June 28, ]()i7 
LAiNU & WATER 
interesting, but altfi all ihcy arc nu nioru than speculati(jii.-. 
However probable they cannot be accepted as facts. But 
let us sec what furtlier light is thrown on the matter from its 
tactical aspect. The first point that comes into view here is 
the appearance on the scene of the so-called " stosstaippen " 
or shock-troops. They seem to have been evolved from two 
sources — one the usual selection from the army at large of the 
most physically fit men ; the other, the transfer of divisions 
from the front in Russia and Roumania, divisions which, 
according tothe German standard, are or were of the "crack " 
variety.^ Again, there seems to be between the " stoss- 
truppen," and tlie now apparently" obsolete " sturmtruppen," 
a ditference which justifies tlie change of term. The " stoss- 
tmppen " are the admitted product of a study of Allied 
tactics. The German has observed tJiat Allied tactics have 
given results which his own troops have not been able to 
rival. As his manner is he puts this down purely and simply 
to the method. To copy the metho<l is. according to his 
thinking, to ensure the results. That is perhaps not an unfair 
sununary of .his argument. Its weak ])oint, that is to say its 
fallacy, consists in looking upon men as automata, who will 
act in the same way if only the strings be manipulated in the 
same way. Starting from tliat as a self-evident proposition 
the " stosstruppen," selected and transferred, are exercised 
and trained after the Allied manner, and ought in theory to 
hoist the engineer with his own petard. 
In passing two observations suggest tliemselves. The first 
relates to this peculiar German practice of selection — a 
practice which has marked the Prussian military service since 
the days of the Elector who collected all the giants of Europe. 
Not so much pcrha}>s was heard about crack corps in the 
time of the elder Moltke, for the chances are that, being a 
capable soldier, he did not believe in them. But at the out- 
break of the war the crack corps idea was ram]}ant, and the 
weakness of the German army was that the bulk was not 
equal to the face. .So far from having died out during the 
war, this practice of j-utting a " face " on the force has become 
still more accentuated. It is one of the devices for restoring 
moral sliaken by reverses. I'irst there were particular regi- 
ments picked out for mention ; then there were the " sturm- 
truppen " as a grade by themselves ; now we have the 
" stosstruji|)en." With every successive draft upon it of this 
kind the fighting value of the bulk is lowered. And the very 
necessity of creating such classes is at once a revelation of the 
real opinion which the German Command entertains con- 
cerning the mass, and a confession of the Allied superiority. 
Further, every successive defeat of these " face " troops means 
for the (krman army a doivmiard step ivhich cannot be retrieved. 
The second observation is that the practice, for that reason, 
involves military risks to which the German Higher Command 
assuredly is now oblivious. 
If then this enterprise against the French was one that 
called for the 'creation of "stosstruppen" and for their 
training on the Allied model, it must have been considered 
an enterprise of first-class consequence. There is again the 
time necessary for the evolution of such troops. The be- 
ginning no doubt was made with crack divisions transferred to 
the West, and the training of the selections went on in the 
meantime. AW the probabilities point to the design being, as 
a design, of by no means recent date. It was probably antici- 
pated by the French offensive in May. and it was undoubtedly 
interruiited by the defeat at wytschaetc and Messines. 
Looking at these careful tactical preparations, at the 
strategical situation,'and at the urgencv of the political motive, 
few Ciwi be surprised to find the sciieme taking precedence 
of every other demand. 
It is not open to 'question that the battle of the Somnie 
enlightened the German Command as to the modern capa- 
bilities of the attack, and it does not need the free entry of the 
Cierman Headtiuarters to infer witii every confidence that 
there was a thorough study of their own methods at V'erdun as 
contrasted with those of the Allies on the Somme. To this 
study Vimy Ridge must have given a further impetus, while 
the loss of the Aisne and Champagne positions must have added 
to it the sharp edge of fear of revenge. 
(IV). The one fact that stands out, and is left by re- 
flection unchallenged, is the momentousness of these opera- 
tions from the enemy's standpoint. To suppose that so many 
risks were run both on the P:ast in tlie withdrawal of troops 
and on the West in a further application of the selection 
idea, and all for the sake of seizing a few odds and ends of 
advance trenches which in the sum total of the battle make 
no dift'erence whatever, is a redtictio ad absurdum. The 
issues at stake were the safety of the German army, and the 
conclusion of the war as a disaster never to be retrieved, or 
as some sort of " victorious " peace. 
