September 6, 191 7 
LAND & WATER 
Riga, and was reported to be dpveloping this success, practically 
a \valk-o>-er, in the direction of the Riga-Petrograd railway. 
If that railway be reached by the German forces, and it 
was not easy to see what was to stop them, Riga would be 
cut ofl, save for communication by sea. 
The city occupies a promontory at the mouth of the-Dvina, 
and the river has to be crossed by any forces approaching 
from the west or south-west. As the river is wide this is 
not easy. A crossing at U.xkuU gi\'es an approach from the 
south-east, and there is no other impediment save the absence 
of good roads. Since, however, the distance from U.xkull 
is only j8 miles, that is of itself not formidable. 
All the probabilities at the moment of writing were that 
Riga could be entered by the enemy with little delay. 
The Russian defence both at Illust and at Uxkull had 
evidently given way. 
Nor, if orders are reviewed and debated by ragimental 
conlmittees, is that in the least surprising. Even if the 
orders were " endorsed " the delay involved would be fatal, 
and besides, no force is worth a rap if wliile some regiments 
stand others withdraw as they may choose. That the break- 
up of the Russian defence is due io this cause may be taken 
for granted. It is remarkable that these breakdowns should 
occur when and where the Germans want them to occur, and 
the circumstance justifies suspicion, for the so-called democratic 
organisation, even if debating societies on a battlefield were 
not the last word in absurdity, is one that seems contrived 
for the verj' purpose of facilitating corruption. 
There is only this to be said, that »7 the Russian army is 
purged of a taint which allows everv cowardly and dishonest 
or blatant fool directly to murder his comrades by exposing 
their lives, the Germans are not likely to hold " conquests " 
effected by such means. 
Broadly, the enemy situation is this. The Roumanian 
campaign last autumn and winter,'coming upon the heels oi 
the battle of the Somme, swept away the German strategical 
resers'e. As the campaign of 1917 could not be faced until 
the reserve was re-created, there was a severe and universal 
" comb " of every industry — agriculture, mining, transport, 
and even arsenal and munition shops. The risks economically . 
were serious, and serious even for the keeping of the armies 
afoot in the matter of materials and supplies. They were to 
be met, for a time, by the Compulsory Service Law. Since, 
however, it was foreseen that they could only be met for 
a time, " unlimited " submarine warfare was resolved upon 
to end the war within a calculated period. Not only has that 
period gone by, but the strategical reserve, re-created at these 
risks, has once more been swallowed up. The po.'^ition. there- 
fore, in that respect, is exactly what it was at the end of last 
year, but with the difference, a very vital one, that industry 
has been drained to the dregs, and that even the hastened 
embodiment of the 1919 class of recruits has made yet 
another draft upon it. 
We can understand therefore the haste to improve the 
situation on the East front as a further insurance against 
eventualities. The move indicates rather the gravity of the 
outlook on the West, and a hedging against its politica.1 re- 
percussion, for German losses in Belgium during the past month 
have been of punishing proportions, and those round Lens and 
on the French section of the front have been in the same ratio. 
There is no reserve, and the economic and labour squeeze 
has become beyond example severe. The submarines 
are the one hope of keeping the Americans out. The hop 
is not now certain. * 
Since the above wan written the Germans, as foreseen by 
Mr. Dane, have occupied Riga without resistance. 
Leon Daudet: A Prophet in France 
By J. Coudurier de Chassaigne 
To those who have sufficient delicacy of perception 
to pick up the wireless currents of political life, it 
has been evident that in all the Allied countries those 
centres of espionage organised by Germany before 
the -war still retain much of their previous subterranean 
activity. Public opinion was pacified when a few non- 
nalnraiiscd aliens were placed under lock and key. But those 
who had taken the precaution of obtaining naturalisation 
papers were left at liberty to spy and plot with our worst 
enemies, who are everywhere tho.se of our own household. 
For however painful the reflection may be, it must be acknow- 
ledged that every country has the traitors, as well as the 
' heroes, it descr\'es. 
In spite of the rigorous Press Censorship in France, the 
r-xistence of this hidden danger has been gen.^rally realised 
and fairly freely discussed. But to all this the French Govern- 
ment turned a deaf ear, though it is true that a few small 
fry were periodically imprisoned. It was not, however, 
until Duval tlu- notorious accomplice of Almereyda, was 
arrested on the Swiss frontier, with a German cheque in his 
pocket, by the military police, that the Ministry of the Interior 
and the civil authorities were forced to take action. 
Even then, had it not been for the speech, now famous, made 
by M. Clemenceau in the Senate, denouncing the incompre- 
hensible attitude of M. Malvy towards these nefarious agents 
of the enemy, it is doubtful whether the whole affair would 
ever have been made public. M. Malvy's resignation is the 
first fruits of that speech, but I question whether M. Clemenceau 
would ever have made it, if the ground had not been prepared 
by the persistent and courageous campaign conducted in 
L' Action Fran^aise by his old political enemy M. Leon Daudet. 
The true sentiment of patriotism, like necessity, makes strange 
bed-fellows, and though M. Clemenceau is a Republican and 
M. Leon Daudet a Royalist, both equally deserve the title of 
good Frenchmen. From diametrically opposite directions 
their common love for their country has on this occasion 
united them against the common enemy. - 
The oersonaJity of M. Clemenceau, whose destructive 
