July 12, 1917 
LAiNU & WATKK 
LAND & WATER 
OLD SERJEANTS' INN. LONDON, W.C. 
Telephone HOLBORN 2828. 
THURSDAY, JULY 12, 1917 
CONTENTS 
PAGE 
To Slay the German Dragon. By Louis Kacmaekers i 
" Reprisals " (Leader) 3 
Battle of Jczupol. By Hilaire Belloc 4 
Air Defence of London. By F. W. Lanchestcr fj 
Three Fighting Figures of France. By Chas. Dawbarn 8 
Secret of Industrial Power. By Jason 9 
" P.Z." By the author of A Grand Fled Chaplain's 
Notebook ir 
Liza. By H. Russell Wakefield 12 
Jane Austen's Centenary. By J. C. Squire i; 
Letters to Editor ' 1"^ 
Books to Read 15 
Public School Education. By S, P. B. Mais 1(1 
Life in Salonika. (Illustrated). By H. Colliiison Owen' 18 
Domestic Economy 20 
Kit and Equipment 23 
" REPRISALS " 
THE best thing which has been said in the Press 
since the last air raid on London — and the phrase 
appeared in several organs of the Press — was that 
the term " reprisals " had ceased to be an accurate 
description of any policy undertaken for the limitation of 
enemy aggression through the air upon open towns. 
The term " reprisals " is a military term capable of fairly 
accurate definition. The enemy does something .which in 
your judgment violates the code of military honour or 
exceeds the limits imposed for the regulation of war between 
white nations. To check his doing such things, you adopt a 
corresponding policy of extremes either by an action parallel to 
his or in some other way. You do such a thing with a temporary 
object and with the intention of relieving your pressure on him 
when he relieves his pressure on you. We have had many such 
examples in this war. The clearest, perhaps, is that of the 
German and French prisoners. The Germans have con- 
tinually attempted a novel policy against their prisoners of 
war, submitting them to excessive or degrading or dangerous 
or military labour, and the French have immediately 
countered, by strict reprisals upon the German prisoners of 
war in their hands. In every case, the effect aimed at has been 
reached. The Germans have abandoned their novel cruelty 
and the French kept the compact, as it were, by relieving the 
prisoners in their hands from the methods employed as a 
temporary necessity. The action has been strictly parallel. 
The only divergence between the two methods being that 
the pressure is more easily exercised upon the Germans than 
upon the French, from the fact that any inconvenience caused 
to a wealthy German touches the very nerve of the modern 
German State, which is plutocratic in character. 
But in the question of these air raids on open towns, we 
have something different. The Prussian theory of war 
includes the terrorising of the civilian population. Ttiis 
point in the Prussian theory is not secret or even novel. It 
has been preached in numerous Prussian text books and is a 
part of the conception of war as it stands in the Prussian 
mind. We shall not get the Prussians to abandon this by 
any temporary expedient. It is a permanent part of his 
mentality. In other words, a mere exact repetition of his 
own action directed against him by us would not of itself 
make him abandon the poHcy of bombarding any civihan 
population within range, any more than it would make him 
abandon the policy of- shooting hostages, of burning 
towns, murdering women and children, stealing private pro- 
perty from billets, and destroying historical monu- 
ments. What we have to consider then, is not so much the 
effect of our action as a deterrent, but rather its effect as a 
positive weapon in war. Would the liarrying of certain 
towns (Frankfort would be politically the most important, 
but It IS distant) shake the moral of the enemy and disturb 
his power of command and his military plans? \nd if 
we are convinced it would do so, would the expense in the 
risk of craft and in the withdrawal of craft arid trained men 
from the purely military activity upon the front be worth 
the results obtained ? Would it be worth those results at 
this particular moment of the war and in this particular 
numerical situation ? The mere satisfaction of a revenge 
dunng the course of an undecided campaign is not only useless 
in the mihtary sense, but is of negative effect. It is waste of 
energy. It is like turning aside in the middle of a prize-fight 
to try and slap the face of somebody who has cheered your 
opponent. But if a military result can be shown worth 
the expense entailed, even though that result be 'arrived at 
mdirectly,' then it is ctearly sound policy to adopt it. 
Now in this matter we can only repeat what has been said 
before in these columns and what remains just as true after 
a. dramatic and startling daylight raid as it is in a quiet period 
when people have half forgotten such raids are possible. 
This truth is that the public in general and members of Parlia- 
ment in particular are wholly unable to judge the situation. 
We have said it over and over again in these columns with 
regard to other miUtary problems. It applies to them all. 
The only men who are in a position to judge what should 
be done so far as military policy is concerned, axe the men 
in possession of the figures. The position' is a very simple 
one. In all war the main factor of success is numerical. 
There are a certain small number of men whose duty it is 
to receive and co-ordinate all the numerical information upon 
the war day by day. These men are the civilian politicians 
who happen to be in power — and only a few of them — and 
a certain very small number in the Higher Command. No 
one else can judge. 
Civilian discipline is as necessary to us as military discipline. 
There is this unfortunate difference between them. Military 
discipline is an organised thing, exact in character, calculable, 
and offering remedies for evidences of weakness which it 
locates at once and can, as a rule, promptly repair. CiviUaa 
discipline is unorganised— especially in the parliamentary 
countries — it is confused by the fact that you have, side by 
side such disturbing factors as rumour, and the action of the 
Press, and it is further confused by the peculiar and abnormal 
nervous condition of mankind when it is massed in our large 
towns. Nothing can supply civilian discipline but the 
good will and the spontaneous action of the civilians them- 
selves. The censorship is an aid and a very necessary aid. 
The exceptional legislation necessary to war, such as the 
Defence of the Realm Act, is another aid also necessary, but 
the main part must, after all, be played by the private citizen. 
Upon the whole he has played that part well in the past. It 
will not only be a pity, but a great peril if the long strain of 
the war and the peculiar position of London so near to the 
enemy bases, so immense a target and so vital in the life of 
the nation, should between them lead him to panic and folly 
at this moment. It behaves us to remember in this con- 
nection that the enemy is compelled to watch and to suffer 
from a rapidly increasing superiority against him. The 
extent of that superiority and its rate of increase have never 
been sufficiently emphasised by the politicians. They have 
been too much concerned with stiffening opinion and warning 
people against a facile optimism. 
We may conclude by saying that a secret session of Parlia- 
ment in connection with this orany other matter is at once ac 
absurdity and a danger. These secret sessions here anc 
abroad are nothing more useful or dignified than a sop to the 
pride of elected persons. There is no sort of advantage in 
letting hundreds of men, who merely happen to be Parlia- 
mentarians, hear this or that about the war which is not told 
to their fellow citizens. Even if the Parliamentarians were by 
some accident men of special talent, chosen for their powers 
to counsel and advise the soldiers, it would be quite im- 
possible to secure real secrecy when dealing with a body 
which is in quantity the equivalent of a battalion. As a 
matter of fact, in these so-called " secret sessions," the 
responsible politicians of every country do keep a great 
deal back from the members. They are compelled to do so 
by the vital necessities of the nation. 
