5 
LAND & WATER 
September 6, 1917 
matters stand pressure may have to be met anywhere. There 
has to be a constant " feeling " of the Allied line to detect 
possible surprise. It is a fatiguing situation. 
Value of Infantry 
One effect of the change in short is that the enemy has had 
to bring his infantry more generally and more actively into 
play. Broadly the later system of defence is based upon 
counter-attack. At any rate it is based upon counter-attack 
in the last resort. 
Now it cannot be supposed that a dcfonsi\c dewlopment 
which brings the enemy infantry more generally and more 
actively into play can at this period of the war have been 
adopted from choice. If the enemy were superior in the in- 
fantry arm the explanation might be acceptable. He is not 
s<iix!rior. The point is not one merely of numbers. The 
difference in the fighting quality of one tJerman battalion 
and another is very marked, and at times extraordinary. 
In short the enemy infantry, like fruit in a basket intended to 
catch the eye, has been deliberately " topped." Much of the 
bulk is indifferent. 
To under-estimate the enemy's fighting capacity of set 
purpose can not only serve no useful end, but might be mis- 
chievous. Optimism and pessimism alike are terms which 
imply views influenced by feelings or temperament. A just 
view has to be based upon the facts interpreted in a dry light. 
Events certainly do reveal the trend of the war and all the 
more clearly if carefully studied. In this instance we have 
(i) the altered character of the front; (2) a modification of 
defensive tactics arising out of that change : (.5) more work 
thrown upon the enemy's infantry by that modification. 
Measuring the effort with the outcome of the effort can 
leave no reasonable mind in doubt that the total result has 
been to make the burd.:n of the defensive heavier to carry. 
To what extent can the enemy carry that burden, and for 
how long ? Of course if infantry has to be brought more 
generally and more actively into play it is not a state of 
affairs tending to lower the rate of casualties. So much is 
demonstrated by the summary just outlined. The root of the 
whole matter is the Allied initiative. It is the Allied initiative 
which has thus compelled the Germans to fall back as they 
have done upon an arm they are above everything interested 
to conserve, and to expose it. More than that the exposure 
under their practice of distinctions between corps and corps, 
takes the heaviest toll of the best elements. There was an 
example of that in the recent fighting at Lens. The evacuation 
of that place was staved off, and no doubt it was important 
politically that it should be staved off, but at what a price was 
that done ! 
The military liability thus imposed upon the enemy is one 
of great moment, and so long as the Allies hold the initiative 
tactically as well as strategically, as they do, it is a liability 
he cannot avoid. In that connection we ought not to for.sjet 
how the complete initiative now exercised has arisen out of the 
course of the war. It represents no " fluke " victory. On 
tiie contrary it has been challenged with Cv'ery resource, 
and at every turn. It is the harvest of a long succession of 
battles. Further, the liability is bound to operate more 
searchingly, not simply in casualties and the incidence of 
casualties, but in fatigue. Even as things are the Germans 
often find themselves obliged to leave troops so long in the 
line without relief that they are unfit to fight. 
It is somewhat the fashion at the moment to consider the 
infantry arm as put down in this war from its old place, and 
its functions as subordinated, and that was the opinioji with 
which the Germans themselves began the war. Whether 
or not after their experiences they hold the opinion now is 
doubtful. Their actions do not tend that way. And the truth 
is that the increased power of artillery, and even the use of 
aircraft, so far from subordinating the function of infantry, 
have made it all the more important. To say nothing of the 
effect upon tactics of machine guns, and the re-introduction of 
bomb throwing and trench mortar>, the work of the footman, 
and his range of skill both in attack and in defence, have been 
vastly enlarged. To think otherwise is to misread all the great 
battles. 
But if the functions and importance of infantr>' have in 
truth been extended and raised, then the side which commands 
tlie greater power in this arm lias the issue so much in its 
favour, and the allied initiative proves as much. Manifestly 
too to widen still further the difference in the power of the in- 
fantry arm is an object of the first consequence, and is one 
of the most telling uses to which the initiative can be put. 
There may be nothing showy in imposing upon the enemy 
liability which is bound in due course to crush him, and in 
rendering escape from it impossible, but if not showy U is the 
higliesl level of military skill, and it is the real art of war as 
distinguished from the spectacle. 
