July 5. 1917 
LAINU & WAlliK 
all, had not proceeded further. Potutory was not yet occupied, 
but tlie Siberian army corps was already master of the trenches 
covering ft from the south-wesl:/ and it was clear that the 
hills between the Ccniowka and the Zlota-Lipa we/-e lor the 
most part in Russian hands. But the attack had not reached 
the Zlota-Lipa itself by Monday night.. 
It is in such a situation that we must leave tliC baltlef Uiitil 
further reports §hall tell us how far it has been pressed." ";• 
The Storming Troops 
Perhaps. the most interesting mark of tfee \yar in tlie West 
at its present stage is the enemy's creation and use of what 
he calls " Storming Troops." Mr. Dane dealt with them at some 
length in last week's issue of this paper when I was 
absent in France. I hope my readers will not think it super- 
fluous if I return to the subject with the added information 
acquired during my visit abroad. 
" The formation of these " storming troops " is, in the first 
place, an open confession of deterioration in quality in the 
mass of the army. That is their first and most obvious 
characteristic. 
We must not exaggerate the comparative deterioration of 
the enemy. Every belligerent force which has been suffering 
from the material and moral losses of three years war has 
passed and is still passing through a downward curve. Only 
those forces which grew slowly in the course of the war 
and have still large reserves of" the best material untouched, 
form exceptions to the general rule. This deterioration has 
among other factors, the following : 
(i) The larger proportion of older and younger classes 
necessary to replace the fittest classes, which have been worn 
down in the process of war. 
(2) The mere effect of time and strain upon the rtien who 
have held the field for long periods. '' 
(3) The necessity of using over again mblfi" who have been 
even badly wounded or, what is worse, who have suffered 
a bad illness or shock. ' ,'.'' 
Every belligerent force then, which 'tiaS'' been at work 
during the whole course of the war, the be'Wigerent forces in 
other parts of every nation fully mobilised 'in 'August 14th, 
has suffered and is suffering deterioration. 
Our interest in the formation of the " storming troops " 
upon the enemy's side is the index it may afford of the degree of 
deterioration, "and the experiment is proof that that degree 
is more advanced than the corresponding degree of the 
Western Allies. It is only what was to be expected from the 
character of the prisoners taken, and from two known facts ; 
first, that the German Empire has had to call up ,a Class a 
whole year younger than has the French Republic — it has 
called up 1919, while the French have not had to call up* 
anything younger than 1918— and secondly, the extremely 
hniited period of training to which the enemy is compelled. 
He gives his recruits little more than half as much time in 
depot and training grounds as the French do. 
German Class 1919 the Test of Exhaustion 
Apropos of this German Class 191 9 I would lijce to admit a 
digression. I have already said in these colun;ws, I think, 
that three-quarters of 1919 was already in depot, but I was 
told upon the best authority during my recent visit to France, 
• that the matter is not quite certain. It is only a. detail affect- 
ing a very few weeks of the campaign, but it is as well to be 
precise in these matters and to correct any errors. The ki;iown 
facts on which there is no disagreement are as follows : , , 
Class 1 918— that is the boys who were born in 1898— were 
called up in successive batc"hes at the end of last year. It 
was with the help of this new recruitment that the man- 
power " in sight ' for the fighting season of 1917 promisad 
a reserve of one million men which, as my readers wiU re- 
member, was the figure given in L.\nd & Water six months 
ago. This million was roughly divided into . two equal 
halves: One half the 1918 class, the other half Hospital 
Returns ; men at the moment in depot and the very few 
that still remained to be combed out from cjivihan em- 
ployment. . , . „ r 
In the first six months of 1917, especially of course 
during the last thre of those months, very heavy casualties 
were suffered by the German forces in the West. Had 
they been subjected to a corresponding pressure upon the 
East the moment might well h^'fi heen dpcisive. But in the 
West alone their casualties of all kind,' including sickness, 
reached a total before the qnd',' of Jiino of more fhan 
800,000 men. And of this total more' than three-eighths_, 
something like a third of a million, were " definite losses, 
that is. moil killed or taken prisoners or so Very badly wounded 
or invalided that they could never reappedr m anv capacity 
The remainder, however, close on 60 per cent, of the total 
casualties, would again appear in uniform at some time or 
another, and peihajis half of them would reappear in the saiiie 
duties they fulfiUcd before, that is, in aOtive sci-vice in the 
tiring line. 
