July 12, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
is for this reason that nearly all our effective air figliting has 
so far been done during the return of the enemy to his base; 
it would be totally out of the question to maintain a sufficient 
force of aeroplanes continually patrolling at high altitude, 
and any such suggestion may be dismissed as impracticable. 
Even if we assume that from naval patrols over the North 
Sea a warning of the approach of enemy aeroplanes can be 
given, the numerical strength of the screening force would 
have to be immeasurably greater than the attacking force. 
It would take perhaps 500 aeroplanes to put up an adequate 
defence of London, and even then it is practically certain 
that the enemy, under favourable weather conditions, might 
slip through. If we were to immobilise 500 machines for the 
defence of London against enemy raids a dozen or twenty 
strong, it would be a far greater justification for the enemy to 
maintain and carry out a succession of such raids than the 
material damage which such a force has hitherto shown itself 
capable of effecting. The time may come when direct de- 
fensive measures may be deemed possible, but it presupposes 
an immeasurably greater numerical development of the air 
service, both on the part of the attack and the defence than 
anything yet in sight. Twenty defenders pitted against 
twenty attackers might never get sight of the enemy, but 
one thousand defenders, on the other hand, might be able to 
put up a successful defence against one thousand conducting 
the attack. Not even then could the enemy be prevented 
from breaking through, but his losses in machines and per- 
sonnel and the interruption and partial failure of the attack 
might, we may hope, mean that his losses would be out of 
proportion to the results achieved, which, as already stated, 
IS tlie criterion of successful defence. • So much for the pro- 
posals of direct defence. If to-day an attempt were made 
to bar the road to London by screens of aexoplanes, there 
would scarcely be a machine available in any of the fields of 
battle for the normal conduct of hostilities. 
The Balance of Advantage 
I^t us come back to the phrase, there must be air reprisals. 
If reprisals are to be effective we must assume that when we 
" reprise " we shall do the enemy as great or greater injury 
than he has done us with an equivalent expenditure of means. 
If, for example, we were to divert 100 aeroplanes from the 
ordinary military duties to do such injury to a German 
city as the enemy ;in] turn have inflicted on London by — 
say — twenty aeroplanes, the reprisal, however effective in 
destroying property and killing people, would be valueless. 
The German has a fair knowledge of elementary arithmetic 
and is quite capable of making his own calculations ; he would 
at once redouble his efforts in raiding London. If, on the 
other hand, we could detail twenty machines to raid some 
German town and inflict more vital injury than that inflicted 
by a similar number of German machines, then we might 
hope that our reprisal would be effective ; it would at least 
carry some degree of conviction. But again, why divert a 
raiding squadron to bomb, say. Cologne, with little or no 
beneficial military effect, when the same squadron might be 
bombing one or other of the enemy bases or depots, doing as 
great or greater material damage, and at the same time 
getting on with the war. Even a diversion of our aircraft 
from their military duties might justify the Hun in employing 
liis machines where he knows we are at a strategic disadvan- 
tage in the raiding of London. These are the facts which 
appear to be forgotten by many of those who call for reprisals. 
It is curious that one fundamental fact seems to be ignored 
by those who blame the military and naval authorities for 
not adopting the particular measures that they wish. The 
naval and military demand for aircraft and personnel since 
the war started has never flagged, and the resources of the 
country have been gradually diverted to supply a demand 
that has been continually on the increase. Writing on this 
subject some eighteen months back,* I said : 
In the author's opinion it is vitally necessary, both with a 
view to ensuring speedy victory and to our future as a nation, 
that our manufacturing resources in the production of air- 
craft should be developed to the utmost ; aeroplanes and 
still more aeroplanes will be needed, aeroplanes in the maxi- 
mum possible quantities of every useful type, whether 
reconnaissance, bomb-dropping, or fighting machines ; our 
total present capacity for production is petty in comparison 
with what we have evidence the future will demand. 
The question of the future of tlie Aeronautical Arm is not 
purely the concern of the Army and Navy.. it cuts deeper; 
it is essentially an affair of the nation. It is national, because 
it concerns both services. It is national, because it is of 
wider and more far-reaching moment than comprised by 
its relation to either. It is national, because it d/spends upon 
our national industrial resources, and may tax thes<^ to the 
uttermost ; national, because it is the Arm of greatest 
potential development in the present war, and in future 
warfare may decide the fate of nations. Finally, it is national 
because it Ls the Arm which will have to be ever rgady , ever 
• Aii'crafl in Warfare, page 20x, 
mobiUsed, both in time of peace and war ; it is the Arm which 
"in the warfare of the future may act with decisive effect 
within a few hours of the outbreak of hostilities. 
