Movember i, 1917 
LANU dc WATER 
of the Russian armies. I took very numerous prisoners. I 
inflicted very heavy casualties. 
" As a result, I obtained — though I certainly did not expect 
it — ^a certain political effect which ha all the value of a 
military decision. The Russian State fell to pieces. What 
had been its armies could no longer lie used. The event 
was of the same military value as thougli I had succeeded in 
1915, and had destroyed in battle the organisation of the 
Russian forces. 1 liad caused them, though only indirecth 
and after a political faslnon, to dissolve. This lesson I there- 
lore draw : Blows sufficiently heavy delivered against any 
people whose political tenacity is uncertain will result in the 
internal or domestic collapse of that people and the corre- 
sponding dissolution of their armies. The policy has succeeded 
against what was once tlie Russian Empire. It shall be 
directed against what is still the Italian Kingdom." 
It is to be presumed or hoped that the enemy's calcula- 
tion here is false. The political imity of Italy is recent. 
But the temper of an old civilisation threatened by barbarism 
is not a temper which the German understands as he under- 
stands that of the Russian peasant and town ^worker. The 
extreme of peril hardly dissolves a country the inhabitants of 
which have long and great traditions far superior to those of 
the invader. It is on the contrary, as a rule, peril in highlv 
civilised countries which acts as the cement of the defence, even 
though that defence prove ultimately incapable of success. 
But whether the enemy be wrong or right (and we wlio know 
our ancient civilisation better than he does, think him wrong) 
that is certainly the enemy's calculation at the present 
moment. He is calculating on an ultimate count out of 
Italy in the forces opposed to him, and he make- of 
it in his mind something parallel to his former good fortune 
in the matter of Russia. 
I-et us clearly grasp all these points. Upon them the 
last phase of the war will turn, and with it the future of our 
race. 
With so much said let us turn to the details of this great 
action. - 
Let me first premise that we ha\'e no accurate infoimation 
upon the numbers either of guns or of men which the enemy 
has concentrated for his present eftort in the foot hills of the 
Julian .■Mps. There has not been tim*^ or opportunity 
during such a disastt-r for a full id'iitificatit)n, and the vasjut' 
estimates sent us are too imperfect to merit analysis. We 
must confine ourselves to the very meagre geographical 
details available at the moment of writing. 
The story, as based upon the slight evidence so far avail- 
able, would seem to be somewhat as follows : ■' 
On Wednesday last, October 24th, after a preliminary, 
bombardment of great \'iolence, the main infantry attack of 
the enemy was launched upon a front of about 20 miles, 
extending from the nortliern edge of the Bainsizza Plateau 
northward, say, from St. Lucia, south of Tolmino to the , 
Rombon Mountain above Plezzo. The enemy had a bridge- 
head over the Isonzo at St. Lucia, an important meeting of 
road and river valley just south of Tolmino. He used this 
bridgehead and here pierced the Italian line first, though 
almost simultaneously he secured his crossing twenty miles 
to the north of Plezzo, just under the mountain just men- 
tioned called Rombon, which dominates the little enclosed 
Plain of Plezzo and the Isonz6 vallev bv just under 4,ooo 
feet. 
Tiiere is no doubt that the Italian front in these two points 
gave way on Wednesday last. The line having given way at 
the two river crossings at either end of its length, the centre 
was lost and everywhere the foremost positions of the Italian 
second army were crushed in against the river and destroyed. 
The enemy claimed by the Wednesday evening no less than 
10,000 prisoners. 
We were told at the time that initial successes of this kind 
could always be gained by any determined modern offensive, 
if it chose to suffer the necessary expense, and with this com- 
ment opinion was apparently lulled. But the comment was 
inaccurate and the suggestion false, for much worse news was 
to come. , 
On the next day, Thiusday last, the 25th, retirement from 
the recently conquered Bainsizza Plateau was imposed upon 
the forces of our Allies b}' the advance of the enemy on the 
north outflanking them. Though a simultaneous attack 
was taking place to the southern end of the Italian line in front 
of Gorizia and upon the Carso, this was probabh' only with the 
idea of containing the Italian forces there. Meanwhile in the 
north the overwlielming success of the enemy's surprise con- 
tinued. He crossed the Isonzo everywhere, the thrust in the 
early morning of that Thursday up the mountain slopes 
beyond, swamping the defence. He seized the summits 
and already overlooked the plains. 
There was a general retirement of what was left of the Italian 
second army on to the frontier line all the way from .\uzza to 
the Monte Maggiore, and by the evening of that day, Thursday, 
the enemy claimed 30,000 prisoners and ;50o guns. 
On Friday the movement continued and the news became 
very grave indeed. The summit of the Monte Matajur 
had already been captured with the other summits on the 
Thursday in the morning. 
Now the Monte Matajur with its twin peak the Monte 
Mia overlooks the Coporetto-Cividale road which runs between 
them b\' a low pass. By Friday he commanded that road 
and was pouring down it towards the plains. It is not yet clear 
at what exact moment the heads of the enemy columns 
succeeded in debouching upon the plain — an act which was 
tile consummation of the whole affair. He was, at any rate' 
the master of the watershed by that Friday night, and at that 
