June 7, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
15 
ing series of insults to her Sovereignty. And no doubt the 
action of Norway in having to endure the steady destruction 
of lier marine has been, first a consciousness tiiat Sweden was 
very unhkely to co-operate, and secondly, a not unreasonable 
doubt that Great Britain's hands might in a naval sense be 
too full to aftord her the help that belligerency would make 
imperative. It is exactly at this point that American inter- 
\cntion changes the entire situation. 
A Possible North Sea Base 
\\'ith eighteen battleships, whose aggregate gunpower is 
vastly superior to that of the whole German battle and 
battle cruiser fleet, the Americans are in a position, should 
Norway elect for belligerency, to establish a North Sea base 
directly threatening both the Sound, Heligoland and the 
exits of the German fleet, which would have a far more pro- 
found effect on North Sea strategy than the mere menace ui 
the German battle fleet implies. For it must not be forgotten 
that one of the main advantages that the enemy has derived 
from the neutrality of the Scandinavias, is. his liberty to use 
their territorial waters, either for running cargoes directly 
into his own harbours or into those of countries powerless to 
resist his demand that contraband should be shipped through 
to him. With Norwegian territorial waters no longer neutral 
and with the Sound no longer an open passage, the problem of 
the closer blockade is entirely revolutionised. Add to this 
that American belligerency gives to the Alliance a new 
power of checking the shipping of supplies ultimately destined 
lor the enemy, and an entirely new situation is created. 
But there is another cpiestion to which attention has been 
directed here more than once during the last six months, and 
tliat is the possiliility of direct offensive operations against 
the German bases. I am still of opinion that such operatibns 
cannot be undertaken with any hope of success, without 
special preparations which may take six months or more to 
complete. The character of those preparations, the special 
construction which they will involve, the demands they will 
make on the shipbuilding, the gun-making and the munition 
])iodncing capacities of the older and the new belligerents, 
need not be sj)ecirted. But it is clear that here again the whole 
character of the problem is changed by the fact that the 
American navy is ready to take a most active jjart. 
Finally, there is the iiuestioa of Spain. We have recently 
seen the more progressive elements in that country have been 
protesting, with every circumstance of' public sincerity and 
indignation, against the cruelties and humiliation that 
Germany has inflicted upon that proud and ancient kmgdom. 
That German influence with large and influential classes in 
Si)ain has been great was for a long time painfully obvious. 
If the Spanish press is to be trusted, it is hardly to be doubted 
that the enemy's submarine campaign, both in the Bay of 
Biscay and in the Mediterranean, has largely been' made 
possible by the help that Spanish sympathisers have afforded 
to the pirate crews. Nothing has been published about anv 
representations on this subject to the Spanish Government 
by our Foreign Office, but it is quite unnecessary to remind 
the reader, whether such protests have been made or not, 
should it be proved— and again I say, if the Spanish press 
is to be trusted, the evidence is irresistible— that such help 
has been given and that the Government has been negligent 
in permitting it, a situation results in which the Spanish 
Government is responsible for the losses which submarines 
so assisted have caused. On this point the precedent of the 
Alabama claims is final. 
Now if such a state of affairs as this has existed in Spain, 
if, as we seem to learn, at least one large section of the Spanish 
people is protesting and asking for an entire change of (iovern- 
nient attitude towards (iermany, we may here, too, be drifting 
towards a political development of the utmost imi)ortance, 
and it is exactly here that once more the influence of American 
sea jxjwer may turn out to be paramount, for the ties between 
S|?aiu and the Southern American States that are Spanish in 
origin; though politically non-existent, arc commercially 
strong. We are already familiar with the list of South 
American States who are either at war with Germany or 
have broken off relations, or are preparing to do so. Spain 
is thus being bnnight face to face with a unanimity of senti- 
ment in the new world, north and south, which may decide 
her attitude. Should she elect for belligerency, the ])ossi- 
bilities for naval co-operation from a continuous string of 
bases from Kirkwall to Gibraltar opens a new field for the sea 
arms of all tlie Allies. 
