Xovpinber 15, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
and tlienfore iihortest line would use a portion of the Piave 
above Nervesa to just beyond Vidor inthc foothills, sacrificinf,' 
l-fltre and Belluno, of course, and holding the heights which 
form the northern watershed of the Rrenta or \'al Sugana 
and thence crossing the gorge of tlie Rrenta join on with the 
existing line deftnding the southern part of the plateau 
I if Asiago. 
To tJ)e importance of this northern sector behind the line 
r)f the Piave 1 will return iu a moment. Let me first" describe 
the line of the Piave proper, from Nervesa to the sea. 
Though the river is, as I iiave said an indifi'erent obstacle, 
liiie nearly all mountain streams (save the largest, which have 
a very wide basin and a Jong passage through the Plains), 
though the waters fall very rapidly after each freshet and are 
in great jiart of the length of the river divided into several 
ihannels which reduce the difficulty of crossing, yet the 
Piave has certain adv'antages over the numerous other rivers 
of this Plain. In the first place, its line in the quite un- 
covered open country is short ; excluding the small loops of 
the river, it is but 25 miles from Nervesa to St. Dona, f;r 
rather the point on the western bank opposite St. Dona, whcie 
the sea marshes begin. As the crow flies it is little more than 
20 miles. Th<> most exposed part of the line, therefore, and 
the most vulnerable, is highly restricted. The width of the 
\'enetian Plain between Nervesa and the I>agoons and marshes 
of the coast is at its least. There is a sort of waist here 
between the I'riulian district on the east and the great Plain 
of Padua and \'icen?a upon the west. Further, everything 
below the bridges of St. Dona is very difficult passage for an 
army at any time, and usually quite impassable by one. It 
i-« a labyrinth of marshy meadows cut by innumerable canals 
and merging into the meres and lagoons of the sea coast. 
I'or some miles above St. Dona — up to the point marked 
" D " on Map I the lower river is fairly deep and has diffi- 
cult muddy banljs : but above D the bed is a broad 
gravelly flat with numerous shallow branches of the river 
trickling through it : only after rain does it rise suddenh- to 
a higher level and fill its banks. 
The line then on which the Higher Command of our Ally 
has decided to stake so much is, briefly, one of three sections. 
The true obstacle between St. Dona and the point D ; the 
insufficient obstacle (save for the strength of artificial work), 
from D to a little above Vidor ; the moimtain section which 
(irst follows the ridge watershed of the Brenta, and then 
turns west to cross that stream and to hold the Asiago plateau 
just south of the ruins of that town. 
The political aspect of the matter is very important in the 
case of Italy, and we note that the Piave covers Venice and 
all the wealth and history of the towns beyond the Adige, 
which would be sacrificed if the Adige were made the de- 
fensive line. 
Now let us consider the cpportunities for supply and obser- 
vation on either side 
The line of the Piave is very well served for the supply of 
the defence. Radiating from Treviso, which is to the Piave 
what Udinc was to the Isonzo, there are three lines ofrailway 
and, as will be seen from the map, a fourth comes in paralle 
with the sea serving St Dona. Further, there is excellent 
cross communication joining these lines, the capital nodal 
point of which is the junction of Castelfranco. (lood roads 
radiiite from Tn^visn as the railways do, but there is none, 
or was noiu> in time of peace, serving the line parallel to 
the lagoons, nor .would it everywhere be easy to construct. 
The way along the coast to St. Dona Bridge is a tortuous 
piecing together of local lanes. 
rnfortunately. the communications of the enemy fur his 
approach to and attack on the lines are equally excellent. 
Apart from a whole network of excellent hard local roads he 
has, for a front of less than 30 miles, three first-class avenues 
of supply, each with its great high road and railway. It is 
improbable tliat the latter have been damaged in the very 
pressed retreat beyond what a few days can repair : for though 
there are on each an exceptionally large number of culverts 
over the numerous small streams of the \'enetian plain, yet 
these are all quite short and low. The only considerable 
works being the two viaducts over the Tagliamento, the 
extent of the damage done to which we do not know. 
These three avenues of supply reach the Piave, the northern- 
most at the Piala Bridge just at the edge of the plain, the 
middle one at Ponte de Piave, the third and southernmost at 
St. Dona. The railways of the first and last are double lines ; 
a cross communication joins them up only 20 miles from 
what are (now that the bridges are down) the Piave rail- 
heads. It is a model condition of supply for an attack in 
the plain. 
