bcEiember 0, igi; 
LAND & WATER 
13 
The "Nine Million" Effectives 
By Hilaire Belloc 
Mr. Bdlcc, who is away on a holiday hut will resume his 
military arlidii next week, contributes /his analysis of 
German Effectives in reply to Ihc letters he has received 
from many correspondents. 
I HAVE been written to by many people about Mr. 
Gerard's expression " Nine Million Remaining German 
litfectives " appearing in the memoirs he is now publish- 
ing. I should like to say in the iirst place, that the 
criticisms I have to advance against this expression in no 
way detract from my appreciation of the excellent work 
which Mr. Gerard has done as a public witness in this grave 
trial of all Europe. x 
\Vhy must we regard this one phrase " Nine million re- 
maining Gernjan eftectives " as wholly inaccurate ? , 
Be/ore answering that question let me remind the reader 
of the way in which we naturally receive any impossible state- 
ment made upon high authority. 
. If a man highly placed in the Hydrographic Service of some 
Government writes of the Straits of Dover : " The deepest 
soundings are but loo fathoms or so," we do not, whatever 
the repute of the writer or his special opportunities of know- 
ledge, accept the statement. We know that it is, as it stands, 
nonsense ; we cast about for some explanation. We say to 
ourselves, there may have been a slip ol the pen ■; if the infor- 
mation is in type, we may refer it to a printer's error ; or we 
may find that the Straits intended to be mentioned were not 
the Straits of Dover at all, but ^ome other deeper channel, 
and that the word " Dover " came in by some error in writing 
or dictating, or in collecting proofs. A mass of long-known 
official statistics, to wit, the numerous soundings taken in the 
Straits over centuries, make us perfectly certain that the 
sentence as it stands is meaningless : no part of the Straits of 
Dover is within much more than a third of the depth stated. 
Now that is just what a man whose business it has been to 
follow the statistics of this war feels with regard to the state- 
ment that " German effectives arc still nine million in num- 
ber." The German eftectives— in the sense of combatant 
units- arc perfectly well known. They arc somewhat 
over ILrce million (at the most 3i), organised in divisions 
and lesser units, the numbois and positions of which have 
been ascertained and arc followed minutely as the war pro- 
ceeds. Behind these eftectives is an organised reserve power 
of nien in dejwt, now very corisiderably less than half a 
million (at which figure it stood ten weeks ago), but to be 
increased in a very few weeks by the greater ])art of class 
1919 and before the end of the year by nearly the whole of 
that class. 
Combatant Effectives 
When we read, therefore, that " The remaining German 
effectives are nine million," we cast about for seme explanation 
of how the statement could have got into print— what sort of 
typographical or other error explains it. 
The word " effectives " i.s generally used to mean the men 
organised in units for combatant service -the actual fighting 
force. For instance, when you are told by a military his- 
torian that " Napoleon had' a difficult v in keeping up his 
effectives in 1814," the phrase refers to difficulties in the up- 
keep of combatant forces in the field— the filling of gaps 
resulting from death, capture, sickness and wounds oiv active 
ser\ice. It is not a word of that precise scientific or 
technical value which words often acquire after long service, 
and one can easily conceive that one source of error in the 
remark we are criticising might be the loose or double use of 
the word " effective " : first to mean mobilised men in general, 
and next to mean of active service alone. 
Whether the word " effectives " has been ased first loosely 
and then technically, thereby creating a confusion, or whether 
it has been used throughout to mean the fighting forces alone, 
is of little consequence to a true statement of the position. 
The statistics of this arc well known. There is no debate 
upon them save with regard to comparatively small margins 
of error. .\ few weeks only of further tightini,' have modified 
a position which, towards the beginning of July, stood some- 
what as follows : 
(i) Total ration strength of the German Armv about five 
and a half millions (or a little under) : To show upon what 
points doubt exists, I may mention that the lowest estimate- 
I have seen is for 5,4.55,oo(» (whicii is that of a high Erench 
authority), and the highest but just under 5,(h)o,ooo. It is 
clear that a slight difference in date, or the "inclusion of one 
very doubtful category /say, the ladies who arc on the ration 
strength doing typewriting), by one authority and their 
exclusion by another, would be sufiicient to account for these 
small' differences. At any rate, if we put the present ration 
strength of the (lerman Army at 5.V millions, we are probably 
just a little over the right figure at the present moment. 
