LAND & WATER 
July 26, 1917 
Between the two the flat summit narrows to a waist only 
slightly broader than that of Hurtebise. 
Oh these heights the French trenches are drawn* Roughly 
speaking the first trench follows the northern escarpment, with 
its observation posts coming in places down below the edge 
and along the face of the hill. The second trench follows 
more or less the summit, or centre of the flat, and the third 
roughly corresponds to the southern edge. Theplateauof Cali- 
fornia at the extreme eastern end above Craonne is of a special 
value because it is the highest part, because it is a natural 
fortress, very difficult of access on all sides, and because it 
overlooks not only the valley to the north between it and 
the ridge of St. Croi.\, but all the vast plain of Champagne, 
the east of which it dominates as Black Down dominates, 
the Sussex Weald or Shaftesbury the flats of Stour Valley. 
The first portion of the northern escarpment is bare, but 
after a short distance varying from 50 to 150 yards, the lower 
slopes and the valley below are for the most part covered 
on this section of zi miles by woods which conceal the con- 
centration for an' assault. The largest body of wood is below 
the western part of this particular section, just under the 
Casemates Plateau- and known by the name of Vauclerc. 
The escarpment of the ridge dominates the valley below (which 
is that of the Ailette) by about 300 feet; and the sharp slope 
is about 150 to 200 feet m dip. y 
It is quite clear that the Germans intended this time a 
complete operation which should put them in possession of the 
Craonne and Casemates Plateau. We can be certain of this 
both from the strict circumscription of the effort, from its 
determined character, from the quality of the troops employed, 
and especially from the very prolonged and intense bom- 
bardment. Further, the attempt is stiU continuing at the 
moment of writing. 
The preliminary bombardment extended for over a week. 
There is evidence (from prisoners) that it was to have ter- 
minated, and the infantry attack to have been launched, 
two days earlier (that is Tuesday, the 17th), and its post- 
ponement may have been ordered for pohtical considerations. 
The new Government in Germany— the new Chancellor, that 
is — was to make an inaugural declaration upon Thursdaj', 
the rgth, and it was perhaps designed that the carrying of the 
plateau should have come as welcome political news 
immediately after. 
At any rate, the bombardment lifted just before 7 o'clock 
of the morning of Thursday the 19th and the infantry was 
launched to the assault. 
This infantry, the first batch of it at least, which took 
the brunt of the fighting, was specially chosen. It was that 
5th division of the Guard which was formed in the earlier 
part of this year, .with whom were distributed elements 
of the " Storming Troops," a description of which was recently 
given in these columns. The French iront trenches were held 
by troops from Indre et Loire — Tourangeaux. 
Immediately after seven o'clock this 5th Division of the 
Guard which had, I think, been kept behind the Hnes up to that 
day, attacked the escarpment. The attack failed completely 
against the two wings, the Western and the Eastern ; the nar- 
ow piece of ground between them was more difficult of defence 
because the direct observation of the barrage from the 
trenches behind was not possible, and here over a sector of a 
little more than a hundred yards the Germans obtained a 
footing in the demolished front trench. This did not give 
them, by the way, any observation posts, because the front 
trench at this point runs just below the escarpment. The 
few yards of ground thus seized were subject to a very heavy 
converging fire from the I'rench right and the French left, 
which, as will be seen from the map, project upon either side. 
Following upon this converging lire the French counter- 
attacked, apparently in the afternoon, and drove the enemy 
back to the lower part of theslope. While it was still day- 
light, at half past eight in the evening, the enemy returned 
to the assault, and all night there was a violent hand to hand 
struggle along the entire two and a half miles. 
It is remarkable that the German communique issued that 
evening told us nothing of this very considerable action. 
The next day, Friday the 20th, another division, which may 
have been the reconstituted 5th Brandenburg Division or the 
6th,* and which was in any case composed ot Brandenburg 
troops, was thrown in, in support of the shattered Guards. They 
appear to have come into action in the course of the night, 
for the action died down quite early, and during the greater 
part of the day nothing more was attempted by the Germans. 
