12 
LAND & WATER 
September 20, 1917 
of t]ie German Intellectuals. Imperial Germany there 
I)roclaims through tlie mouths of her finest thinkers her poli- 
tical and social superiority over all the rest of the world. And, 
in this alleged superiority she sees the product of her very 
Imperialism. That constitutes for her the foundation of her 
right. It is in the name of her imperialist superiority that 
she claims hegemony, and calls upon democracy to submit 
in order that mankind may rise to the level of German per- 
fection. If the democracies refuse, Germany summons 
them to the arbritrament of the sword. German warfare 
is pedantic : it assumes the character of a demonstration. 
It is not enough for the weaker to acknowledge himself 
defeated: he must confess that he had been mistaken, that 
his constitutional principles did not permit him to assure 
himself of that security without which civilised existence is 
impossible. He has no option but to enter the school of 
the victor. 
Since the United States joined the coalition, and since the 
revolution in Russia, the allied democracies make up a popula- 
tion nearly three times as large as that of the Central Powers, 
without reckoning their colonial populations, which give 
them important co-operation. Their wealth is infinitely 
greater than that of their adversaries, and their industry 
more potent. We have had three years in which to mobilise 
our resources. The sea is ours, despite the submarines. We 
possess mafked numerical superiority on all the fronts, pre- 
ponderance of artillery on nearly all the fronts, and the advan- 
tage in material of all kinds. If in these ciicumstances 
democracy were unable to triumph over the Emperor, it would 
be the most appalling confession on her part of impotence, 
incapacity and weakness. She would vanish from off tlie 
face of tlie earth like other unfit creatures eliminated in the 
struggle for existence. Never has the inevitable necessity 
of victory been imposed more imperatively. This is a case 
of victory or death. 
A Moral Victory 
Even if, despite the improbability of any such hypothesis, 
Germany, whose armies still occupy unbroken lines in hostile 
territory, renounced all ideas of indemnities and annexation, 
if she ceased to demand any of these economic or military 
'' guarantees " of which her Chancellor talked last April, 
if si'e agreed to the admission of Poland into a nominally 
independent unity, and to the restoration of Alsace-I.orraine 
to France, but still retained her Emperor with his present 
power unimpaired, I contend that this would be the most 
signal victory for German imperialism. 
A moral victory, to begin with : for it would have been 
demonstrated thai by virtue of its essential principle it was 
•apable of withstanding forces three times superior to its own, 
ind compelling them to accept a compromise. 
An economic victory, in the next place : the most elementary 
acquantamce with things Russian would convince anyone 
that, reinforced by the prestige accruing from its victorious 
resistance to a coalition of the world, it would speedily impose 
German commerce upon Poland, and at any rate, all the 
western provinces of the former empire of the Tsars. It 
woufd recover and increase the hold it previously had upon 
the Barti'an?, and upon the Ottoman Empire. And it would 
realise, in the most favourable conditions, the ambitious 
projects indicated in the construction qi the Berlin-Bagdad 
railway. 
And, finally, a political victory, for, all the world over, 
political influence follows in the train of commercial conquest. 
Sof)ner or later the Middle- Europe Confederacy would be 
constituted, and the equilibrium of the world would be 
definitely destroyed. 
Among the Stockholm party there are many people who 
recognise as we do tlie imperative necessity of' breaking the 
power of German Imperialism, but who think that it may 
be awaited as the result of an internal revolution in Germany 
They rely upon the German socialists and democrats. At 
the outset, it is well to agree about the meaning of words. 
Who are tl^e democrats upon whose courage reliance is to 
be placed ? 
Are they the Deputies who a few weeks ago voted the "Motion 
of the Majority " in the Reichstag ? The event has proved 
already how much their sincerity was worth, and what the 
concessions with which they are satisfied amounted to 
Are they the Socialists of the ATajority ? The Emperor has 
had no more zealous supporters. It is "through their agency 
that he keeps the people in submission. Everyone remembers 
tiic manifesto in which they implored the people to remain 
submissive when it was manifesting some unrest. 
Are they the Socialists of the Minority? Everyone ac- 
quainted with the facts recognises their excellent intention 
rather after the fair though unfortunately it was. We 
raise our hat to their courage, and if Germany can be renewed 
from within it is assuredly their influence" that wUl do it 
But is not that precisely the argument which must persuade 
Western Socialists to refuse all compromise and all 
common action at Stockholm with the Majority Socialists ? 