For another point not infrequently overlooked is that 
war, as now waged, is, notwithstanding all the multiplication 
of its mechanism, more even than ever it was a clash of the 
power of mind. There is a very widespread idea that the more 
mechanism is introduced the more the conflict becomes one of 
blind strength in contrivances. Apart from" the fact that 
mechanism is itself an embodiment of intelligence, the ap- 
plication of such aids calls for more intelligence, not for less, 
and commandership rises alike in responsibility and ineffecti\ e- 
ness, not alone with the size of armies, but with their complexity 
and equipment. It may be bad taste in that respect to praise 
ourselves, but our French Allies who, despite all Genrian 
claims and boasts, are the most thorough-going soldiers in 
the world, and can wage war brilliantly and successfully 
without degrading it to the level of cowardice and outrage, 
hav2 gripped that fact, and are not blown about by the 
winds of vain doctrine. 
It is apposite in passing to obsen-c that if war were a blind 
conflict of man-killing inventions, and that if infantry were 
the almost negligible quantity which some who know little 
of the matter think it to be, then very likely there could be no 
decision. There could not be a decision in a mere contest 
between opposing artilleries even if assisted by fleets of air- 
craft. It is upon these notions that doubt as to whether there 
can be a decision is founded, and it is a peculiar thing that both 
are in a marked degree serviceable to the enemy. He is 
most strongly interested in propagating the no decision possible 
legend, because as he well knows a decision is not only 
possible, but given the necessary time, foregone. 
Suppose he were the better in leadership, had finally won, 
and held the initiative, were the stronger in infantry; and as 
the effect of all these things had imposed upon us what we 
knew to be a wasting and deadly, yet uncscapable liabilitv, 
and suppose somebody in those circumstances came along and 
assured us that there could be no decision notwithstanding. 
That somebody would forthwith be voted the most ridiculous 
and grotesque of optimists. The contrary pessimism, or 
professed pessimism when the balance is in our favour, is not 
less grotesque, and not a whit less ridiculous. 
The Thrust at Riga 
The state of affairs on the East front is abnormal, and so 
long as that state of affairs continues there is no basis on 
which calculation can be applied. It is a very remarkable 
fact that in the renewed campaign in Moldavia, Mackensen 
has met with no success whatever save what was presented to 
him by the defection of certain Russian units. Other Russian 
troops have fought conspicuously well. A few days ago the 
special correspondent of the r/w/cs writing from Jassy, declared 
that in this campaign beginning with the resumed offensive 
by the Roumanians, fourteen enemy divisions had been used 
up, or at all events, had to be withdrawn on account of their 
losses. This piece of information was doubtless derived from 
Headquarters, and is probably reliable. If so, it has been 
for the enemy a very expensive, and on the whole hitherto, 
a singularK' unfruitful adventure. It is evident that reor- 
ganised and in effect handled by French officers, the Rouma- 
nian army has proved a p'jculiarly tough proposition, and if 
doubt concerning its supplies could be eliminated, there 
should be no ground for misgiving, and the less so because 
of the situation in Italy. 
That the enemy should have chosen such a juncture to 
laimch an offensive having as its objectives the capture of 
Riga and Dvinsk, may at first sight appear odd. So far from 
being influenced by any favourable turn elsewhere, on the 
West let us say, it has pretty certainly been inspired by the 
bad outlook in that quarter. Relying upon the instability 
of Russian resistance, and considering the issue of the war to 
have resolved itself into a race between the submarine cam- 
paign and .American intervention, with the chances, as they 
think, in favour of the U Boats, the aim of the- Germans 
is to create as improved a position as possible on the East 
front by rounding off as quickly as may' be the conquest of 
the Baltic Provinces. 
But for the confusion — it might be more properly called the 
absence of authority — in the Russian army, the niove would 
not have had the remotest chance of success. As it is it appears 
to ha\'e every chance since there is nothing in effect to oppose 
to the advance^ 
On Siiturday the news came through that the enemy had 
crossed the Dvina from the Illuxt bridgehead, abandoned 
by the Russians some time ago, thus menacing communica- 
tions with Dvinsk. 
On Saturday he apparently, with ijo effective opposititm, 
passed the Dvina also at U.xkull, 18 miles to the south-east of 