That there are objections and quite serious objections to the 
American fleet basing itself in the North Sea, instead of in 
America, is obvious enough. There is at once a new demand 
made upon ship])ing, which would otherwise be devoted to 
supplies, and this might mean a reduction which, at our 
present rate of loss, would perhaps be grave. So far from it 
l)eing the least, it is in all resuects the most serious of the 
results of the submarine campaign, that it must have this 
chrect effect in limiting the exercise of naval power just as it 
has luuloubtedly limited militaiy jiower by excluding 
the possibilities of amphibious operations in the Meditei- 
ranean, where a flank stroke at the Turkish communications 
would clearly make the whole dilierence both to the Palestine 
and to the Tigris operations. Th.c extension of American 
activities then is not a (juestion that can be answered sim])ly 
by ascertaining whether or not Norway or Spain wish to joiii 
the Allies, or whether the American battle fleet would like 
to take its place in the European field of war. There is no 
immediate answer possible to the first ouestion, though the 
answer to the second is obvious 
The truth of the matter seems to be that we are face to 
face with a strategical position in which the enormous sea 
power of the Allies is an incalculable potenliul force, but that 
this application of it in any particular direction is beset witii 
extraordinary difficulties, both technical and political. It is 
manifestly a case for deep study by the best strategical brains 
we can muster, and in choosing one course or other — out of 
the many that offer— the strategists will, themselves have to 
be limited by the technical feasibility of each plan l)y the 
resources available for producing the craft and devices - 
many of which must be of new patterns — for carrying any of 
these plans into effect ; and by the economic resources which 
a marauding enemy has left to us. 
And in this connection it must again be emphasised that 
the problem of the submarine can never rightly be solved, 
unless it is recognised from the first that our policy with 
regard to it must be based t^rimarily on military and only 
ucondarily on ecoiuimic princi])les. The intervi<>w with the. 
First Sea Lord, to which I alluded last week, makes a strong 
point of the distinction between the campaign directed 
tiiwards extinguishing the menace of the submarine and that 
directed towards protecting merchant shipping. As to the 
first, said Sir John Jellicoe, effective means are still to seely. 
There is here the field for the inventor. As to the second, 
numbers can only bring security. It is pleasant to' find that 
a point insisted onin these columns so long ago as July 
i()i5 is thus conhrmed on the highest official authority. 
It was in an issue of that month that it was assumed that 
tlie moment the submarine campaign was threatened in 
Decemiier, that our destroyer programme was proportionately 
enlarged to meet it. And that since the threat materiahsetl 
in February this magnified programme had been " doubled, 
trebled and quadrupled." It was also pointed out that, 
%«th these vastly multiplied resources there should come a 
narrowing of the submarine field by the direction of all traffic 
into areas it would be possible to patrol, so that in a com- 
bination of guarded routes and protected convoys safety 
could be sougnt. I take no credit for this statement, for the 
o])inions were common to everyone who knew the rudiments 
of the situation. But the fact that they should need emphasis 
now from the First Sea Lord seems to suggest that these arc 
not the principles on which his predeces.sors, the Admiralty, 
acted during the last two years. 
In this matter, then, as in so many others, we have to 
make a special appeal to our nfew AUics to help us. They 
have been extraordinarily prompt in offering us what aid 
was available, and the efficiency of the craft already over 
here is hardly surpassed by the goodwill and energy "of the 
ofliccrs that command them. It is not surprising that the 
mere presence of so vigorous an Ally, accompanied as it has 
been by a return of our submarine losses to the level of 
February and March, should have put fresh heart into the 
pubHc. There is no question that public confidence is higher 
to-day than it was, say, a month ago. But there is a grave 
\>zr\\ in this. Ministers and writers in the press have told us 
vaguely, that the anti-submarine caminiign is more effective 
than it was. This may well be, without tliis deduction being 
]>ermissible, that the submarine is any less threatening than 
it was. The public deceives itself if it supposes that any 
variation in the rate of loss can rightly be interpreted to show 
a proved limit of the submarines' ])ower. I believe the idea 
that we have reduced, or can yet reduce, the number of sub- 
marines to negligible proportions, is as baseless as the theory 
that only to lose i« ships a week displacing over 1,(100 tons 
each, is a state of aft'airs we can look upon with complacency. 
If ]>eopIe would but remember that this takes no account of 
neutral losses and leally represents a level of destruction 
considerably more than twice as high as was ever attained in 
any of the submarine campaigns in the preceding two years, 
they would understand that there is not yet here any matter 
for congratulation. Thus, whatever aspect of the naval 
position we look at, we are brought back to the same point, 
the burning neces.sity of a new strategy, offensive— because 
warlike— in its purpose, and one that is shaped in view of 
the vast dilfeitnce in our resources that the American 
AUiance lias introduced- 
Arthur Pollen. 