These are men with whom the sincere democrats of Germany 
have recognised it is impossible to act in concert, and with 
whom they have abruptly broken off relations. Are we, 
who are separated from the (lerman Majority by many other 
points of disagreement and by many other offences of theirs, 
to go and resume relations which are repudiated by the 
Minority in Germany ? Are we to go and recognise a? 
representatives of German democracy men who are denounced 
in Germany as traitors to the cause ? Are we to assume 
the task of rehabilitating them ? Surely a singular way of 
assisting in the emancipation of German democracy ! 
It is important not to give way at this point, either to 
idle scepticism or to childish trustfulness. No one is justi- 
fied in maintaining that Germany will for ever be incapable 
of realising her own democracy. There exist to-daj' no 
peoples marked out for servitude by a kind of irremediable 
predestination, just as there exist to-day no elect peoples. 
But, above all, no one is justified in regarding this process of 
democratisation as inevitable and imminent, and in basing 
his politics upon that dangerous hypothesis. 
The Russian Revolution 
It has been said that the Russian revolution made the 
German revolution imminent. Perhaps it would do so, 
if the Russian revolution were to triumph both at home 
and abroad. But, if the revolution is defeated, if its armies 
take to flight, if it is unable to avert anarchy or economic 
paralysis from the country, what then ?' After spending 
two months in Russia in close study of events, and after 
careful examination of the situation in Germany, I have 
no hesitation in saying that up to the present the events in 
Russia have contributed to spoiling the chances of a revolution 
in the dofuinions of the Emperor William. 
It has been declared that, if we were to make peace with 
the Emperor to-day, democracy would triumph to-morrow. 
History teaches us, however, that it is not victorious Cjesar 
who is overthrown, but Caesar vanquished. If the German 
people are to be detached from their Emperor, they must 
first be convinced that \\ illiam, like Napoleon before him. 
has become the public enemy, and that the nation has not 
only nothing to gain, but everything to lose from linking its 
destiny with that of the t;. rint. 
Before concluding I miist say a word about a last class 
of advocates of the Stockholm Conference ; those who would 
go there, not with the object of paving the way for a peace 
by compromise, but for some other reason, as, for example, 
in order to arraign the German Majority Socialists, or to 
lay the case for the Western Allies before the Neutral Powers 
and Russia. Their intention is most laudable. But it is 
not by their intentions that political actions must be judged, 
but by the results to which they logically lead. Unless 1 
am very much mistaken, the results from Stockholm would 
be deplorable. 
Is the atmosphere of a Peace Conference very favourable 
to an arraignment ? In opposition to our friends who desire 
to proceed with the Conference, there would be in Sweden 
the German and Central delegates, who have no intention 
of standing their trial, the Neutrals, who desire at all cost 
to prevent the prolongation of a war into which they are 
in danger of being drawn, and the Russians, who have de- 
clared most audibly that it was for the express purpose of 
effecting peace with despatch— and consequently, by com- 
promise—that they were so insistent upon summoning the 
Conference. Moreover, in opposition to them would be 
an important section of Westerq delegates, who would re- 
present, in numbers wholly disproportionate to their strength, 
the pacifist elements of France, England, Italy. America 
and other countries. What good could come of "an arraign- 
ment of which the first effect was to group all these disparate 
elements into an artificial coalition ? 
At Stockholm, as at all Conferences of this kind, it would 
not be the speeches which would have any effect. The 
thing that matters is the temper created by the convocation 
itself by the intentions proclaimed by the organisers, and 
by the adherence won to their projects. Now, whether 
we like it or not, the Conference has been announced as a 
Peace Conference, and it was held up before the peoples as 
the symbol of the approaching cessation of hostilities. To 
attend it is to give credence to the idea that that peace is 
possible, and to arouse dangerous hopes which would be 
disappointed. 
Look at Russia. I know nothing is farther from the 
thoughts of the Soviet than a separate peace, than fraterm- : 
tion on the battle front, than abandoning positions belon 
the enemy. Nevertheless the Russian soldiers who fought 
like lions under the old regime and whose valour is above 
