14 
LAND & WATER 
August 2, 191 7 
last ten days must already be rep laced ; that in the last 
attacks every man, including cooks and orderlies, was thrown 
in, and that the last a'^sauU. which established itself near the 
ruins of Ailles and held a little of the French front trenches, 
but failed to roach the summit, was the forty-fourth delivered 
against the Chemin dcs Dames sincc.its capture by the French 
three months ago. 
On Saturday there was sotae interruption of the effort, 
or, at the most, an attack tliat was repelled. On Sunday a 
French counter-attack in front of Ailles recaptured a short 
section of front trenches there which the (iermans had held 
for three days, but as this se< tion was in the northern slope, 
well below "the crest, it had not, for either side, the im- 
portance of the observation posts further east on the Case- 
mates and the California plateaux. 
The whole affair— whi.:h is still in progress— closely re- 
sembles the last efforts in front of \'erdun just before the 
great blow was struck on the Somme — and that for a very 
good reason: the! enemy knows that much bigger things 
are preparing elsewhere. 
No official estimate has been issued of the probable total 
German losses upon this comparatively short sector in the 
period under review — that is, since about April 24th— -but 
a guess at about 100,000 in total losses, say 30,000 definitive 
losses, though it sounds high, has been suggested for the whole 
period on the line between Laftaux and the neighbourhood 
of Rheims. 
We must not forget that even this very'considerable German 
effort will be eclipsed by the news of the near future, and that 
it is, in spite of its intensity, a secondary point in the whole 
field of the war. But even so it teaches us certain lessons 
with regard to the present situation of the enemy. He has 
thus striven to recover the Aisne ridge, first because he must 
try to guarantee his southern rim of the great angle which he 
holds across northern France and Belgium. The holding of that 
southern rim firm is essential to his power of retirement. 
In a word, he is defending his pivot. 
Next, he attaches great importance to the poUtical effect 
of anv success here attained. 
Lastly, should he obtain full possession of the observation 
posts upon the ridge, he would transform the whole situation 
to his advantage. He would be able to hold the heights with 
a far less expenditure of men than he is now holding the valleys, 
and he would have security of movement free from direct 
observation in the eastern plain of Champagne. 
Let us turn from this question of the Aisne Ridge to that 
of the Russian breakdown in Galicia. 
The Russian Situation 
Lamentable as have been the effects of the breakdown of 
all discipHne in the nth Russian army (*), there is a 
strategical aspect attached to it which distinguishes it from 
a mere disaster. This is the success hitherto achieved by the 
7th and 8th armies to the south in effecting their retirement 
so far witliout being cut off. The breakdown of the troops 
covering Tarnopol led to an immediatje enemy advance on that 
sector of nearly ten miles a day. After the first and disastrous 
collapse things went more slowly. Not because the 7th 
Russian army had recovered itself but because the enemy 
had not the power • (—luckily for us! — ) to reap the full 
harvest promised by the extraordinary situation — the ex- 
traordinarily favourable situation-^presentcd to them. 
It is clear from the positions upon the accompanying map 
that the enemy having once decided upon a very large opera- 
tion — or at aiiy rate an operation as large as his very much 
reduced forces permitted — was not merely striking where his 
reports told him that the discipline was bad and the military 
force of his opponent correspondingly weak, but was also 
striking where, if he could advance fast enough, he would 
get round the two Southern armies, cut them off from the 
centre and be upon their communications. 
The advanced position of the two southern Russian armies, 
and especially of the 8th army south of the Dniester, was the 
obvious temptation to act in this fashion. 
The Austro-Germans, with their Turkish Allies (of whom 
four divisions were present) having broken the whole Russian 
front of Tarnopol, reached that town and even pushed on to 
the frontier, were in a position, upon the map, to strike 
southward and eastward behind the communications of the 
southern armies and to achieve. a very complete victory. 
If any man were describing the situation as between two 
equal forces he could come to no other conchision. The 
utter collapse of the line in front of Tarnopol ought to mean 
th° military ruin of everything to the south. 
Look at the map. The collapse of the Xltli army put the 
enemy right on'the flank of the Vllthand VIIIth;"_,these were 
(>) The number was wrongly quoted la,st week as "the 2nd," due 
to a simple but inexcusable error upon my p:irt in reading " 11" in my 
notes made some time ago as a Roman iL 
at his mercy — on. tlie map. Yet at the moment of writing 
so complete a success has been denied to the enemy. The 
retirement of the two armies upon the Dniester has been 
effected in time — though only just in time. With the loss 
of Tarnopol they have lost one principal base of supply. If 
(as is probable) they have to go back behind Czernov.iti 
they will lose another. But the essential thing is that the 
Austro-German advance, even though it be due, as it is 
to a complete military Breakdown in certain units, has not 
produced a full rupture of the line, nor the presence of the 
enemy upon the railways and roads behind the retiring 
Russian force to the south. 
Now, why is this ? The answer would seem to be that 
the enemy is not in sufficient force to do what can only 
be called the normal thing under the circumstances. 
The failure of the Galician centre in front of Tarnopol 
would never have taken place at all had it not been for the 
abnormal condition of the nth Russian army, and par- 
ticularly (as it would seem) of the Guards in this same 
critical point. 
To the Roumanian advance against the densely wooded 
ridge of the Central Carpathians up the Putna valley no 
conclusive result can as yet attach. The numbers there are 
not sufficient and the defensive opportunities are too great. 
Some very thin screen, probably of bad recruitment, was left 
to cover the Oituz pass. It "gave way before the stroke 
delivered against it. It was in bad moral condition or it would 
not have abandoned guns as it did, and the combined 
Russian and Roumanian forces pushed into the forests of the 
foothills and even up towards the main crest. But the 
result cannot be considerable in this southern field unless 
the main Russian forces to the north rally. H. Belloc 
