October 4, 1 91 7 
LAND & WATER 
The Political Factor 
In the opening of this article 1 spoke of the enemy's 
strategic and material position. including his position in man- 
power, and mentioned the effect of all this under the qualitica- 
tion of politico apart. But to that enormous qualification I 
nnist return. 
The enemy's waning strength, the certitude of his de- 
feat, the preponderance over him of his opponents— all these 
aic what they have been described not only in these columns 
but by every competent authority for some time past. But 
such calculations take for granted the permanence of the 
jiolitical situation ; it is precisely upon the break-up of that 
political situation that the enemy counts to-day in an especial 
manner. 
He has counted upon it, of course, in general, and has 
worked towards it, ever since the Marne ; but since the 
Russian Revolution, and especially since the effects of that 
]^evolution, in the military collapse of Russia during the pre- 
sent summer, he is dependent upon the political factor for a 
measure of success such as last year he never hoped to attain, 
and the whole of his action, not excepting tjtie campaign by 
sea, turns upon p<jlitical calculations. 
Let us tabulate these to see them more clearly. 
(i) The enemy counts upon the divergence of aims between 
the various Western Allies and in this divergence of aims 
must be included the difference in national characters, tradi- 
tions and experience. 
(2) He counts upon the lassitude, ignorance and confusion 
of the civilian population as regards the war> apart from 
other domestic clifiiculties. 
C)) He counts very much upon internal divisions, especialK' 
in highly industrialised countries and districts where the 
<|uanel lietween the wage-earning workers and the Capitalist 
owners was already acute before Prussia and her Allies chal- 
lenged Huropo to war. 
These are the three main divisions of his political calcula- 
ti()n--and it is a formidable one, full of menace to our futvire. 
The Russian Revolution has given it a character it never had 
before, for the Russian Revolution has shown every one of 
these three points in a high light. It has shown how different 
were the national traditions and ideals of the East from those 
of the West. It has shown what enormous effect lassitude, 
ignorance or c( nfiision can be upon the population at home, 
and it has shown what can be done by the enemy when he 
works ujion domestic hatreds and divisions. 
If we do not appreciate these three main engines which are 
calculated to counteract his desperate military situation, we 
shall not understand either why the enemy is still so confider.t 
or what good grounds of confidence he has. We shall fail, 
therefore, to master his policy. 
(i ) The divergence between the various Allies, even between 
the various V\ estern Allies, is clear enough. It is first appa- 
rent in the matter of aims. The French, for instance, are 
lighting in iin old quarrel of theirs and for the recovery of 
territory which had been taken by force, colonised by the 
enemy and erected by him into a formidable economic sup- 
])<)rt of his military power. The English are lighting for moral 
;md material things necessary to their existence ; the respect 
of neutral territory in Flurope, particularly of the North 
Sea Coast ; the security of supply by sea,' and the prevention 
of one Power's arising to mastery upon the Continent. The 
Italians upon their entry fought for strictly national aims ; 
the retention of lands which were morally Italian, and the 
liisforic claim Hiat the Adriatic should be Italian in control. 
The Americans, when they entered, entered because their 
sovereign rights had been directly challenged by the German 
claim to sink their neutral ships without warning and to mur- 
der American citizens at will. 
These differences are quite clear and on the surface, but 
if we are wise we will consider other differences far more 
imi-Mjrtant, which arc of national tradition, exix-jrieuce, tem- 
perament and even morals, which arc too often glossed over 
in the natural desire to avoid friction. 
It is a matter of life and death, for European «;ivilisation 
at any rate, that the war should be won, and it will not be 
won unless we resolve these frictions or at any rate understand 
their quality. Even as I write, 1 find in a paper which has 
reached me from America, a Pacifist organ appealing to the 
academic classes of the Eastern States, and professing sym- 
pathy with Western Europe — The New Republic — an 
a.stonishing plea in favour of the German Empire remaining, 
not only strong after the war, but in full possession of Alsace 
Lorraine, with the exception of the district round Metz. 
