July 19, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
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that the battle would develop towards the North ; as a fact 
the main blow was struck immediately afterwards on the south 
by General Korniloff, who broke the enemy's front in front 
of Stanislau, rapidly reaching the line of the Lomnitza, and 
turned and carried Halicz, the bridgehead supporting 
Bothmer on his right, and securing the passage of the Dniester 
river, ^yithin a week he had forced the Lomnitza, itself and 
had carried after the most desperate fighting the point of 
Kalusz, not quite half way from Stanislau to Stryj. At this 
point, that is, after the delay of a week from the first effect of 
surprise upon Bothmer, a very noticeable thing appeared. 
The troops defending Kalusz, who twice succeeded in re- 
capturing the point, and were twice driven out again by the 
superiority of the Russians over the Germans in hand to hand 
fighting, were German. In other words, they were a concentra- 
tion effected from the local reserves centre southward to rein- 
force the threatened sector and to save Stryj, the threat to 
which was the main peril of the Austro-Germans, for reasons 
which we shall see in a moment. 
Let us first appreciate how this concentration was effected. 
The Dniester is a broad and rapid stream running in a rather 
deep depression and cutting off the centre under Bothmer 
from the forces south of the river, which had just been broken 
back by Korniloff. Rapid communication from the north 
to the south of the river for the purpose of such concentration 
as we have j ust seen to take place at Kalusz is only possible 
by two avenues, (i) the road which runs from Brzezany to the 
bridge of Swika, a road continued on to Kalusz and there 
joined by the road from Stanislau ; and (2) the railways from 
Brzezany and Lemberg, and so on Vo the neighbourhood of 
Stryj by way of Dolina. The ipermanent road bridge at 
Swika was no doubt supplemented by temporary bridges, 
but everything that crossed the Dniester here had to come 
by the main Brzezany road and to go on by the main Kalusz 
road. 
Now with Kalusz gone this road loses its strategical value, 
and the lateral communicationof the enemy becomes the road 
system and the railway uniting the region of Brzezany with 
Stryj. The enemy can still probably use the bridge at Suvka, 
but he has no good road serving from this point the hilly 
region behind Kalusz, and for any considerable concentration 
a nodal 
the pre- 
Anyone 
between 
To the 
of men and material he will be largely dependent upon the 
bridge higher up at Zuravno and the railway from Brzezany 
through Bohatyn to Stryj alone. 
Let us suppose that with these means of concentration he 
can still, as now appears probable, while holding all the 
Brzezany region in sufficient strength, concentrate a sufficient 
material, a sufficient number of men, and above all men of the 
right quality, to prevent a further Russian advance up the 
railway and main road from Kalusz to Stryj through Dolani, 
or across country directly from Kalusz to Stryj by the side 
roads. What will he have gained by such an effort ? He 
will have saved Stryj. 
The importance of Stryj is that Stryj makes 
point where the railways and roads supplying 
sent front, which covers Lemberg, converge, 
holding Stryj prevents through communication 
the Hungarian armies and the "army in Galicia. 
north of Stryj begin the marshes of the Upper Dniester. 
South-west of Stryj begins the mountain road over the main 
pass into Hungary, and anyone holding Stryj holds 
in his hand the knot of communications upon which the ex- 
isting front depends. 
With the Russians at Stryj the existing line covering Lem- 
berg, which may be called " the line of Brzezany," falls. 
There are other roads and railway passages of the Carpathians 
further west, and Lemberg itself is served by these roads 
and railways as well as by the main road and railway through 
Przemysl to the north of the mountains. Stryj is not a 
point the occupation of which compels the evacuation of 
Lemberg itself, as has been written in some quarters. But it is 
a point the occupation of which would compel the enemy's 
present line in Galicia to fall right back. 
Now such a retirement in the dry season and in full contact 
with a superior force must everywhere involve for our 
opponents a grave peril of rupture. That is true everywhere 
upon the 2,000 miles of front, and that is why the Allies 
everywhere worked to compel such a retirement ; not because 
it means the occupation of territory but because it shakes, and 
by shaking imperils the continuity of the enemy's line. 
Such are the reasons which permit one to call the great 
battle now going on between the Dniester and the Carpathians 