Meanwhile, though it has no railway leading to any enemy 
base, but only one ending at the hills, the open valley below 
Belluno has an excellent high road and cross-road system, 
and l>y it also a concentration could be efiected fairly rapidly 
round, from the plains by the main road from there to Belluno. 
wiiich I have marked (i) (i) on Map 1. — a broad, excellent 
highway for petrol traction. 
As to observation, it is to be remarked that where the 
Piave goes through a gap in the foothills just above Nosera 
either party has observation right over the Venetian plain to 
south and the enclosed flat of Vidor to the north : the enemy 
on the height marked B, the Italians on that marked A. 
The latter is, happily, somewhat the higher, but this advan- 
tage is not great, for from any part on the crest of B— which 
is from 600 to 800 feet above the plain, one can completely 
observe operations and view all about the northernijiost 
river crossing. 
Such is the line of the Piave with its strength and weakness. 
It has the military advantage that it is short, the political 
that it Covers Venice and the great towns of the neighbouring 
mainland. It has the disadvantage that the obstacle — unlike 
that of the Adige — is very imperfect, that right on its flank 
and behind it is the threatened Asiago plateau, and that if it, 
.,the Piave line, be abandoned, all further retirement rapidly 
extends the trace to be held by the armies compelled 
to such retirement under the immediate pressure of superioi 
forces. - • 
Palestine 
Tlie retirement of the enemy in Palestine is not only of an 
importance, but even of a character which we cannot judge. 
l)ecatise we have no enemy accounts and because the accounts 
from our side are necessarily little more as yet than the des- 
))atches to hand, but there are certain features in it which are 
dear enough already, and are worth tabulating. 
In the first place it is clear that the British turning movement 
round Beersheba and the capture of that point involved the 
collapse of the whole (iaza line. In other words, it is clear 
that (mce Beersheba had gone, the Turkish command deter- 
mined upon a general retirement which involved, of course, 
the abandonment of Cia'za, and of all the defensive works 
organised against wliat the enemy calls rather absurdly 
" The Sinai front "' 
By l-riday last, (hec^th, over sevent3' guns had been counted, 
of which several were 5.0 howitzers ; and fieneral AHehby 
estimated on that day the total Turkish casualties, exclusive 
of s.ooo prisoners, to be not less than 10.000. 
The immediate interest in this field is the line upon whicK 
we are now told the enemy will elect to stand : the line oi 
the W.'idy Sukereir continued south-eastward to cover Beit 
Jibrin ind the highest point and terminal in front of Hebron. 
Let us consider the general nature of the country 
The structure of the land is exceedingly simp'e It is all 
based on lines lunning jurallel with the .Mediterranean coast, 
md that coast is itself as sim})'e as any in the world A mere 
flat line ; no natural harbouis whatsoever, the whole making 
a line cutvipg ver\- sligh^Iv w-'stward of south .\lmost 
etactly due north and south, and at a distance from the sea 
•which varies from 70 miles at the southern end to .some 3o"miles . 
at the northern, runs the valley of the Jordan, terminating in 
the Dead Sea. This great cleft is a depression far lower than 
the Mediterranean (the Dead Sea itself is only just under i,.loo 
feet lower, and the Sea of (lalilee hHy feet lower, the valley of 
the Jordan in between sinking from the lesser to the greater 
depth). ' 
■ Between this valley of the Jordan and of the Dead Sea and 
the Coast line of the Mediterranean, there is a backbone of 
high mountain land, not much larger than a large English 
countv, upon which, as upon a stage, has been played the 
liistory of the Jews, of Christian origins, and of the Crusades. 
This great lump of mountain land, some 55 miles long froni the 
Desert on the south, to Samaria on the north, is nowhere 
much more than 30 miles broad, is ilistinguished from the sea 
plain ftn the one hand, and from the valley of the Jordan on 
the other, not onlv by its ruggedness and its height , nor by the 
fairlv rapid way in which it rises from the sea plain and the 
precipitous wa\- in which it falls on to the Jordan valley, 
but also liy the wav in whicli its culture has, from immemorial 
lime, conti-asted with the culture of the coast on the west, with 
llie Desert to the east, and with the almost tropical deep 
gorge of the Jordan, nuich of which men were compelled to 
l.-ave Iialf inhabited. I'limi the p )int of view of military 
■ history, rpirt from the ])nlitical ehects on juilitary history 
which the separation of races and religion involved from the 
point of view, that is. Of purely ge;)grai)hical military history 
