August 2, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
15 
The Growth ot Democracy 
By Principal L. P. Jacks 
UNTIL the war comes to an end no one can measure 
its effect on democracy, nor. mdeed, on anythmg 
else. There is a plain sense in which all these 
speculations are premature. No doubt the wai 
has already caused profound effects in social and political 
life, and yet the end of the war when it comes may take 
a form which will wipe out the more important halt ot tnese 
effects and replace them with their opposites. It ib a 
highly risky proceeding to interpret the meaning ot a tact 
while it is incomplete, as the war now is; though that is 
precisely what many of our thinkers have been doing witn a 
hardihood that is astonishing. 
The truth is that the war may have one or other ot two 
different meanings, and one or other of two opposite ettectb 
upon evervthing, according as it ends m the victory ol tne 
Allies or in that of the Central Powers. It may be said. 
Df course, that the war has already lasted three years, and 
that with so big afragment of it before us, and with so long an 
experience behind us. we m^y go ahead boldly with our 
measurement of its effects. But this is no answer. For the 
httle that is yet needed to make the war into a completed 
fact is precisely what is going to make all the difference to the 
meaning of this big fragment now before our eyes. Ur it 
might be said that these three years have already taugW 
us political and other lessons which we can never forget, 
let the war end as it may. True ; but a German victory, 
though it might not cause us to forget those lessons, would 
effectually prevent us from making use of them for a long time 
to come. The practical moral of this is plain. If any ardent 
democrat believes, as he well may, that the war up to date 
has brightened the prospect of democracy the world over, all 
the more reason is there that he should exert himself to the 
uttermost to bring the conflict to the one end in which these 
prospects can be realised, and to prevent it ending in the way 
which would wipe them out of existence, or, at least, 
defer their fulhlment for generations. It is too early 
for democrats to exult over the triumphs of their cause since 
1014. The question is, will these triumphs stand.'' iney 
will not stand if the Germans win. In that event democracy 
will be discredited, and all the more discredited because its 
recent extensions were unable to save it from overthrow. 
In this way, it is evident. President Wilson has read the 
practical moral, of the situation. He sees that all these 
gains will not only be lost, but will accentuate the downfall 
of democracy if the critical events ahead of us should mis- 
carry. 
A Conflict of Principles 
Viewed from the political angle of vision the war is clearly 
a conflict, perhaps the final conflict between the democratic 
and the autocrat principles. It is the battle of the I-rench 
Revolution fought over again, but on ^vastly greater scale 
and between antagonists far more f«.r™dable tooneanothen 
In the course of the war both principles have developed 
their strength and at the same time displayed their ^?akness. 
Democracy has shown its power to umte great Peoples.m them- 
selves and with one another, in the pursuit of an ideal aim 
and it has shown this at a moment when, for want of an ideal 
aim the same peoples were rent and sundered, mtemall>, 
by a multitude of petty quarrels. In this way democracy has 
revealed its strength. On the other hand it has shovvn the 
weakness which :comes from divided counsels, from demat 
ing pohcies and above all from mistrust of 't^ great mem 
Aid yet it has not been daunted by the difficulties and mis^ 
fortunes arising from these causes ; but has held on to its task 
in spite of them all ; so that we may say its ^^^kness to^ 
served incidentally to deepen the impression of its stren^th^ 
Autocracy presents the same double record. In the fen^^J 
model, at all events, it has displayed an immense efficiency m 
the pursuit of its aims. Per contra it has proved 'tsel to be 
thorouKhlv immoral, and revealed its true nature as a principle 
of riin|ledVr?aThery and violence in the Hfe of nations, thereby 
condemning itself to everiasting mistrust. 
Clearly it is futile to attempt any estimate of the effects 
of the war on democracy unless we consider at the same tmie 
its parallel effects on autocracy. The two things must he kept 
in ^nd together, ^t is the common practice « each of the 
parties to look at the matter exclusively from ts own Po " 
of view, with the result that most discussions of the question 
exhibit the facts as far simpler than they really are- jVe are 
apt to be solely impressed by the phenomena on our own side_ 
We see an immense consolidation of democratic peoples 
firmly united in defence of their principle and from this 
w draw the conclusion that our principle has already 
vindicated its right to rule the world. 
