November 15, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
After-the-War Work* 
By T. H. Penson 
13 
k 
N<>BtM)V will dispute the fact that after fjlie war 
the economic condition of the country will (iemand 
tlic most serious consideration. E\cry war in- 
volves a great expenditure of men and mone\-, 
the destruction on a very large scale of material wealth, 
increase of national indebtedness, and general dislocation of 
industry and trade, and this has proved very specially the 
case in this the ' greatest of all wars of ancient or 
modern times. {Reference is constantly being made to the 
^tate of things which prevailed in this country after the great 
wars with I-"rance. 1 79.5-1815, and it is thought by many that 
the economic distress 0/ the years i8i5-i820is likely to occur 
again at the close of the present struggle. The comparison, 
however, is not so clyse as some would think, and there seems 
little reason to believe that history will rejieat itself with any 
e.\actnT>ss of detail. Now, as was then the case, there is 
bound to be financial exhaustion and, owing to the disband- 
ment of armies and the cessation of war industries and em- 
ployments, serious disturbance of the labour market. 
But England is in a very different position industrialh' 
from what it was a century ago. At that time England was 
j)assing through the economic changes generally known as the 
Industrial devolution. Everything was in a state of tran- 
sition. Agriculture was giving place to manufactures, and 
the factory system was being rapidly extended. Population 
was increasing at an abnormal rate, and people were shifting 
from the country to the towns. Poverty and pauperism were 
widespread, and the condition of the labouring classes generally 
was deplorable. The j^eace which followed Waterloo meant 
not a return to pre-war conditions, but an aggravation of the 
distress which had been occasioned by the changes going on 
during the war. 
Good Organisation 
At the end of the present struggle there will be many diffi- 
culties to adjust arid many problems to solve — but they will 
not be those of 1815. The industrial system, however im- 
jVrfect it may I^e, hias now reached a high stage of develop- 
ment. The wage-earniiig classes are well organised ; they 
•jccupy a better social and economic position, and they repre- 
sent a powerful force both in industry and in politics. When 
jjeace is restored there will bc^ much to readjust, much to 
reconstruct, and much to abandon altogether. It will be the 
opening of a new chapter in the social and economic life of 
the country, with infinite possibilities and, it may be added, 
infinite promise. 
There is one consid^ation. ll0^yeve^, which is fundamental 
to the realisotii>n of ttie various schemes for the material 
improvement of the conctition of what are generally described 
as the working classes. . The present struggle has been more 
costlv thin any that has preceded it. The War Hill has been 
steadilv mounting up and now exceeds eight millions a day. 
As this amount is far in excess of the wealth that is being 
l>roduced. it is ob\'ious' that we have been using up wealth 
previously accumulated, and at the same time mortgaging 
lieavily wealth to be produced in the future ; and further, 
the war has involved to some extent the destruction of those 
factors which are essential to the production of wealth — 
labour j)ower. fixed capital, means of transport, etc. All the 
belligerent Pf)WLTS will emerge from the war both poorer and 
less well equipped for wealth production than they were in 
the middle of if)i f. The poverty of other countries cannot 
fail to exercise an important effect on the development of our 
own industry and trade, which is a fact which cannot be 
ignored. But it is sufficient for the present purpose to c(Jh- 
centrate our attention on the mere t]uesiion of wealth pro- 
duction, and to take as our main proposition the fact that 
after the war England will be far less wealthy and far less 
well provided with th:- means of producing or obtaining 
wealth than she has been for many years past. 
Wliat is going to be done to remedy this state of tnings ? 
Is it sufhciently realised that just as during the war we ha%e 
as a nation had to make an unprecedented effort and unpr> - 
ccdented sacrifice's, s(j for some years after' the war we ;hall 
as a nation have to make further effort and further sacrifices, 
though of another character, if we are to replace the wealth 
that has been destroyed, and to restore to a condition of efii- 
ciency the productive' forces which liavi- been so seriously 
impaired. The si)lution of labour problems is chjsely bound 
* This article was alruiuly in print Ijcforc tin- ilebate lii tlie House i>f 
Lords ijf November 7. The .speeohes then made ulfonl full justifita- 
liun. i( any bt: needed, f«r*h(; stress here laid on the nctosity o{ inti"ca.sed 
wcaKh oroducliun alter tl>f w.ir. 