I open an English paper and r /ad of the debates in th,? French 
Parliament exactly as though it were an institution like the 
English Parliament, aristocratic in origin and deep-rooted 
in the popular tradition of France, instead of its being the 
recent and e.\cei<^ingiy unpopular exjieriment whicli it Is in 
tJMt rniintiv. It is a little as thoiifh a Frenchman were 
to write of the London County Council twenty years ago, 
in the days of Mrs. Ormiston Chant, as the political soul of 
London. [ open a F'rench paper and I note the Labour 
Party taken as the representative of the mass of the English 
wage earners, and the absurd Pacitists of that party as in 
some way representative of the li^ngUsh workmen. 
These are but a few obvious examples of the differences 
between the various Allies. The fact that the right of re- 
jirisal is being debated in this country at all, is another example. 
The fact that one of the Allies has suffered invasion still an- 
other ; the fact that London is frequently raided from the 
air, while Paris is nearly immune ; the fact that the whole 
weight of the submarine campaign falls upon this country 
and is only indirectly felt in others ; the fact that Great 
Britain is almost entirely industrialised, while F'rance and 
Italy are largely agricultural States ; the fact that Great 
Britain depends so largely upon direct taxation for financing 
the war, compaA'd with the postponement by our Allies of 
this burden — these and one hundred other contrasting points 
will occur to the reader. The marvel is not that so general a 
congeries of nations mustering something like half the strength 
of the world against the other lialf, should display these 
differences, the marvel is rather that the Prussianised Ger- 
man, bv his bestial actions, and proclaimed anarchy in morals, 
should have called such an Alliance into existence. 
Civilian Feeling 
(2) The lassitude, ignorance or confusion of the civil 
l)opulation' includes, not only the natural weakness cons^-.- 
quent upon three years of war, nor the ignorance in which 
one population may stand of the lightness of its losses, com- 
pared with those of an Ally, but also the inability of great 
bodies of men to grasp the lessons of the past. We repeat 
constantly (in all the Press which counts in th is country) 
that this war is a war of life and death. It is not a rhetorical 
expression. It is an expression strictly true. Those who 
know upon what the greatness of England has been founded 
and what her ]X)sition has now been for over 200 years in the 
story of the world, know that a negf)tiated p-j'ace is the beginning 
of a rapid decline for England as certainly as they know 
the laws of the physical universe. The mass of the population, 
especially in a Parliamentary country, is not only ignorant of 
such a past and of its causes, but has been, as a rule, misled 
with regard to them. Its instincts are none the less sound, 
but they are instincts alone, and if forces in favour of the 
enemv (or of a negotiated peace, which is the same thing) 
are allowed to play upon the popular ignorance, the con- 
sequences may be fatal. It is at this disarray of the popular 
feeling that the enemy aims. The petty bom bardments of 
London certainly have no other object, and even the campaign 
against shipping by submarine and mine is now mainly 
directed with this object in view. None of the directors of 
(ierinan policy can by this time believe that the destruction 
of shipping will decide the war, however grievous its effect 
upon our comfort and stMisc of security. What they do 
believe is that its continuance may so afi'cct civil opinion as to 
make a successful prosecution of the wa: ultimately impos- 
sible. In this category of lassitude and confusion one may 
properly put the enemy's dependence upon international and 
cosmopolitan finance. Not that this part is confused or 
ignorant. It is, on the contrary, very well informed, cunning 
and acute. But its impatience with the continuation of the 
war works along the same lines as all other forms of im- 
patience and misconception and indift'erencc upon the arms 
of Europe. 
(3) Lastly, the enemy counts upon civil differences in 
domestic events within each country and particularly upon 
the difference between the possessors and the wag'^ earners 
in the industrialised countries and districts. He has had 
here some measure of success. 1 le counts upon a much greater 
measure. It is interesting to see by what methods he has 
himself checked though not destroyed similar tendencies 
within his own boundaries. Universal conscription without 
exemption or with exemptions in rotation is one of these 
methods, but the most powerful of all has been his policy of 
interfering as little as possible with the domestic habits of 
the people. I think it may be justly said that during the 
.whole war there has not been in the Central Empires any 
restriction that was not imposed with the direct object of 
wiiming the war, and which was not so clearly connected 
with that object as to be apparent to all. The same cannot 
be said of ourselves. 
This brief review of the political forces upon which the enemy 
depends for arriving at his object of a negotiated peace, is 
no more than a summary of their names. It pretends to no 
analysis of their causes or their working ; still less to any con- 
structive remedy for the evils they thieuleii. One can only 