But that is not the view of German autocracy. It has not 
lost faith in itself— at least not yet. It is waiting for the end 
of the war— that " little more " which is needed to turn the 
war into a completed fact— to prove that we are wrong. These 
German defenders of autocracy are pointing with pnde to the 
results of their system, and, what is more, they are pointing 
with contempt to the results of its opposite. " What, they 
are asking, " has enabled Germany to put up this tremendous 
fight and to hold together as a single-minded unit through the 
strain and stress of these terrible years ? What is the secret of 
our immense efficiency ? It is autocracy which has enabled 
us to do these things. On the other hand it is democracy 
which is responsible for the inefficiency of our opponents— 
for the political difficulties of France, for the present chaos 
in Russia, for the inabihty of the United States to make up 
their mind until it was so late ; for the unpreparedness ot 
the British and for the ease with which we fooled them before 
the war ; for the want of cohesion and continuity in their 
military policy, for the failure a.t Gallipoli, for the scandals 
in Mesopotamia, for the indiscipline of their working classes, 
for their domestic broils and dissensions, and for the way they 
sacrifice their great men." 
German Arguments 
These arguments are theirs, nA mine. But though they 
are inconclusive at the moment, there is no denying that 
they would wear a very different aspect »/ the Germans were 
to win. There are millions of people in all countries, not 
excepting our own, whose faith in democracy is by no means 
assured even now, and it is doubtful if any vestige of their 
faith would remain with them in presence of a German 
victory. To meet this by saying that the Germans are riot 
going to win is beside the question. Indeed it is something 
worse than a mere irrelevance. There are too many people 
about who assume that democracy, just because it is demo- 
cracy, will triumph automatically by virtue of some Divine 
Right inherent in its nature. This is a mdst dangerous 
illusion, and if we indulge it we shall be beaten, and what is 
more we shall deserve to be beaten. The superiority of the 
democratic to the autocratic principle must not be taken 
as a fact estabUshed in the nature of things which of itself 
and by itself will decide the issue of the war. Rather is it 
the very question which the issue of the war is going to decide, 
and it will not be decided in favour of democracy unless every 
democrat puts the last ounce of his strength into the struggle. 
We are much to apt to think that our service to democracy is 
ended when we have spelt it with a capital D. Let us speU 
it with a imall one for the present. 
The question how far the cause of democracy^by which 
I mean the principles of representative self-government— has 
advanced during the war is extremely complicated and 
reveals when it is narrowly examined, some curious paradoxes. 
If we consider the broad facts of the international situation 
the first to strike us is that the great democratic communities 
have made common cause with one another. The United 
States have joined in and Russia has become democratic. 
Nothing of course can give greater strength to a prmciple 
than the union of those who have it at heart, and with a 
union of this magnitude, engaged m a common task, before 
us, we have surely the right to claim that the three years 
since 1914 have witnessed the greatest triumph which the 
principle of democracy has ever won. . , ., 
But when we consider the matter more in detail counter- 
considerations begin to make their appearance. How, for 
example, have we ourselves, in Great Britain, been governed 
since the war broke out ? It were hardly too much to answer 
that representative self-government has been temporarily 
suspended. This was a necessity imposed upon us by the 
war When war breaks out it is at once apparent to every- 
body that the conduct of its operations cannot be lelt to the 
mercy of popular voting. Authority and independent control 
are essential a-d these in a degree wh ich has aUthejjuahties 
Mr. Pollen's Article 
We greatly regret that Mr. Arthur Pollens Review of 
Naval Events and Policy, which was posted three weeks ago 
from New York, has not been received in time to include in 
this number. We trust it will reach us within the next 
few days, and we intend to publish it in next week's tssue of 
Land & Water. 
