LAND & WATER 
June c8, 1917 
German Disintegration on the West 
By Edmund Dane 
BOTH the German attack upon the French position^ 
^<Juth of the valley of the Ailettc — the various and 
successive enemy efforts here all formed part of one 
enterprise — and the results of that attack, so far, 
merit particular attention. From the German standpoint 
the attack was undertaken as an effort of rtrst-class import- 
ance, and the evidence goes to show not only careful and 
complete preparation to ensure success, but that the pre- 
I)aration was inspired by hopes of very significant political 
conseipiences if success followed. 
Hy success in this connection has to be understood such a 
breach in the French position as would, by destroying their 
tnntinuity, have compelled the abandonment of all those 
parts <)f the Craonne Ridge and tothe westwarcl'of it from which 
the ]>ench, holding them, have direct observation over the 
enemy lines in the valley o{ the Ailette, and eastward of 
< raonne over tjie enemy lines in the valley of the Aisne, and 
its tributaries the .Miette, and the Suippe. Anything short 
of that woukl.not be success. The seizure liere and there, 
for exami)le, of the first line of French trenches, or even the 
seizure hen- or there of a salient in the French front would 
not be a success, for such local gains tcere not the objective. 
Much less would such local gains be a success if they proved 
merely temporary : still less if the cost of such local gains 
turned out to be high. All these arc no more than several 
degrees of failure. 
It is i-vident that, in the preseiit situation of the German 
forces in hYance, an fftort of this kind was not one lightly 
to be undertaken. If hopes of significant poUtical conse- 
quences rested upon its success, military- consequences hardly 
less significant must result from its want of success. 
As was the case to begin with regarding the German 
attacks at Verdun, the meaning of this counter-offensive 
along the valley of the Ailette lia's apparentlv been involved 
in some mystery. It may help to clear that mystery up, 
and at the same time to show the importance of the attempt 
from the German standpoint, if the matter be considered 
lirst under its strategical aspect ; next with reference to its 
political pur-pose ; and lastly, in the light of the tactics em- 
l)loye<. 
Primitive Notions 
(I). The German began the war with comparatively up-to- 
date theories. There was no question then that the chief aim 
was to destroy the hostile forces, and in the briefest possible 
time. But as the war has gone on, those theories 
haw been either modified oV abandoned in favour of notions 
curiously primitive. The fortification, for instance, of heights 
and plateaux, and the holding of them as fixed positions, 
takes us back to the campaagns of Julius Casar, for that was 
precisely tlie sort of resistance offered to his legions bv the 
i.auls. And the reason foir its resurrection by. the Germans 
in tins war is exactly the reason why it was resorted to by the 
Gauls. They were unab'ie to meet the legionaries in the 
op<n. The. Germans in this war have never fought the 
Western Allies in the open since the battle of the Marne. 
The Marne was a test of their abiUty to do so, and a \ery 
complete test. So far .as they are concerned, all of what may- 
be called the finer part of the art of war, skill in manoeuvre 
and evolution, has, in this Western campaign, gone by the 
board. 
Another primitive -noiion is that of annexing territory by 
squatting on it. and of defending it by corporeal possession. 
Tills IS the barbarian iciia of defence, "because it is an idea 
antecedent to treaties, or international comity or relation- 
ships. In a word, both in this respect and in tlie fortification 
of heights and plateau: < the Germans have acted precisely 
as would their progcnitj jrs 2,000 years ago. 
Hoth these practices, which reduce the German professions 
of military science alnn 1st to ridicule, have influenced their 
proceedings to an extrac rdinary degree. We have to suppose 
that they desire absolut sly to retain as much of the territory 
f>f l-'rance as possible, a r alternatively to hold it to ransom. 
Hut, despite that desire , the safety, not to say the fate, of 
their forces in France m ay come in the last resort to depend 
upon mobility. They n lay, that is to say, have to sink the 
desire, and the barbarian practice of squatting, in the necessity 
(<i self-preservation. \i so thev must be ai)le to retreat as 
an army, or they will -nr ver retreat at all. 
