LAND & WATER 
November H, 1917 
The Tagliamento 
By Hilaire Belloc 
CRUCIALLY important as the Italian situation 
is, there is very little to say abont it in the wav 
ot reasonable comment, both because it is still 
so tragically, simple and because the information we 
have upon it is so meagre. The essential thing for British 
journalism as a whole at this moment is to insist upon the 
extreme gravity of the crisis and to make opinion face facts - 
if indeed that can be done. But this duty can ix> fulfilled in 
few sentences. There- is no need for piling up rhetoric or 
for repetition. 
As to a retrospect upon what has happened, a fuller des- 
cription made iwssible by fuller news with which it would 
have been interesting to have j^egun tliis week's article, we are 
unfortunately debarred froih it by a continued ^ick of infor- 
mation. Such stories as ha\c come through have hardly 
any military evidence about them. They are mere descrip- 
tions of a hurried retirement and tell us nothing of causes or 
manoeuvres. If we put together all the really military evidence 
available we get something like this : 
The enemy concentrated a certain (unknown) ntnnber of 
extra divisions, a very great (but unknown) number of e.vtra 
guns upon the northern part of the Isonzo front, that is in the 
mountains, against the Second Italian Army, which held the 
line from North of Gorizia to the neighbourhood of the 
J'redil Pass. These new divisions, some few of which were 
Germans, but most of which were Austro-Hungarian?, were 
taken mainly from the Russian front or were formed of men 
taken from the divisions" hitherto standing on tlie Russian 
front — at any rate the concentration was clearly made possible 
by the view the enemy now takes of the Russian frolit. And 
if this were true of the concentration in men, it is still more 
true of the concentration in guns which was decisive. 
What that concentration was we simply do not know. 
The Press for some reason or otlKT lirst obviously exaggerated 
it and then as suddenly minimised it. But those who may 
be too hastily jjrepared to accept the smaller figures now 
suggested should remember that we have no real evidence 
upon the matter. There was no proper identification of 
enemy forces before the attack began on tlie Isonzo front — 
that is quite clear. It is equally clear that the Russian front 
cannot now any longer send us accurate news of what is 
happening in and behind the enemy's lines opposing it. 
■' J r 
