act of war against 
France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy. Holland and 
Denmark are quite possibly so placed geographically as to 
make active resentment entirely out of tlie question. The 
lesson of Belgium has not been lost upon them. Hut Spain, 
Holland and Sweden stand in a different relation. How d<R'S 
American belligerency affect^it .' 
; There is first the moral and intellectual effect of a demo- 
cratic country — with no objects of its own to gain and with 
but very moderate material interests to defend— throwing 
oft the oldest and most cherished of its political traditions 
and making the cause of Europe its own, without ulterior 
purpose than the preservation of our common standards of 
right conduct between nations. In Sweden, Norway and 
Spain the institution of monarchy is of the British, not of the 
German character. In all three countries it is the repre- 
sentative assemblies of the nation, not the crowned sovereign, 
that rule. It is, therefore, in the voters and noi, cither in a 
single autocrat, in the army chiefs, or in the government 
ortices that the source of national power is to be found. In 
all three countries, therefore, the effect of the American 
example has been profound. In Norway, and still more in 
Sw«len, the effect of the Russian revolution can hardly have 
been less. With Finnish liberties restored, all fear of Russian 
aggression from the north has been removed, and the great 
Scandinavian Peninsular can now have no possible fear of 
invasion by land. The traditional distrust of Russia, then, 
that made Sweden look to Germany immediately for sym- 
l^athy and ultimately for help, is gone for ever. Loyalty to 
I hi-; tt;i(liti,in Ii;is in f lie (•■^<,■ uf Sweden survived the ;i«lniind- 
J 
