October 25, IQI7 
LAND & WATER 
O I 2 3 * S" Sea7)fi/es /o 
The TvfOON SOUND 
The small craft got away to the north, and it is the tnention 
of this fact by both the Russians and the Germans which has 
gi%-en an erroneous impression of wliat occurred, for tlR' 
escape of these smaller vessels is alluded to in very vague and 
general terms, such as " the remainder of the fleet,'.' etc. 
The fact that only the smaller vessels could have got away 
is clear enough from a glance at Sketch II, where it will be 
seen that the northern approach to Moon Sound all the way 
from tlie northern coast of Moon Island to the main land is 
Solocked by a ridge, the western half of which is called the 
Kumorsky Reef, and the whole crescent of which forms a 
complete barrier against entry or exit by the north, save 
for vessels drawing less than fifteen feet of water — indeed 
considerably less than that draft, for this amount of water is 
jnly found in very few variable points. 
It is true that tl'ie level of the Baltic here rises slightly 
when there is a combination of strong westerly winds and of 
melting snow and ice inland, but the present moment is a 
season of nearly the lowest water with easterly winds and the 
rivers low. Moreo\'er, even when there is the greatest 
lift'ercnce of level, it hardly adds another three feet. 
. It is to be noted that the opei ation has taken place while 
there are still before the enemy several weeks of open 
water. The shores of the Baltic here, and the Gulf of Riga in 
particular, freeze in a very changeable manner. The Irben 
Channel was open the whole winter during four of the eleven 
years i8g3 to 1903, and though ice forms, of course, much 
earlier in the rivers and is discovered on the shores before it 
cjeeps outwards, it is a very early year in which navigation is 
interrupted before winter has well set in. January to March 
is a sort of normal period of interruption, though the ice has 
stopped navigation in the ports two months earlier and two 
months later than those normal dates in exceptional years. 
The Zeppelin Raid 
The Zeppelin raid with its astonishing sequel, hardly 
falls within this department of L.\nu & W.vter, but it is too 
remarkable a passage to leave quite uncommented. 
So far as the evidence stands at the moment of writing, 
it seems that eleven Zeppelins left Germany on the Friday. 
Of these tliree got back by the direct eastern route which all, 
obviously, must have been under orders to follow. But of 
the remaining eight, all were in some fashion damaged in 
\arious degrees or thrown out of their course or lowered 
by loss of gas, and were condemned to reach home as best 
they could after a bad deflection southwards. Of these 
eight three may have landed in Germany, with what losses 
we do not know. Five are accounted for by the French 
observers : one captured entire, three brought down, and one 
blown out to sea over the Mediterranean, half wrecked. 
Though one has nothing but conjecture to guide one, the 
first thing that will occur to anyone who considers the main 
facts is, that the fleet must in some way have got crippled — 
or, at any rate that part of it which drifted over France. 
Whether it was crippled by gunfire in this country or, as 
has been suggested in some quarters, by unexpectedly severe 
frost suffered at a great height aflei' engines had been stopped, 
or by both these agencies, or whether perhaps there may 
not have been added to such causes a violent northerly 
gale at the great heights in which these craft were operating, 
we have not yet been told. But it is entirely incredible that 
they merely lost their way. 
It is not incredible, but it is highly improbable that such a 
fleet should have any intention of travelling even over northern 
France during daylight— and it was largely due to the fact 
that they were caught by daylight that the Zeppelins suffered 
so lieavily. The one which had the worst luck was the one 
that came down at St. Clement, near Luneville, south of 
Nancy, quite close to the opposing lines. Those which were 
accounted for in the south must, in the nature of tWngs, have 
been out of control and at the mercy of the northerly current. 
Yet another drifted out to sea over Toulon at the end of the 
day, and apparently has been lost in the Mediterranean. 
But the most extraordinary part of the whole series, and 
that on which we shall most eagerly expect details, is the 
capture of one of the Zeppelins intact with her crew unhurt 
apparently, and in full working order near the little watering 
place of Bourbonne on the high ground between Langres and 
the Upper Moselle Vallej-. 
There must be remembered in this connection a very striking 
point illustrative of more than one of the enemy's methods. 
The crew of this captured Zeppelin— L 49— used (we are told) 
parachutes. The crew of the Zeppelins, unlike the observers 
in a kite balloon, have not been, I believe, furnished with 
parachutes before. Regulations of this severity work both 
ways. They tend to the conservation of material to the last 
moment, but they also tend to exasperation in a moment of 
crisis and, when the limit of endurance is reached, to ill judg- 
ment and perhaps to mutiny. The rule seems to have been 
changed, perhaps, as a concession. 
The Conditions of Victory-Ill 
THE last and third pait of the enemy's propaganda, 
to which the first two parts lead up, fs the demand 
tl^at the .\llies sliould state specific teims of peace. 
The suggestion being that the enemy is too strong 
to be decisively defeatefl and that negotiation must be 
resorted to (a suggestion the falsity of which was 
shown here a-^t week) it is concluded that no reasonable 
man would deny the advantage of stating particular 
terms. 
Now even if all the rest of the enemy's propaganda were 
true, even if the absurdity of an innocent German people 
writhing under a hated tyranny, or the other flatly con- 
tradietory absurdity of an unconquerable German people, 
were possible in the real world, this third contention for a 
detailed negotiation of peace before victory is utterly un- 
tenable in the present circumstances. 
The main reason fr>r this is the nature of the issue between 
the two camps : Its magnitude and its simplicity. If it 
be true that the enemy's armies are unconquerable, then much 
the simplest thing is to admit defeat ; to say, "Wc intended to 
safeguard our future and .that of Europe. We have failed in 
the attempt. We will stand back where we were before and 
in the future the struggle must be renewed." It is the strong- 
est and the best thing for anyone to say who once desired 
victory but ha^ come to believe it impossible. 
Personally, fdo not believe that there are any men on the 
Allied side to-day who at once desire victory and believe it to 
be impossible. I "think that those who are talking of the impos- 
sibility of a decisive victory are men who desire to save 
Germany from the moral consequences of her acts. But I 
say that if there are men who honestly desire \ictory and yet 
believe it impossible of achievement, then it is far the best thing 
for them to admit defeat. It was the attif^de of the French 
patriots in 1871. Tliey said : " We are compelled by mere 
force to cede what tiie victor has no moral right to. We know 
that this thing is only a truce, and sooner or later the issue 
must be fought out a.gain." 
i'o-dav the issues are far greater than they were in 1871, 