Tlieir front betwecni N'erdun and the sea still forms a huge 
pronounced salient- -a .--onvex which involves the maximum 
of exposure to attacj^ w/^h the minimum power of resistance 
to attack. Under pressure on both faces of the salient at one 
and the same time, it also means immobility. At present 
the immobility may not signify a great deal, but in view of 
the disadvantages inherent in the conformation of the front, 
immobility may very well come to signify everything. To 
hold such a front, for instance, calls for a great weight of troops, 
and there is a limit below which, so long as the front remains 
what it is. that weight of troops cannot be allowed to fall. 
Coincidentally. to have to employ a great weight of troops 
with the maximum of expf)sure to attack, implies something 
like the maximum rate of losses. Indeed, the rate of losses 
is only to the slightest extent in such circumstance.-) under 
control, and if tiie hostile force has a superiority in guns and 
in air work, the control over the rate of losses may for all 
practical purposes be left out of account as negligible. 
Now manifestly that is a very serious position for any 
army to be in, and although the desire to get out of it may 
conflict with the desire to stick to what the Germans have 
come undoubtedly to look upon as their own, yet the desire 
to be able to get out if need be, must always be present as a 
motive. 
The one way of ensuring withdrawal in the event of necessity 
is to have, at any rate, one face of the salient secure. Assum- 
ing it to be secure the troops on the other face might, should 
necessity dictate, fall back. One purpose, at any rate, of the 
(ierman defences along the Aisne and across Champignc was, 
as it were, to keep an open door for the enemy's right wing. 
In the first instance, those fortifications were intended to form 
the pivot for offensive operations on that wing. But as the 
campaign on the West shaped itself, these works became in 
purpose purely defensive. They. were the first laid out, and 
the Germans clung to them from September I()i4 to May 
1917. despite every assault. In May, when they were lost to 
the French, the German position in the. West, as a whole, 
was radically altered. There was increased exposure to 
attack with an increased total rate of loss, and there was set 
lip the condition of immobility. These were three heavy 
disadvantages, the last a disadvantage which, if not remedied, 
tnighl prove fatal. The term, immobility is employed in this 
connection in its military sense. It is not suggested, and , 
nobody would suggest, that they could not as individuals, or 
as groups more or less large, retire from their right between 
the Oise and the sea if and when they choose. The point 
is their retirement as an army, that is to say as a fighting 
organism. Such a retirement is altogether a different tiling 
from tlie withdrawal of a crowd, or of groups, for it is an 
operation of great delicacy and risk, and ^s such strictly 
dependent upon the conditions imposed by strategy. 
(II). The German Government want a peace. They want a 
peace because of their own difficulties over man-power, labour, 
foodstuffs and materials, and credit. They want a peace 
because of the situation in Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey, 
and because of the developments in Greece. But they want 
a peace which will save the autocracy and the standing and 
privileges of the junkers, a peace that is which will enable 
Germany to dodge insolvency, otherwise certain ; a jieace 
that isay be proclaimed as a .success. The question is how 
to bring about such a peace before American intervention begins 
actively to take effect. It is as clear as noonday that with the 
military situation what it is American intervention must be 
the last straw. 
How can such a peace be brought about in advance of active 
American intervention ? There is here an evident time limit. 
Neither the U boat campaign, nor the Stockholm manoeuvres, 
nor the intrigues and the promoting disorders in Russia are in 
any sense of the word certainties. But American inter- 
vention is a certainty, and tlie only doubt attaching to it is 
how long the prcjiarations may take. 
If we adopt as far as we can the present Gorman point of 
view, the chief obstacle to such a peace will readily aj)pear to 
be* l-rance. The only means of dealing with England is 
isolation. But France is possibly> just possibly — this, of 
course, is a hypothesis of German opinion and not my viere — 
an obstacle that is removable. Undeniably civilian agita- 
tion in France, without influence or following, is the 
flimsiest of flimsy straws. But the would-be conquerors of 
Europe in 1914 cannot afford to neglect straws in 1917. Is 
it possible in the circumstances to' doubt that the openly 
expressed discontent with the French army and with its 
leading, ill-informed and irresponsible as that expression is, 
has influenced German designs and given birth to German 
hopes ? Is it ]K)Ssible to doubt that five Germans now con- 
sider Russia as a fighting quantity counted out ? 
(ITI). Tli''<'' ^i "-dilations, let lis suppose it said, may bf. 
