LAND &, WATER 
14 
igj.e, as an " explanation of the war aims of Germany." 
Against England we have to keep our hand on Belgium and the 
Channel coSst. For the safety of our Western frontier it is 
indispensable to so organizfe tlie Government of Bc\f-nmx tnat. 
after sepai-ating for administrative purposes the '^•'•'wn .inn 
Flemish parts.the inhabitants have no influence on the poliUcai 
fate of the country ; and the possessions and undertakmgs. 
of the Walloon notables pass into German hands. 
Firmly planted remains the opinion as put forward among 
others by Prince Salm Horstmar, member of the Prussian 
House of Lords, in Der Tag of July 29th, 1916 : 
We shall have lost the war if we do not bring home as prize 
of victory the domination of the F'lemish coast. 
It should be noted, however, that it is not only in those 
German circles which we call reactionary and whose great in- 
fluence should not Ix! lost sight of. that these views prevail. 
Among the groups of other political creeds exactly the same 
opinions arc held. Good burghers of the city of trankfort 
on the Oder jointly addressed a petition to the German 
Chancellor of the following tenor : 
Belgium has resigned its title to an independent State. W^ 
want it. We want its mineral wealth and industrial under- 
takings in order to increase our economic power. The lorm 
of our possession is indifferent to us. Annexation is un- 
necessai>'. We want a Flemish State within our black and 
white and red frontier posts. 
From places in other parts of Germany such as Catholic 
Freiburg in Breisgau exactly similar petitions have been 
sent : "Let Belgium come under German leadership. The 
popular Political Parties have uttered similar language. The 
Christian Soci;d Party already in March, 1916, passed a resolu- 
tion containing the following words : 
It is necessary (hat no Belgium which can serve as a Franco- 
British marching ground remains. A Germanic kingdom oj 
Flanders with a true Gerninn prince at its head should be called 
into existence. It should without annexation form part of the 
German Empire; and while retaining its language and internal 
administration, its means of communication, army and naval 
ports should be under German supremacy. 
^s regards the Centre party, the Koelnische Volks Zeittmg 
in October, igi6, devoted several articles to the Belgian 
question, one extract of which reads as follows : 
Considerations of our defence and security guide us. Belgium 
will remain a rich country : we can let it continue to seek its 
own economic advantages if only we take permanent care that 
Belgian economic life does not become a weapon against us. 
Antwerp is of special importance. In the future it should 
even more than in the past become the sea gate for German 
production, especially for the Rhenish- Westphalian industry. 
But in order to rule Antwerp's future we must have it in our 
hands, precisely like Hamburg and Bremen, militarily and 
economicallyl And without Ostend and Zeebrugge we are 
not masters of Antwerp. 
The National Liberal leader, the late Herr Bassermann- 
wrote in the Deutsche Slimtnen of December 25th, 1916 : 
For Germany's security it is indispensable that wo have our 
hand on Belgium- If we do not succeed in holding the Flemish 
coast, England has won the war. Only by keeping these 
points d'appui we can enforce peace. To retain Flanders 
for the Germanic race is the question. Antwerp must re- 
main a German port. 
The views of his party are also expressed by Lanick in 
Klurheii uber Kriegsziele : ^ ^ 
Luxemburg and Belgium should uncoaditionally be brough*- 
within the German boundary system. Belgium on ou*^ 
Western' frontier will have to fill the same part as the fortres^ 
line in Alsace-Lorraine. It must be open for us as a strategi*^ 
marching ground, and we mist have its natural means of de' 
fence in our possession. We require tangible guarantees. 
We must direct the Belgian railway systems and occupy the 
principal fortresses. It is obvious that Belgium should also 
economically and in its foreign policy be dependent upon 
Germany. However, annexation is not desirable. 
As regards the advanced Radicals the following quotation 
from a loudly applauded speech made by the Reichstag 
Deputy, Herr Wiemer in the party meeting in Greater Berlin 
on January 3rd, 1917, may be taken as typical : 
We do not want to annex Belgium, no party desires this, Bu*- 
what the Chancellor said in the Reichstag on December oth. 
1915. with approval of all parties remains unaltered : we must 
protect ourselves militarily, politically and economically 
against England and France having in Belgium a jumping- 
ofi ground on Germany." 
The well-known Reichstag Deputy Herr Muller-Mefningen 
said in the General Meeting of the Liberal League at Frei- 
Munchen in January, 1917 : ' 
The neutral press accepts as a communis opinio that Belgium 
can rely upon being restored and indemnified by Germany. 
