10 
LAND & WATER 
August 9, 1Q17 
Ships were being destroyed at the rate of two and one half 
and three a day. But the intensity of the attack had fallen 
away before President Wilson intervened, though not, per- 
haps before his intervention was assured. It was comforting 
to think— on the facts as we know them— that it was indeed 
our own counter-measures that had brought the shipping losses 
to less than one a day before the American ultimatum was de- 
livered. And it was a natural conclusion to form on such 
knowledge as we possessed. 
No Antidote 
Of the details of Admiralty methods and as to the 
scale of Admiralty preparations we were, of course, com- 
pletely ignorant. But pre-war discussions had made it appear 
that fast and numerous patrol vessels were a perfect antidote 
to underwater war. War confirmed this view. Between 
August, 1914, and December of the same year the enemy's 
efforts to reduce our Heet's strength by torpedo attrition had « 
been thwarted, and, as we suppose, solely by nets, by mines, 
underwater bombs, and destroyers -the counter-measures 
witli which we were already familiar. The transport routes 
had been perfectly protected from the first. It looked then as 
if the formula that spelled success was known, and that it was 
a mere question of numbers to apply that formula over as 
wide an area as possible. And, as there had never been the 
least doubt that the enemy would attack upon the largest 
possible scale, it was natural "to infer that our counter-prepara- 
tions would correspond. 
Quite early in 1915. the conjecture was pubUshed that the 
enemy might produce one submarine a week in 1915, and three 
a week in the following year, and as he began tlie war with 
nearly thirty ready for sea, and twelve in various stages 
of completion, and as a fairly close estimate of his losses 
could be made, it should not have been difficult to foresee 
his probable strength in underwater craft at any time to- 
wards the end of 1916, nor how it would increase. We 
had, besides, had a fairly full experience of both kinds of 
submarine war — the ruthless and the more civilised. The 
enemy had sometimes attacked everything in sight,and then for 
whole periods liad confined liimself to attacks when some chance 
for safety could be given to the crews. Those who knew the 
truth about the two orders of campaign should have been 
able to judge the extent to which sheer ruthlessness could 
add to the enemy's piratical efficiency. In August, 1916, 
therefore, it was perfectly reasonable to assume that the anti- 
submarine formula was known, that the scale of the enemy's 
preparations had been foreseen, that the difference which 
ruthlessness would make was understood, and that the incom- 
parable shipbuilding and engineering resources of Great 
Britain had been drawn upon to their limit in preparation for 
the inevitable day when Germany would make her last 
effort to ward off a military defeat by an effective sea 
blockade. 
That this effort was inevitable was clear from the first. 
There was not the least ambiguity about the threat of 1914, 
and the surrender of 1916 was unequivocally conditional. 
This was not indeed forgotten in August. But it did not cause 
anxiety, precisely because we assumed that as the attack 
was inevitable, an adequate defence would certainly be 
ready. 
A Rude Awakening 
September, October and November brought a some- 
what rude awakening. As the glory of Jutland faded from 
our view, a new portent occurred which added doubts as to the 
future and destroyed the illusion of the past. As December 
and January went by with no mitigation of the losses, 
thoughtful observers began to wonder what would happen 
when, after the peace overtures had failed,Germany must make 
her final effort. Then, in February, the great effort was 
made. It is not necessary to recall the monotonous story 
of the last six months. It is sufficient to contrast the doubts 
and anxieties of to-day with our complacent optimism of a 
year ago. Our command of the sea — in the historic sense 
of command of the surface of the sea — is stiU as absolute as 
it was, in that we can forbid the enemy either to trade 
or invade. Our defence of our own surface sliips against under- 
water attack seems still to be reasonably perfect, so far as 
the ships of war and the transports on the military lanes are 
concerned. But the merchant shipping of the world, whether 
British, Allied or Neutral, is being destroyed at an alarming 
rate. 
Three years ago the enemy relied upon the attention which 
mines, torpedoes and Zeppelin bombswonid inflict upon our 
ships of war, in his hope of reducing the balance of sea power. ' 
This hope he was compelled to abandon. He is trying tiie 
slower method of sapping our fighting strength. Could he 
have qualified fleet power and won a sea action, victory 
on the whole field of war would have been his — and instantly. 