But the success had to be a definite success, and not one or 
another of the several degrees of failure. Was such a success 
expected ? .-\fter the Somme, \\m\. and Messines unquestion- 
ably it was. Were not the •' stosstruppen " trained as Allied 
iiiiautry, and besitics such Iraiuuig, were they nut Gcimans, 
that is to Say, superior to anything the Allies could pro- 
duce ? Why then should not they sweep the French out of 
these positions ? 
Of course the fallacy of the reasoning is to any impartial 
mind nothing less than glaring. To begin with, and this is a 
capital fact, the importance of which it is impossible to over- 
estimate, the whole of the French and British infantry if it 
comes to that are " stoSstruppen." They are '' stosstruppen " 
armies. The difference is a difference of system, and the 
difference of system is founded ultimately on race, or character, 
the character being the resultant of political freedom and of 
history. Two currents of history meet in the clash of battle, 
one the expression of self-reliance and indejiendence, the other 
the expression of servility organised l^y officialism, that is to 
say CsEsarism, from the cradle to the grave. This is the real 
Nemesis the over-blown ambition of Ger"man autocracy 
has conjured ujj, in challenging the free nations of Europe 
and America to arms. • 
Strategic Hesults 
(V). If, therefore, there be an impression that the latest 
episodes of the battle in France are but of minor consetjuence, 
that impression is wrong. The repulse of these German attacks 
along t-he valley of the Ailette has been the withering of a great 
German hope — great though ill-founded. It has been ;i 
phase of the battle that will contribute materially to the 
German autocracy's final discomfiture, and to its destruc- 
tion. The strategical results too, are not to be overlooked. 
With the repulse of an efi'ort of this kind, and more so with 
the repulse of every succeeding effort, the situation of the 
German army with its deadly disadvantages becomes the 
more confirmed. The persistent battering-ram blows of 
the British army owe no small jiart of their eft'ect to the 
(ierman immobility. Indeed, in no slight degree they are 
the more severe as shocks because they carmot be avoideil. 
In standing up to them, the (jermans make a virtue of neces- 
sity. Not to stand up to them would be to precipitate dis- 
integration, for it wouldbeattem]3ting a practically impossible 
manoeuvre. In the meantime disintegration proceeds apace. 
It may be thought that the appearance of " stosstruppen " 
indicates German resourcefulness in organisation. It is. a 
sign of disintegration, because it is a sign of falling moral. 
The non-success of such a device is felt over the enemy force as 
a :wholc. Setting up a distinction between the mass of tiie 
army and a minority of " heroes," it not only by implication 
reveals the limited confidence felt in the mass, but it inevitably 
causes the mass to conclude that where the heroic minority 
cannot succeed it would be unreasonable to expect them to 
succeed. . It is just the sort of idea to commend itself to a 
shallow intellect enamoured of catch-words. 
The material losses of the enem\- are important, but they 
are after all only half the tale. The lowering of moral must 
be kept in mind if we are to form a truthful picture. Contrast 
the operations at W ytschaete and Messines with this fighting 
along the Ailette. The task set to the German assaulting 
troops in the latter instance was not a whit more difiicnlt 
than thAt apparently set before the British troops in the 
former. Indeed, it was less difficult, so far as the defences 
to be taken were concerned. 
The truth remains that men are men, and are not reduced 
by military discipline to atoms or molecules of a system. 
An army is not a mechanism, it is an organism, and the 
central fact of an organism is vitality. It is the intensity 
more or less of the vitality as the organism which is called 
moral, that quality to which soldiers, and most of all soldiers 
of experience, attach such supreme importance. The phti- 
nomenon presented to us, if we choose to regard it, in this 
fateful conflict in France is only in a minor degree the gain 
or loss of positions. In the major degree it is the decline in 
the vitality of t;he German organism, and the coincident 
intensification, in the vitality of the Allied organisms. 
Consider the state of matters disclosed by the latest raids 
and attacks along the British front. A British raid is now 
more often than not the signal for the enemy to bolt. The 
Germans used to take to earth, but that proved to be too 
dangerous. We may say if we like that these local and 
temporary retreats are an expedient for reducing casualties. 
But thev leave the defences to be destroyed, and the labours 
of months to be wiped out in half an hour. There was a time, 
but a few weeks back, when apparently the defences counted 
for more than the defenders. If that estimate has been 
reversed either the defenders are no longer plentiful enough 
to be sacrificed, or they cannot be held up to it. In all likeli- 
hood something of both numbers and moral enters into the 
explanation. At any rate the disintegration, and the 
lowering of the German army's organic vitality goes on day 
by day. and the non-success of the operations along the 
Ailette has banged and bolted the last possible exit. 