This, however, is not in accordance with the official declaration 
of August 4th. 1914. The future relationship between 
the German Empire and Belgium must be settled by the 
arbitrament of arms. In Belgium either France or Germany 
September 20 , J037 
(even without annexation) will exercise hegemony. 
From the above quotations it becomes apparent how the 
formula "no annexations" has been| combined with hege- 
mony. On May 3rd, 1917, the Reichstag Committee discussed 
the Belgium question. A Radical Deputy then said in agree- 
ment with Dr. Helferich, the Vice-Chancellor : 
There is no longer any question of annexation. Even ^ 
semi-sovereign Belgium would lead to continual protes* 
movements. But restoration of the old situation would also 
carry the greatest dangers with it. Belgium then would only 
be an appendix of the Entente. The only way by which to 
attain our object is to separate politically Flemish andWalloons. 
The Flemish are, as the most advanced guard of the Germanic 
world, tied to us in life and death. We have to take care that 
now before peace is concluded as much as possible of Flanders 
is tied to Germany. Within half a year the Belgian State 
should be split in two and Flanders should immediately be 
closely connected economically with Germany. The Young- 
Flemish desire a Flanders^ kingdom in close relationship with 
the German Empire. 
Now for the Socialists ! Too much importance is attached 
abroad to a few manifestations of the Party and especially to 
Scheidemann. Scheidcmann is not by any means as 
positively in favour of Belgian independence as many think. 
There are optimists among oui countrymen who have been sur- 
prised when in answer to their question : " So you wish Belgium- 
to be free, "hehasanswered,"Yes, certainly, butundercertain 
conditions."' But in the German Socialist party many much 
clearer expressions have been heard. 
Against Scheidemann's speech of October nth, 1916, about 
" Peace by international' agreement," Leimpeters wrote in 
the Socialist organ Die Glocke : 
I have ample opportunity to mix with adherents of our party 
in mines and factories. Nearly all without exception are 
annexationists. Even many who side with Liebknecht and sup- 
port the minority, will surrender neithet Belgium nor other 
territory. If a vote were taken in out Party certainly ga 
per cent, would be for annexation. 
Paul Lensch, a Socialist Deputy of the Reichstag, wrote in 
the Dusseldorfer General A nzeiger : 
There is no difference of opinion among the German paople 
that Belgium should not be annexed ; but they are also agreed 
the necessity of demanding so-called guarantees for the future 
Herr ^Conrad Hanisch wrote in the Vorwarls : 
It seems as if the leaders with their manifestations in favour 
of peace do not represent the rank and file of the party. As 
regards, for instance, the much discussed "annexation ; " I, 
for my person do not make a secret of my conviction that the 
interest of the German people and labouring classes demand 
a great extension of our Eastern frontier, and also real guaran- 
tees to prevent Belgium from remaining the gateway through 
which England can invade Central Europe, taking into account 
the interests of the Belgian peoiJc. 
In the December, 1916, issue of the SozialisiiscJic Monal- 
shefte Herr Max Khippcl wrote : 
A clear programme to protect us against Belgium (dismantling 
the fortresses, control of foreign policy, mutual means of 
communication, economic rapprochcmeiit or amalgamation) 
has still to be worked out. Unfortunately the press of our 
party avoids this question, and only conducts the windmill 
fight against the annexation nonsense. 
These are perhaps an excessive number of quotations, but 
we wished this time to give a faithful and lively picture of 
what it is necessary to understand about the intentions 
generally held in Germany with regard to Belgium. Is the 
answer explicit or not ? And may we not say with Lanick 
from whose Klarheit uber die Kriegsziele (1917) further matter 
on this subject could be quoted : " Germany desires on the 
Channel a Western Mark or Dependency under German pro- 
tection, not an independent Belgium." To satisfy this 
aspiration, Bethmann HoUweg pledged his word in the 
Reichstag on December 9th, 1915, and Michaelis repeated it 
when speaking of grenz vicherungen (frontier security) in 
his recent speech. 
***** 
Note by Editor : Since this article was published in 
.Amsterdam, other impressions of opinion on the future of 
Belgium have appeared in the German Press. The most 
remarkable was the following from the pen of Count Revent- 
low, which was published in the leading article of the Pan- 
Germanic organ, the Deutsche Tageszeitung, only last Sunday : 
If it is true that the German Government has decided on th^ 
renunciation of Belgium, the ruin of the German Empire 
would be sealed, and the English would be right when they 
said that the Germans would win battles but that Eng- 
land would win the war. In the solution of the Belgian 
question lies, indeed, the future of the German Empire. 
For the present nothing more certain is known, but it :s 
necessarv to draw attention to the fact that rumours of such 
a German renunciation have been increasing of late. Such 
a peace would be a bankrupt peace. 
