8 
LAINU & WATER 
October 4, 1917 
say in the presence of such a peril that it is the duty of cverv- 
ane who sees what a negotiated peace would mean -and 
uo;.t educated men see it— to withstand bV cAcrv means in 
their iJowcr the progiess of lassitude and of disaftection, and 
Lo resoKc by every means in their jjowcr the inevitable 
differences of temperament and tradition between the Allied 
peoples. The discussion of those i)oints which interested us 
in the day> of i)eace is futile to-day. lupially futile is mutual 
recrimination between conrtictin)^ jfiterests, hovve\er sliaip 
:hcir conflict. The whole task and the only task is to win 
the >var. And winning the nar means the im position by force 
of arms upon the German people and their Allies, of the con- 
ditions imposed by European civilization : not the jjcrsuasion 
of the tlerman i)eople to an acceptance of those conditions ; 
that would be worthless. Nor a document merely rcRistering 
those conditions that we know from rejjcated ]'russi;ui 
declarations and actions would lie <lisregarded. The Gciman 
never keeps his word. But Vicfor>- imposing tlirse conditions, 
with the weight of guarantees held by the \ictois. bhoit of 
that, the war is lost and we are lost. 1 
Ramadie 
The victory in ^fesopotamia achieved by Sir Stanley 
Maude last l-'riday and Saturday is ol first class importance. 
The news has come in late and I can oidy deal with it very 
briefly this week. 
It would seem, so far as we can judge from the first news 
alone, to have this character : 
The enemy can attack by two roads, and with two lines 
of supply behind him. The first line of supply is the Valley 
of the Euphrates, nourished from Aleppo, whicli is the nodal 
point of all near Eastern strategics. He can also attack 
down the Tigris Valley, indirectly nourished from Aleppo, 
but only after a tedious journey across country from the 
Tigris and necessarilv based to some extent upon his exist- 
ing stores and magazines in the mountains of .\rmenia, 
where, before tlu- Russian invasion, he had his principal con- 
ceniration to meet the successful armies of the Grand Duke 
Nicholas. 
He apparently intended to attack the British troops hold- 
ing the area of Bagdad by both routes. He would strike from 
the north along the Tigris, whence he would get most of his 
men and a sufficient supply. He would strike from the east 
where his forces were probably less considerable, but with an 
ample supply, because there is no direct transport down the 
Euphrates from the railway, which reaches and crosses that 
river, whereas it does not reach the Tigris. 
At any rate his plan appears to have been this double^ 
and converging attack. Sir Stanley Maude's victory of 
last Friday forestalled this plan by restoring on both sides 
the advanced base of the attack from the west along Euph- 
rates. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers arc at their 
nearest in the region of Bagdad. The road westward to 
Aleppo from Bagdad runs to a pojnt called Eeludja, some 
35 miles from Bagdad. To the north of this road goes the 
telegraph line, to the south of it a railway. 
Feludja is on the eastern or Bagdad side of the Euphrates. 
There is a large bridge of boats at Feludja crossing the broad, 
very rapid, and difficult t^tream. Beyond the stream the rail- 
way ceases and the telegraph and road run together, south of 
the riN'er and between it and the big marshy stream of water 
called the Habbaniya mere. This shallow lake and marsh 
drain into the Eu|)lirates by a water-course which comes in 
at the point of J^amadie — four nviles to the east of this is 
Mushaid. At Ramadie the (reneral commanding the main 
Turkish force, Ahmed Bev, and his staff, with a c(^nsiderable 
garrison, were awaiting the moment to advance. At 
Mushaid was an advanced post. The great success which 
followed was obviously due to surprise, that one necessity of 
decision. The British Force reached the bluff which stands 
to the south of Mushaid, overlooking the river, <m the even- 
ing of Thiusday last, Septcm.ber j/th, and established con- 
tact with the enemy. It is clear from what follows that the 
eneinv expected no such movement. The left of the British 
line attacked Ramadie from the south-east, and meanwhile 
the cavalry, having crossed the watercourse, established 
themselves on the road to the west of Ramadie. By some 
time on F'ridav, therefore, the main "Turkish force lying at 
Mushaid, on the road behind it towards Ramadie, and at 
Ramadie itself, was completely encircled. The British con- 
tained it to the east, to the south and to the west. On the 
north ran the river. 
During the night an attempt was made by the enemy's 
forces, thus trapped, to break out up the Euphrates by the 
road westward. The British cavalry was already there and 
stopped this attempt, and at nine o'clock in the evening 
of Saturday the encirclement was so apparent to tlje enemy 
that he was compelled to surrender, though under what con- 
ditions, whether of negotation or by^the storming of his last 
defences we do not know at the moment of writing — the even- 
ing of Monday, October ist. Sir Stanley Maude reports that 
the fighting of Friday was very severe, including, presumably, 
as it did, the carrying of the enemy's field works thawn to the 
south east of Ramadie, eastward of the water-course. We are 
informed in the despatch that much material and several 
thousand prisoners fell into British hands, as well as the Turkish 
general in command and his staff, but there is no enumeration 
as yet of these captures. 
Those interested in military history will note the parallel 
between this brilliant piece of work and the manoeuvre of 
Rivoli — allowing of course for the difference of scale. 
H. BliLLOC 
l^edite rran e an. 
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