8 
LAND & WATER 
July 19, 1917 
recently there was no appreciable loss on the Eastern front 
save the normal loss from sickness and occasional bombard- 
ment ; while on the Western front the great bulk of the losses 
have been incurred during the course of the great blows de- 
livered against the enemy since the beginning of April and 
during the counter-attacks following upon those blows. It is 
estimated that the total casualties from January ist to the 
beginning of June were somewhat over 800,000 men, taking 
the German army as a whole. Of these some 40 per cent., 
or a third of a million, were what is called " definite casualties," 
that is, men killed, taken prisoner, or so very badly wounded 
that they cannot be used again in any capacity whatsoever 
nor for any work, however hght, even behind the zone of the 
armies. 
In these " definite casualties " are included, of course, the 
comparatively small percentage of definite losses through 
sickness. That is, men who are off the strength from sickness, 
not temporarily, but for good and all. 
The remainder of the casualties, between 400,000 and 
500,000 men, 60 per cent, of the total casualty list, return to 
some kind of duty within an average delay of about foiu: 
months. But a considerable fraction cannot, of course, be 
taken back to full active service as infantry of the front line. 
It is interesting to compare the present state of affai'-s 
with that of the moment which may be called " the half-way 
house " in the course of this war : That is, the end of the year 
1915, and the beginning of the year 1916. 
The many articles which have appeared in Land & Water 
from my pen during the last two years and which have care- 
fully followed the numerical situation of the enemy from time . 
to time, so far as information was available, include an article 
of the February 24th, 1916, which was particularly detailed 
and took a general survey of the situation, basing its con- 
clusions upon the number of " military dead " which could 
be accounted for in Germany from the opening of the war up to 
December 31st 1915. 
It was then pointed out from the most varied evidence 
(to which I invite the reader to return) that the German 
" military dead " at that moment touched the million. The 
number of dead included directly or indirectly in the official 
Geiman casualty lists was 19 per cent, less than this figure : 
about 810,000. -But the true total could be established by the 
comparison of a number of other forms of evidence — though 
the official casualty lists were the basis of the calculation. 
What we find at. the beginning of June, 1917, is what was to 
be expected from the contrast between the nature of the fight- 
ing in the earlier and in the later part of the war. The number 
of German military dead is at the present moment less than 
double the number, although the two periods before and after 
December 31st, 1916, are almost exactly equal — each of 17 
months. 
The fighting in 1916 was very severe upon the West, in- 
cluding as it did the tremendous but abortive attack upon the 
Verdun sector and the Battle of the Somme. On the other 
hand, the Russian offensive in the centre of the Eastern line 
held by Germans at Baranovitch failed, while the Russian 
offensive which succeeded upon the south inflicted casualties 
mainly upon the Austro-Hungarians, and had no considerable 
effect in diminishing the numbers of the Germans there 
present. Again, there was throughout the winter a general 
lull, at least a lull compared with the earlier very heavy 
fighting upon the West ; and, as we know, the Eastern front 
was almost absolutely quiescent for nearly nine months. 
The number of German military dead at the moment of 
which I write, the beginning of June 1917, had therefore not 
doubled the number on January ist, 1916. It had added 
more than 75 per cent., perhaps near 80 per cent., but not the 
full 100 per cent. "' IVfihtary dead," I may remind the reader, 
means the dead among all those who have been drawing 
rations since the beginning of the war. It includes, many 
beyond those who die in action or shortly after action, from 
wounds. 
It is further interesting to note that the present estimates 
of " definite losses " tally exactly enough with the present 
strength of the German forces, their known reserve of man- 
power, and their total mobilisable strength in three years of 
war. There were' on June ist more than 3J milHons, but 
less than four milli'on Germans who would never come back 
to use in any form- whatsoever. For though the Germans 
keep in uniform every single iridividual they can, there is a 
margin of wounded whom it is hopeless to attempt to use in 
any service at all, e ven as porter to a prison or servant in a 
hospital. 