On the night between Friday and Saturday there were a 
renewed bombardment and numerous infantry assaults, 
none of which got home, and during the day of Saturday 
there was another interruption in the enemy's infantry 
operations, an interruption filled with a continut)us bom- 
bardment. On Sunday yet another division — the 15th 
Bavarian — was thrown in by the enemy after a particularly 
intense prepaiatory bombardment at daybreak, and pefhaps 
portions of a fourth. 
All the Western effort between Hurtebise and the " waist " 
to the east failed. Meanwhile there was a considerable con- 
centration going on behind the German lines, part of which 
was caught in the open by the French observers and very 
heavily punished under direct fire from the batteries concealed 
under the southern slope of the heights, and it beame clear 
in the course of the day that the enemy was organising an 
effort of first-class importance. Not only had he added 
to his original Guards Division, a second, a third, and possibly 
a fourth division against that little point of 2i miles since 
the opening of the battle four days before, but he was con- 
centrating a great m'ass of artillery, many new batteries 
being located in the course of this last Sunday by the French 
observers. Before Sunday evening the enemy lost ground 
in front of the Casemates, but at the same time — just before 
dark — they got into the French front trenches on the northern 
edge of the California Plateau. 
It seems from the last report that the French observa- 
tion posts on the northern edge of the " California " plateau 
were even in enemy possession on Blonday, but not the parts 
on the east overlooking the plain. As we go to press the action 
is continuing and would seem to be increasing in intensity. 
■ -1 ; ■ — ■ ^ ■ " 
*As the paper goes to press a French dispatch gives the Division as the 
5th Reserve — a iJrandenburg formationj 
The Russian Break 
The Russian front has collapsed. That is the plain truth 
of what has happened on the 25 miles between, and north of, 
the two railways which converge on Tarnopol. To what 
extent the breach may be extended by the time these lines 
are in print it is impossible to say, but at the moment of 
writing its seriousness is best grasped by the eye. 
Let the reader look at the huge bulge on Map III. and he will 
appreciate what I mean. The Austro-German armies are 
already bej^ond the point from which Brussiloff started nearly 
14 months ago, and the breakdown was due, not to military 
but wholly to political circumstances. There was no faulty 
strategical disposition. There was no lack of munitionment 
or of guns. What was at fault was the human will and the 
political organisation of men. 
It is the strongest object-lesson in the necessity of military 
discipline which the war has yielded : May it be laid to heart. 
It is not only the general discipline of any army wliich makes it 
strong, it is the permeation of that discipline throughout every 
detail of that army. A chain is as strong as its weakest link. 
A line is as strong as its weakest sector. The 7th army did 
magnificently in the first two days of July at Koniuchy and 
in front of Brzezany. The 8th army under Komiloff a week 
later did better still, and carried the whole line of the Bystryza, 
reached the Lomnitza and threatened Strj'j . The 2nd army, 
which covered Tarnopol and ran through Zborow, may very 
well have contained elements as excellent as those of the 7th 
.md 8th irmiesto the south of it, but because one element was 
rotten nothing could hold. 
The 607th regiment appears to have held a portion of the 
trenches about 15 miles north of the Lemberg-Tarnopol rail- 
w'ay, just on the watershed between the two river systems. 
Its sector was not broken by the enemy artillery, still less 
driven in by the enemy's infantry attack. It was simply 
abandoned by its defenders at 10 o'clock in the morning of 
last Thursday, July 19th, and the event is perhaps the most 
significant of the whole year. 
The local reserves immediately behind were ordered to 
make good before it was too late. Instead of obeying orders 
they went into committee and moved amendments. Before 
evening, the four or five miles for which the original mutinous 
four battalions were responsible, was a clean hole in the 
Russian line, and the elements to the north and to the south 
had, of course, to retire if they were to save themselves from 
envelopment. The whole line was dissolved, and over a space 
of some 25 miles or more a precipitate retreat began and was 
indeed necessitated by the original act of mutiny upon the 
part of the 667th. It continued all Friday ; by Saturday 
night the enemy's troops were in the very suburbs of Tamopo! 
and the Russi:in line in Eastern Galicia had ceased to exist in 
any true military' sense. The salient created by the enemy 
was already thirty miles in depth ; by Monday Tarnopol 
Was in enemy liands. 
What the. furt^her consequences of this piteous political 
breakdown may be we cannot yet tell. The facts as I have 