He is trying to get the same result, and by the same means — 
directed at a different target. He must deny us the sea he 
cannot use h'mself, or perish. His effort could not be made 
except at a cost of atrocious cruelty and outrage — and it has 
put him at odds with all the world. 
, The question is, can he bring our shipping to the danger 
point before he is himself exhausted, and therefore militarilv 
defeated on land ? Only those can answer who know his power 
of further resistance, and our power of doing without shipping, 
Arthur Pollen. 
Forestry Development 
To the Editor o{ Land & Water. 
Sir, — There is a great danger of some rash gigantic afforesta- 
tion scheme being hurriedly embarked upon which will ulti- 
mately involve the country in colossal losses. It is generally 
hinted that a movement is on foot to introduce, perhaps in a 
modified form, some such scheme as that recommended a few 
years ago by the Coast lirosion Commissioners, and it seems 
necessary that the public should realise beforehand what such 
a scheme would have involved. 
It was a scheme for planting nine million acres of more or 
less waste land; and it was admittedly based on German 
statistics. The State Forests of Saxony which gave the very 
best results of any coniferous forests in Germany were in- 
stanced ■ as showing what results could be expected. Un- 
fortunately, however, it appears that the figures were mis- 
applied, for if pre-war British prices of timber are applied 
to the volume data of the Saxon forests there is incontestable 
evidence to prove that if the nine million acres of land 
had been afforested, and if the undertaking had been 
■ financed at 3J per cent, interest, the country would have 
been involved in an ultimate net loss of about twelve hundred 
million pounds by the time the area was in proper working 
rotation. The writer appeals to all those who are now 
advocating vast afforestation schemes to weigh carefully 
these facts. 
So also, the Commissioners estimated that the land they 
proposed to plant was then yielding 15 lbs, of mutton per acre, 
and though they omitted to reckon the sheep's wool, yet if 
this be added, the land was, at pre-war prices, producing a 
revenue of about 13s. per acre. Is it wise to sacrifice a real 
3'early profit for that which must result in a direct loss, and 
which requires a large capital to be locked up in enterprise for 
seventy to eighty years ? 
The poor lands of this country can be made to produce a 
great deal more food if capital, labour, and brains are ex- 
jiended thereon, and the resulting profits will accrue quickly 
as compared with afforestation. However, all who are not pre- 
judiced will agiee that some afforestation is necessary as an 
insurance against submarine menace in the future. But 
tlie facts must be faced. The loss involved, that is the cost 
of the insurance, must be openly stat(;d. In the past there has 
unfortunately been a concerted attempt to hide from the 
country any real evidence about the finances of forestry, and 
schemes have been suggested based upon such hypertrophied 
data that the promoters have defeated their own object. 
In the writer's opinion afforestation for the next five j'ears 
must be confined to replanting or re-sowing the areas recently 
denuded of timber,and which are therefore unsuited to farming. 
The existing forest area should be sufficient to provide an in- 
surance or reserve stock of timber when once it is properly 
grown,?/ only future fellings are controlled with this end in view. 
But even if it were not thus sufficient it could be supplemented 
by storing imported timber equal in amount to one or two years' 
supply. This would be far more economical than trying to 
produce the greater part of rt at home by planting nine million 
acres and sacrificing a yearly revenue from meat and wool of 
nearly six million pounds sterling. 
If Great Britain were again involved in war in 30 years 
time, what would be thought of the economists who had sac- 
rificed the food and wool from nine million acres and in return 
could only point to woods, the oldest of which would only 
provide pit props; whereas the majority would have no econ- 
omic value for another 20 or 30 years ? 
The writer has no wish to prejudice any sound scheme, 
but his recent investigations when valuing for sale some 
400,000 cubic feet of timber, including some of the best 
grown Scots Pine in England, have convinced him that the 
greatest caution is necessary. Unfortunately we cannot 
produce all our food and timber at home, thus the nation must 
choose between farming and forestry-r-the plough or the 
planter's spade. 
July, 191 7. ' p. Trentham Maw. 
Heron Court Estate Office. 
