July 26, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
stated them apply to the events recorded by both sides in 
almost similar terms up to the night of Saturday last, the 21st. 
As this paper now goes to press 24 hours earlier than it formerly 
did— a necessity imposed upon it by the labour conditions of 
the moment — we have no later news at the time when this 
article has to be set up. 
The remainder of the news from the Eastern front is so 
far insigniiicant. There is a report that the 7th army is 
furthering its retirement south of Brzezany, and it is difficult 
to conceive how it can avoid such a movement, and the 8th 
arm)* south of the Dniester has abandoned the last points it 
held beyond the Lomnitza and will in its turn feel the effects 
of what is going on fifty miles to the north of it. An artillery 
duel of some severity, followed by an infantry attack, took 
place in the north simultaneously with this all-important 
breakdown in Galicia. The German attack was successfully 
met by Siberian troops. The scene of the attack was the 
lake region north-west of Minsk. There was also a certain 
amount of fighting on the Dwinsk front, btit compared with the 
Galician news these northern developments may cilmost be 
neglected. 
There is only one point of relief in connection with that 
news. It is the point we have always made in these coh.imns, 
and it remains true even in the face of such events as those of 
Tarnopol. It is, that in the presence of chaos the enemy 
cannot for the moment weaken his Eastern front. The situa- 
tion is abominable but it is one degree better than it would 
have been had an organised nation with disciplined 
armies accepted peace. To-day it is clear that nothing that 
has so far happened upon the Eastern front yet permits 
the enemy to leave that front ungamished. He needs, and 
wil>need, counting in the Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian 
Allies, not less than a miljion and three-quarters between 
the Black Sea and the Bahic. With less than that — only a 
man to a yard — his line cannot be held, and no breakdown on 
the Russian side, nor even negotiations by any portion or 
fraction of what was once the Russian Empire, can guarantee 
him so far against the necessity for continued vigilance. 
The Transformation of War_III 
V\'c were saying that the three great factors in the tran^s- 
formation of modern war were, first the change in scale which 
involved a change in quality— (or the modern war is the war of 
a whole nation or of several nations combined ; secondh', 
the effects produced by the new violation of neutral rights ; 
and thirdly the effect of new instruments, particularly the 
internal combustion engine with its two great developments 
of aircraft and rapid road transport. 
The second of these factors in the modern change, the 
innovation of neglecting neutral rights, has certain military 
consequences which have, as yet, only partially appeared. 
It is remarkable and. greatly to the honour of Europe that .so 
obvious an advantage to thQ belligerent who should under- 
take it, has been in so largeameasure refused, and it is remark- 
able with what stubbornness this purely European tradition 
of the rights of neutrals (for antiquity outside a few small 
federations knew nothing of this principle) has • survived. 
There has indeed been only one perfectly clear cut immediate 
and determined violation of what had for so long been a part 
of European morals, and that was the passage of the. German 
troops through Belgium. Wherever else there has been such 
interference with what used to be thought the rights of 
neutrals, that interference has been partial and tentative 
and has reached even the degree which it now holds, very 
slowly. Such an experience gives a fair ground for hoping 
that even in the future, when a Europe profoundly changed 
shall have arisen out of the war. something wilj remain of the 
old conception that the rights of «i nation within the European 
comity were comparable to the rights of a free citizen in a 
State. The German Government itself in committing the 
crime of invading Belgium admitted that it was a crime 
and proposed the plea of necessity, urging with a really childish 
simplicity that the invasion of France, which was its object, 
Could not be accomplished in any other fashion. As a fact 
the military advisers of the German Government were here 
probably in error. It is doubtful in the light of what happened 
to the first fortresses that were attacked whether the Eastern 
barrier of the French frontier would have held. And if Ger- 
many lost the war at the .Vlarne it was largely because she 
insisted upon executing so enormous a turning movement. 
But at any rate, for the purposes of this discussion, the 
noteworthy point is that for the first time in many cen- 
turies territory of whichtheneutrality was specially guaranteed 
was violated. That which has been done once may»be done 
again, and it behoves us to consider the military con- 
sequences of such an action. 
The first and most obvious military cofisequcnce is its 
necessary effect of grouping the very largest military com- 
binations together. This effect is produced by the com- 
bination of a number of tendencies. The small and weak nation 
upon the flanks of a strong nation knowing itself liable to 
invasion in spite of guarantees, must almost necessarily ally 
itself either to the strong nation which threatens it, or to some 
strong opponent with whose frontier it also marches. We 
might put the thing in a nutshell by saying that after this wav 
the small nations upon the fringe of the Germanic group in 
Central Europe will either fall into the orbit of that group 
(in case the Allies fail to use their victory as they should) 
of, will fall into the orbit of those who have defeated the 
Gernlanic powers. 
A very large number of strategic consequences flow from 
this. The gate of the Baltic will belong to one or other of two 
groups in Europe, as we have seen the entry to the Black Sea 
fatally fall into the hands of one of the two opponents. 
The same will be true of the Continental ports of the North 
Sea; the opportunities for supplies whichthese afford will either 
be left open to whatever governs Central Europe or will be 
removed from that Power. 
Yet another mihtary consequence is the overlooking of the 
smaller neutral territories in the matter of espionage or intelli- 
gence. It is hardly credible that two opposing elements 
will permit small or weak neutral territories to remain in the 
future what they have been in the past, a field of competition 
between the spies and counter spies of either party. We 
may almost use the word "necessary" and say that it will be 
inevitable— a question of national survival — for the victorious 
party to take measures for preventing the use of territory, 
ho\vever sacredly guaranteed as neutral, for the purposes of 
espionage by the defeated party. 
To take another aspect of this thing. History will not fail 
to note that if Germany probably weakened herself by the 
violation of Belgium strategically, she none the less politically 
strengthened herself and has in that occupation the immediate 
though subsidiary advantages of near bases for attack by air 
upon this country. Whether that occupation, so long as it en- 
dures, also gives her naval advantage I do not know, but it 
jnay well be so. Had the Entente, taking as their excuse the 
violation of Belgium, immediately proceeded to a similar 
violation of neutral rights, their strategic position would have 
been enormously improved. In the matter of blockade 
alone, the immediate rationing of all the small nations of the 
North would have hastened the conclusion by months or years. 
A corresponding neglect of neutral rights would have given a 
perfectly open road into Serbia from the south and would have 
established bases for action against Austria in the Adriatic. 
The Entente has suffered in a military sense heavily by its 
attachment to the older principle and by its great reluctance 
to detract even partially and tardily from that principle. 
But we must do ourselves the justice to record the truth, 
that this hesitation was mainly a moral one. There were, 
it is true, other elements. There was the desire to prevent any 
accession of strength to the enemy by throwing even the small 