Up with the po.ssibilitv of rai;iiug tlie itaudaid of living of the 
workers. The rai'^iug of the standard of living presupposes 
a corresponding production of wealth. 
Economic Difficulties 
The economic difiicultie^ which may be e.Npected to nsult 
from the long period of war arc will recognised in tiermanv. 
("lernian manufacturers and aitisans. farmers and peasants, 
trader.^, financiers, sh'pcnvncr^. and men of science, have but 
one idea in their minds — that they must devote their 
utmost energies and all their available resources to replacing 
their lost wealth, to regaining their lost trade, to repairing 
their damaged industrial fabric. The national determination 
is well expressed in a letter found on a German prisoner : 
" When the war is over, oh, hmc xve u-ill nork ! " It is by hard 
work, by the putting forth uf their utmost effort, that the (icr- 
mans expect and intend to recover from the disastrous 
economic efiects of the war and to build up renewed pros- 
perity in the shortest possible time. 
Is "this the resolution also of the people of this country? 
Is it realised here also that work is the only avenue to re- 
covery' ? We have, it is true, one great advantage over 
Germany, inasmuch as he? overseas trade has been cut off 
altogether, while ours, though it has suffered somewhat from 
shortage of shipping, from credit restriction, and from war 
conditions generally, remains essentially untouched. Ihit 
we have the same need as they have to meet the industrial, 
fmamcial and commercial disabiUties created by the war with 
the resolute determination to work— to work long and to 
work hard— in order to build up again the national pros- 
perity. And in this work of rebuilding all must take a part. 
The "task is not reserved for one section only of the com- 
munity. High and low, rich and poor must all unite in this 
great national undertaking,. There must be no buried talents, 
no forces left unemployed. 
Are there any signs that this necessity for work is as fully 
recognised as it should be ? Is there not, on the contrary, 
a fairlv widespread feeling that the war has been a period of 
strenuous activity and of spedal effort, and that when it is 
over we '^deserve a period of comparative slackness distin- 
guished bv short hours, easy conditions and good pay ? The 
recent demand for a thirty-hours week— six hours a day. for 
five days with Saturday" and Sunday off— seems to lend 
support to such an idea : but what a disastrous policy 1 
It is Uke answering the German " Oh. how we will work ! " 
with, " Let us do as little work as possible ! " It is probable 
that the authors of the thirty-hours week programme would 
have been the last to approve of a general relaxation of effort 
such as is here suggested, and that in their anxi&ty to avoid 
the evils of unemployment which inevitably accompany dis- 
bandment of large numbers of men from the army or from 
occupations otherwise connected with the war, they have put 
forward a scheme which by limUing the amount of work. 
to be done by each would "secure occupation for the largest 
possible number. This, however, would necessarily result in 
limiting, the total amount 0/ the product and is nothing more than 
the old familiar economic fallacy of the "Work Eund." This 
assumes that there is only a certain amount of work to be 
done, and that in order to employ everybody, only a very 
limited quantity must be given out to each. Such a policy 
has always had the most unfortunate results, but if it were 
applied after the war the consequence to the economic welfare 
of this country would be absolutely disastrous. 
When a man finds that his larder is getting empty, the 
remedy is more work, not less work ; and similarly when a 
nation urgently needs to rebuild its material prosperity, liard 
work, intelligent work, persistent wqrk, is the only sure means 
to the end. If every man were engaged in producing the 
food, clothing, etc., tliat were needed for the satisfaction of the 
wants of his household, the folly of the thirty-hours week 
would at once become apparent. He would learn by sad 
experience that by working less he would get less. But as 
he produces goods for other peoj)le's consumption, himself 
I'eceiving weekly wage, the connection between the actual 
resiilts of his labour and the food, clothing, et<-., which go to 
make up his real wage, is only ti^ often lost sight of. 
The fundamental fact is that wealth must lie produced 
K-fore it can be consumed, and to increase money wages to 
l,f). or even t,^n a week would not in any way benefit the 
rvceivers unless as the result of their efforts the wealtii wan 
produced which they are desirous of consuming. The in- 
ci-easc of the demand lor conuuodilie'^ in general, combined 
with the shortage of supply, would only lead to giadually 