(2) (M this large body, the only part which counts in our 
calculation of fighting strength is the organised combatant 
active force, and is about or perhaps at the present moment 
a little under three and a quarter millions. This is what 
would nonnaliy be called the " effectives." 
(3) Of the balance of somewhat o\er two millions, and 
perhaps nearly two million and a quarter, the great bulk are 
n\ade up either of men who are used to garrison, to supply, 
etc., hut tire too old to be used in the field (save a few excep- 
tionally here and there), or of men so affected by war in the 
way of wounds and illness that they can only be used for 
similar auxiliary purposes. These last do not count among 
" definitive " losses, that is, they are not out of the army 
for ever as are the dead, the prisoners and tlto discharged 
from vcn>- bad wounds or Hlness ; but then, neither are tliey 
capable of active scr\^ice in the future. 
Depot Strength 
The only part of this balance between the total ration 
strength (5A million) and the army in the field ( ;} million) 
that counts in the active strength of the enemy is the number 
Germany has in depot ; that was in June last under half a 
million— excluding class 1919. By some British accounts this 
reserve is by this time so depleted that the first of class 
1919 have begun to appear in the battle — but they are barely 
due, and it is probable that prisoners of 1919 arc volunteers. 
This class was expected rather in the beginning of September 
than at the end of August, and they will probably dribble in 
during autumn — to the extent of 350,000 or thereabouts. 
This is -not the whole of class 1919. The remainder of it, to 
the extent of 140,000 or a little more, were put back as im- 
mature for later training, and most of them will presumably 
appear in the winter. 
Such is, in rough figures, the situation of the enemy as 
regards eft'ectives, that is. in combatant numbers. There is 
no mystery about it. The figures are perfectly well known 
and generally dealt with all over Eurlopc by those who concern 
themselves with close and rational study of the campaign. 
They arc based, of course, upon the convergence of many 
different kinds of information, all grouped under the Intelli- 
gence Department of the various belligerents. 
Twenty-ohe German classes were put into the field in the 
first months of the war — classes '14 to '94 inclusive. They 
included the young men in their twentieth year and up to 
men in their fortieth year. These classes 1914 to 1894 inclusive 
came from men born during the course of 1874, during the 
course of 1894, and during the course of the intervening years. 
Apart from these, five older classes from 1893 to 1889 in- 
clusive, that is, men from their forty-first to their forty-fifth 
year inclusive, were summoned as liable to military service, 
but not used in the field save in exceptional circumstances 
and in small numbers. 
The total number of men bom from 1874 to 1894 inclusive, 
and still alive when Germany declared war was, omitting 
figures < under a thousand, 10,757,000. Of the youngest 
class, under normal conditions, about three-quarters are fit 
for service. The elder, of course, as one approaches forty, 
tail off' rapidly and come down through less than five-eighths 
to little more than half. The total number normally available 
for active use, within the 21 classes, was over seven, but rather 
less than seven and a half millions. Of these, a certain 
proportion, probably about a million and a half, were not 
mobilised in the first months, but kept back for civilian work. 
With the second year of the war, or rather a Ihtle before 
the beginning of the second year of war, whit is called 
" abnormal " recruitment began in Germany — as it did 
somewhat later elsewhere. 
It took three forms, (i) The combing out of what could 
jxjssibly be spared from civilian occupation among the fit ; 
(2) the calling of the younger classes ; and (3) the combing 
out of the ' unfit." that is, of those who under normal re- 
cruitment are rejected. 
The first process was largely aided, some months lat r, by 
the beginning of^the slave raids organised by the enemy in the 
territories he occupied. 
The second, which was begun in October 1915, could not 
in the nature of things yield any very large body of men, 
though, as the pressure increased with every passing month. 
