September 6, 1917 
LAND & WATLk 
Warfare in the West 
By Edmund Dane 
ON the West front tlie week August 27th to Scptcmlser 
2nd was, during the greater part of the time, wet 
and stormy. This state of things not only affects 
the ground, tending to impede movement and trans- 
port on both sides, but, covering the battle area as a whole 
with mist, restricts observation both from the air and on the 
level. Nevertheless, to speak of a lull in the fighting istoenter- 
tain a complete misimpression. Considering the conditions, 
the activity was as sustained as it has been in any week on 
the West during the war. 
North-east of Ypres, from the farther side of Langcmarck 
to the Ypres-Roulers road, wc " cleaned up " another series 
of posts and emplacements forming part of the enemy's 
third system of defence in this area. From Gouzeaucourt 
to Hargicourt wc made, on July 26. a further and npt un- 
important bite into the Siegfried line. North of Verdun 
there was the battle round ISeaumont, and the approaches 
to Hill 344, and at th.; end of the week there was the French 
attack on the enemy positions north-west of Hurtebise, a 
brilliant piece of work which proved entirely successful. 
At the same tiine, the artillery duel, more especially north 
of N'erdun on both sides of the Meuse, round Lens, and in 
Belgium, was sustained, and often intense, and our airmen, 
naval as well as military, and the French airmen, carried 
out various bombing raids on a large scale, and with well- 
marked results. 
This during a week of very broken weather is assuredly 
qualified inactivity. 
Coming down to details it is worth observing that the 
German defences no longer present a uniformity of type. 
They are not now everywhere aji uninterrupted closely inter- 
woven web of diggings, heavily wired, linked up with deep 
and capacious dugout refuges, and supported at commanding 
or vital points by concreted redoubts. The difficulty attending 
such a system is that if sections of it be Swept away renewal 
to the rear is a matter not only of great labour, but of time 
and of material. Inanycvent a line of that character, even 
given the necessary labour and material, and the time, can 
only be rebuilt beyond the range of the hostile guns. In 
the. meanwhile the sections remaining, though reduced 
in value, are fixed, and that in the circumstances becomes a 
serious disadvantage, for to no small extertt the value of any 
part of a system of that kind depends upon its being held as 
a uhole. The underlying assumption ,was that it could be 
so held. Events, however, have destroyed the theory. It 
is not only therefore doubtful, and more than doubtful, if 
the enemy has at his command the labour and material 
required ; but the plain necessity has arisen for a defensive 
system which, while strong, is at the same time morahlc. 
Today the state of affairs is that on some sections of the 
front we have what may be called a movable type of defences, 
and on other sections works of the older, immovable style. 
The breaches made in the older system are from the Yscr 
canal to the Lys ; from the north of Lens to Queant ; along the 
Craonne Kidgo, the length of the Moronvillers Ridge ; and 
lastly at Verdun on both sides of the river. In between are 
patches or sections of the immovable line connected up by 
the posts and emplacements representing the later develop- 
ment. 
It is interesting to note that during the week under review 
our troops had to deal in Belgium with the one type of obstruc- 
tion, and between Gouzeaucourt and Hargicourt with the other. 
More than once in inspired German statements it was asserted 
that British troops would prove useless in open or semi-open 
warfare. That, of course, was after the assertion that they 
could never successfully assault the fixed works had had to be 
removed from the propaganda screen. There is never an 
assault oh the fixed works now that does not go right home 
to the objectives dctennined upon. The world, nevertheless, 
is still invited to believe that in face of the later development 
it is another story. 
Hence the frequent appearance of the enemy formula 
with reference to British attacks, sometimes imaginary, that 
they " broke down in front of our defences with heavy losses." 
The new discovery- has apparently a mysterious virtue. So, 
however, had the older invention of an " impregnable " 
line—imtil its supposed qualities were exploded. 
The question worth determining is whether the change from 
a uniform fixed front to one partly fixed and partly " t-lastic," 
has added to or liRhtoncd the burden of the enemy's defensive. 
Should it have lightened the burden it is from his point of 
view to the cood ; should it have added to the burden it is 
to the bad. By burden of the defence has to be understood 
the amount of effort called for in relation to the results of that 
effort. If the effort called for be great and the results less 
than before, the burden is increased ; vice versa if the same 
effort or less gives greater scsults. 