This is as true to-day as when it was written, and the 
truth is one to which I am sure those responsible for 
directing the destinies of British aircraft develojiment have 
beer\ fully alive. Factory after factory has been diverted 
to the production of aircraft and aero-engines, possibly not 
so quickly as I or other enthusiastic supporters of the Aero- 
nautical Arm might have wished. But we must not forget 
the past call for ammunition and more ammunition, and the 
past and present call for heavy calibre guns and still more 
heavy calibre guns. The industrial resources of Great Britain 
have been taxed to the utmost, and the construction of aero- 
engines is not to be taught or learnt in a day. The power of 
the present Air Board as a branch of the Ministry of Munitions 
is as nearly absolute when it comes to a matter of supply as 
any power in the country. If the military authorities have 
not pressed for aeroplanes more insistently than they have 
pressed, if the naval authorities have not pressed more 
resolutely for an increase in aircraft, it may be at least 
credited to them that it is their duty to provide themselves 
with munitions of other kinds which are equally essential to 
tl^e conduct of the war, and it is certain that allowing for 
mistakes and errors which must be deemed inevitable, no 
increase in the output of aircraft could have been obtained 
without a diminution in something else. As in the para- 
graph quoted " aeroplanes and stUl more aeroplanes," are 
needed, and if the war goes on for another year, or two 01 
three years probably this same fact will remain equally true. 
We have to remember that the enemy is within easy 
reach of London, our capital city, and the enemy cities within 
our reach are cities of comparatively minor importance. The 
suggestion has been made that for every attack on London 
we at once organise an attack in force on a German city and 
flatten it out. Cologne is sometimes mentioned. Let us wave 
on one side the difficulties of the problem, and assume that 
by saying the wor4 we could muster a sufficient force of bomb- 
dropping aeroplanes to wipe Cologne out of existence. It 
might be considered a salutary act; although as. a matter of 
ethics the bombing of London can be better justified as 
likely to affect the course of the war than the bombing of 
Cologne. .However, I am, or will make myself, sufficiently, a 
Hun at heart to say " Damn the ethics ! Let us muster all our 
air resources and concentrate on a city like Cologne to destroy 
it, so far as the power of high explosives is able to effect that 
object." The question remaining is, presuming we possess 
such resources and can detach the air force required, whether 
still a city such as Cologne would be the best and most valuable 
objective. Would it not be better to say to our military 
and naval commanders : " Utilise the air forces at your dis- 
posal to hit the enemy as vitally and as hard as you can. 
If you can liit harder in conjunction with infantry and artillery 
use them so, if an expedition against an enemy city or railway 
junction will hit the enemy the harder, do it." Surely the 
military authorities, perhaps in conjunction with the naval 
authorities, and finally the War Cabinet, can be trusted to 
make the available force of aircraft as effective against ,the 
enemy as it is humanly possible. 
If we have commanders in the field or in the navy that we 
cannot trust, let them, be replaced, do not let us try to do 
■ their work for them, it is no use .the man in the street rushing 
in to put a finger in the pie. Support the policy of aeroplanes 
and still more aeroplanes by all. means. Do not for a moment 
allow anyone in authority to think that there would be the 
least lack of support for such a policy, either as to material 
or personnel, in its entirety. Let the public take their 
share of responsibility, if they think fit, in advocating aero- 
planes and the Air Service in front of everything. I believe 
that it is the right policy. Let them give confidence to their 
servants, for their Ministers are their servant:?, to the extent 
of making it clear that whatever mistakes they may be blamed 
for in the future, they will never be blamed if in the ffght of 
history the Air Service becomes too strong or the aeroplanes 
too numerous. But do not let us allow any 'hysterical inter- 
ference with the control of our ai: forces, for there is nothing 
which would justify the enemy in his own eyeis more fully and 
completely in raiding London than that. 
Those who have not made a study of the; problem of air 
defence may feel irritated and ask why, if it p ays the Germans 
to detach squadrons from his fighting forces, already inferior 
to our own, in order to raid London, it should be bad policy 
for us to retaliate in the same coin. The answer is simple. 
London is within two hours' easy flight of territory in the 
occupation of the Germans, namely, Belgium. Berlin, the 
nerve centre of Germany, is virtually out of.- reach of bur air- 
men: it is some 400 miles distant from our- nearest point of 
take-off: we are at a strategic disadvantage. ' ' 
We must get on with the war. If wc d m gel the Germans 
out of Belgium, the air defence of London is^assured. 