The reserve of man-power of which I have spoken^ one 
million men in sight behind the existing armies for the fight- 
ing season of 1917 — was used, as everybody remembers, 
for the formation of the famous " strategic reserve " with 
which Hindenburg was, by the unanimous consent of the Ger- 
man Press inspired by the German authorities, to " restore 
a warfare of movement in the West," etc., etc. 
When we say that this reserve of man-power was used 
to create such a strategic reserve (perhaps 25 divisions) we 
do not mean, of course, that the new divisions were formed out 
of the actual men composing this reserve of man-power, but 
that the presence of such a reserve of man-power made it 
possible to create the strategic reserve in question. Now the 
capital fact of the campaign during the last three months has 
been the destruction of the strategic reserve, the break-down of 
the German plan for restoring a war of movement and the eat- 
ing into the German man-power at a rate far superior to that 
which the enemy had budgeted for. He thought that the re- 
tirement during the thaw and fog of last March to his new 
line Arras — St. Quentin — Chemin-des Dames would prevent 
the delivery of a spring offensive, that is, would delay Allied 
operations by at least eight weeks, and he thought that this 
new line would hold at its essential or pivot points and there- 
fore that he would not suffer any exaggerated loss. 
Both these judgments were miscalculations upon his part. 
Sir Douglas Haig delivered his blow as early as the 9th of 
April and the French came in with theirs a week later. There- 
fore the period over which heavy casualties were spread was 
extended over a greater period than the enemy had allowed 
for. Further, the two principal defensive positions on the new 
line failed to hold. Vimy Ridge went, and so did nearly the 
whole of the Chemin-des-Dames. Apart from the actual loss 
in prisoners and dead incurred by those two defeats, the enemy 
has been subjected through the loss of these defensive positions 
to a heavier rate of loss than leoidd otherwise be the case, and 
the same apphes in varying degrees to the consequences of 
losing other defensive points, especially the White Sheet 
Ridge, and the Moronvillers Hills east of Rheims. 
It is difficult for general opinion to seize the truth that 
the rate of loss is the decisive factor in siege warfalfe. General 
opinion is much more struck by the more vivid and obvious 
capture of ground. Nevertheless, it is the effect upon future 
rate of loss produced by the capture of such and such a piece 
of ground which is the really important thing. The enemy 
having lost the Vimy Ridge, for instance, has by that loss 
necessarily suffered a higher rate of casualties by far in the 
sector of which the Vimy Ridge was the shield, than he would 
have suffered had it held. He has the disadvantage of being 
directly observed. He has for a long period — one of weeks — - 
to hold new and imperfect defences requiring from their 
character the sacrifice of a greater number of men. He has 
to counter-attack perpetually in order to maintain himself. 
To give but one example of the way in which the loss of a 
good defensive position compels one to spend men : The 
corner by Vauxaillon, where the German hne leaves the 
Chemin-des-Dames and runs off northward. The original 
defensive positions on the crest were held by two divisions. 
Had they remained intact two divisions was a sufficient 
" lining." In the same space to-day, the enemy has had to 
mass five divisions since he lost the crest, and he has been 
counter-attacking almost without respite for now two months 
in order to maintain himself at all. 
The enemy thus having been attacked earlier than he 
expected and having lost the defensive positions (incidentally 
also positions of observation) which enabled him to spare men, 
has been subjected to this heavy rate of loss, the consequences 
of which are now following. Before May was over it was 
clear that he no longer had the power to handle any so-called 
strategic reserve offensively. It was being eaten up in the 
process of defence and it was further apparent that he 
wou'd have to call very soon on class 1919, that is, 
the boys who reach their i8th birthday in the course 
of this year. Class 1918 went out of the depots into the 
fighting front very early. It had already begun to 
appear in the firing line during April. By the end of May, 
if I am not mistaken, certainly early in .June at the latest, 
no one was left of i<)i8 in the" depots. They were all either 
incorporated in the fighting units or in those so-called " field 
depots" immediately behind the line, which the German 
system maintains as a sort of small reservoirs to afford 
instant replenishment to units between the main depots 
and the fighting. 1919 was warned only a few weeks after 