The Week's Record 
Even this particular week, from August 27th to September 
2nd, affords the means of settling the point. Let us run over 
the enemy's activities. 
August 27th : Resistance to Britisli attacks east and south- 
east of Langemarck. Succession of counter-attacks. Raid 
on the British positions north of Lens. Driven off with loss. 
Attacks north of Laffaux, east and west of Cerny, and on 
both sides of Hurtebise. No result. Violent attack on the 
southern outskirts of Beaumont. Completely repulsed, and 
according to the French report " annihilated." 
August 28th : Heavy fighting in resistance to British 
attack astride the St. Julien-Poelcapclle road. Succession 
of counter-attacks. Two attacks on Inverness Copse. Both 
repulsed. X'iolent bombardment of California Plateau. 
Bombardment mastered by French counter-battery fire. 
Intended German assault failed to " materialise." Artillery 
duel north of \'erdun. 
August 2qth : Counter-attacks against British south-east 
of Langemarck. Attempted raid of British posts east o| 
Oosttaverne. Unsuccessful. Defence against British raidfe 
south-west of Hulloch, and north-west of Gouzeaucourt. 
Artillery duel on Aisne sector. V'iolent cannonade on both 
sides of the Meuse at Verdun. Reconnaissance against French 
positions in Caurieres Wood. Repulsed. 
August 30th : Cannonade in Nicuport sector, and north 
and north-east of Ypres. Fighting against the British south- 
east of St. Janshoek. Artillery duel at Lens. Artillery 
duel at Craonne and Braye. Attack at Chevreux. Un- 
successful. Continued cannonade at Verdun. Another at- 
tempt against the Caurieres Wood.^ Repulsed. 
August 31st : Another raid on British posts east of Oostta- 
verne, tliis time in strong force. A British post captured. .- 
Attempted raid on Britisli positions at Arleux-en-Gohellc. 
Repulsed. Attack in force on British posts at Gillemont 
farm, arid trenches of Gouzeaucourt. British post at Gille- 
mont taken. Attack otherwise unsuccessful. Attempted 
raid east of Cerny. No result. Resistance to French raid 
south-cast of Corbeny. Position lost. Trenches raided by 
F'rench at Butte de Mesnil. Artillery duel at Verdun. 
September 1st : Cannonade at Nicuport. Defence against 
British raid east of Wytschaetc. Cannonade soutli of Lens. 
Attempted raid south-west of Havrincourt. Repulsed. 
Positions lost to I-'rench north-west of Hurtebise on front 
of 1,500 metres. Three counter-attacks to retake lost posi- 
tions. LTnsuccessful. Casualties heavy. 
September 2nd : Resumed attack against British posts 
near Havrincourt. Positions captured, then lost. Raids 
between Lens and La Bassee. Repulsed. Attempted sur- 
prise attack on French posts near Cerny. Rei)ulscd. Renewed 
attempt to retake the positions lost at Hurtebise. Broken 
up by French artillery. 
* * * * * . 
This was a week not marked by any great offensive blow. 
The period may be ranked as one of the interludes.- Yet we 
find very considerable and general enemy activity. Of the 
many counter-attacl:s the net result was the capture of two 
British posts. On the other hand the positions lost north- 
east of Ypres. south-west of Le Catelet, and at Hurtebise 
were of decided tactical consecjuence. In one way and another 
the enemy effort was greater than that on our side ; and it 
was ccrtaiiJy much the more costly. There is hardly a com- 
parison, however, between the respective results. On the one 
hand they were negligible ; on the other of indisputable value, 
and unless we assume that the Germans are merely fighting 
for show, which of course is absurd, the bite of the Allied 
.attack, watching its opportunity, pressing where the opening 
offers, and getting in at moderate cost, is in sufficiently 
striking contrast with the relative restlessness, and lack of 
bite on the part of the defence. 
There is evidently on the (ierman side sharp<^r sense of 
insecurity. When the front was more homogeneous comparative 
quiescence might be relied upon even though at some given 
point like the Sommc a heavy, pressure had to be met- As 