It is important b sre to avoid confusion betvveen different 
categories of meani ng attached to the word " losses." A 
confusion which has a great deal to do with the conception 
that the estimates 1 egularly printed here throughout 1916 
were erroneous. F; ir from: that, they exactly tally with 
present known numb ers, and indeed the estimates printed in 
Land & Water for , nearly two years past follow an exact 
cui've and accurately correspond with what we now see to be 
the result in enemy exhaustion. " Definitive losses " are 
the smallest category : they exclude all men who are kept 
on the army lists in any form whatsoever. A man who has 
lost a leg or an arm and is working in an office is not included 
in definite losses. Nor is anyone in hospital or on con- 
valescence or of no further use save as a prison guard or 
hospital servant. At the " half-way house " of January 
1st, 1917, the number off the possibility of active service at 
the moment, for instance, was already some three millions 
or a little more, as appeared in my article on numbers at the 
time. But the " definitive losses " were far less, little more 
than two millions if as much. 
While four millions or a little under represents to-day the 
" definitive losses " of the German army, the losses " off 
the fighting strength " are another matter altogether. These 
general losses, the number out of action in the sense that they 
cannot again be used for active service is, of course, much 
larger than four milUons, and the bulk of the balance reappear 
in the 5^ millions of the army total. If we add the 5^5 millions 
actually drawing rations to those four millions, who no longer 
exist, even on paper, and estimate the reserve furnished by the 
1919 class, in so far as it is not yet drawing rations, we get the 
total mobilisable strength in the third year of war in almost 
exactly the same scale as the other fully mobilised belligerent 
Powers, more than 13 per cent, but less than 14 per cent, of 
total population. For while it is true that Germany has been 
able to release men by enslaving occupied populations, it is 
also true that the Allies have been able to draw upon the 
labour power, of neutral countries, and the one advantage in 
man-power pretty well cancels out the other. 
It is well to keep these simple numerical facts clearly before 
one even at this late stage of the war, when opinion is naturally 
weary of such things : for it is the wastage of enemy effectives 
that is winning the war. If the enemy has backed down from 
point to point in his claims, if he has asked for peace and 
still asks for peace, effectives is the clue. 
The general impression that the published studies on 
enemy's numbers, his rate of loss and what not, are a matter 
of guess-work is great nonsense and ought never to have been 
allowed to arise. 
It is one of the few things on which one has a right to 
criticise the authorities in time of war that they have not 
issued, as they could have done, at regular intervals, the known 
numerical position of the enemy — within a due margin of 
error. It could have been done without betraying any im- 
portant secrets and without weakening the Intelligence De- 
partment of any Power. The French military authorities 
have indeed pubhshed such estimates from time to time. 
They have done well, because this sort of thing affords a solid 
basis for sound judgment neither exaggerated, exalted, nor 
cast down. 
In the absence of such simple figures, officially vouched for, 
or through the erroneous supposition that the estimates 
' printed were nothing more than private guess work, there 
has arisen the thoroughly false conception — now very difficult 
to eradicate — that this all-important factor towards our 
general judgment of the war was lacking. Worst of 
all are the writers who use phrases implying that the 
numerical condition of German effectives is unknown, 
that their recruitment is marvellously in excess of their 
opponents, their recuperation from wounds and sickness in 
some way miraculous, and their rate of wastage incalculable. 
All these things are normal, all are known within no very 
great margin of error, and the progress of the siege towards 
its inevitable conclusion is marked by that knowledge. 
H, Belloc 
A War History in Photographs 
To the Editor of Land & Water. 
Sir, — The Committee of the National War Museum are 
anxious to make, as far aa possible, a complete history of the 
War in Photographs. Such a record should be of permanent 
historic value and European importance. 
Efforts to obtain similar National Collections are now 
being made by all the other belligerents. We wish, therefore, 
to make a strong appeal to all friends and relations of officers 
now serving, or who have at any time served with H.M. 
Forces during this present war, for free gifts of bromide 
photographs. Such photogaphs should be unmounted and 
printed on bromide paper, this in order to facilitate docketing 
and to secure their permanence. If the donors will write on 
the backs of their photographs such details as will form a 
minute concise biography, withjdates of promotion,distinctions, 
etc., they will materially assist the committee. 
CHARLig§ FFOULKES, Lieut. R.N.V.R., 
National War Museum, jr. • Curator and Secretary. 
Storey's Gate, Westminster. 
