l^Iovember 22, 1917 
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and Fagarc. At the first of these points he suffered a loca' 
disaster. The Italian account is that the trocps which had 
managed to cross were all either annihilated or captured 
through the efforts of the 265th and 266th regiments. But the 
main crossing was made at Fagare, and this though very 
heavily counter-attacked by the Xovara Brigade and the 3rd 
Bersaglieri (forming the 54th division) stationed itself upon 
the western bank, and still held the bridgehead upon the 
Friday night. 
Meanwhile, on that same Friday, the i6th, the Monte 
Prassolan, a very strong point, between the Brenta and the 
Piave, fell to the enemy. 
Early on Saturday, the Italian line on the watershed 
hills between the Piave and the Brenta gave way slightly, 
but there was a successful counter-attack against the bridge- 
head which tlie enemy had established at Fagarc, and further 
down the river the enemy's attempt to give himself elbow 
room upon his bridgehead at Zenzon was defeated. Indeed, 
in these two actions against the enemy bridgeheads, the 
Italians took over 1,200 prisoners. 
On Sunday the full effect of the loss of the Tomatico height 
was felt, anil the Italians lost Ouero, the point where their 
mountain defences touch the Piave, and fell back on Mt- 
Tomba, the last point at this part before the plains. 
Now let us put all these things together and see what the 
whole picture means. 
The Italian front— still subjected, remember, to superior 
pressure — consisted when the. enemy's present manoeuvre 
began, ten days ago. essentially of two limbs. One limb ran 
along the Piave from just north of Ouero to the sea, the 
other limb ran from Ouero north of the " wall " which the 
foothills of the Alps make as they fall sharply upon the Italian 
plain. > 
The j)os^itions governing these tw6|lirqbs differ very much 
the one from the other. .V 
The defence upon the Piave is concerned with the mainte- 
nance of an obstacle while reinforcements come up, and 
politically as well as strategically with the covering of Venice. 
It is felt that the loss of Venice would be a political blow of 
th? gravest character, whilst strategically the loss of Venice 
would mean the loss of any power to act upon the Northern 
and Central Adriatic, and that, though I do not pretend to 
comment upon maritime strategy, which I do not understand.' 
would obviously be a very grave weakening to the whole 
Italian position. Further, the holding of the line of the Piave 
is the holding, as we have seen in previous articles, of the 
" waist'' where the distance across the Italian plain from the 
mountains to the sea is at its minimum. 
Although the attention of the public has been chiefly 
directed to the resistance upon the Piave, strategically it is 
the other sector, the sector in the mountains, which "is the 
• most important : for if the mountain sector be" forced not 
only is the line of the Piave turned, but no very rapid retire- 
ment from it will be possible. If the reader wilflook at Sketch 
Map I. he will sec that the coming down of the enemy, over 
tli<> mountain wall west of the Piave, w(juld mean his imme- 
diate appearance uix>n the main railway linesoii the Northern 
Italian i)lain (Vicen/a-Trevis,, and. Vicenza-pHdua-Trcviso) 
wliich are the vital communications of the army on llu' Piave. 
If the enemy can cut tiiat railway it means a complete disaster 
to the forces now ui.xjn the Pia\-e banks. 
The fact that me enemy is only now growmg in strength 
at this second sector is, by the way, clear ehough proof that 
he never e.xpected so great a success as he attained when he 
attacked on October 24th upon the Isonzo. But that is ancient 
history, and we can neglect it for the moment.' 
When we contrast these two sectors we discover the favour- 
able point that communications and supply are far better for 
the enemy upon the Piave sector than upon the mountain 
sector. Were it otherwise the position would be even;nio/e 
perilous than it is. He is rapidly concentrating against the 
mountain sector (which may also be called the Asiago sector), 
but he is handicapped by the nature of the ground. He has 
two or three good roads which he made eighteen moitths agp, 
during the Trentino offensive of iqi6 in this same region, but 
he has only one railway down the Upper Adige valley to supply 
him. It is a Iwttle neck through which everything must come. 
Further, the season is very far advanced for operating in the 
mountains. Snow has already fallen heavily upon all these 
hills. That, upon the whole, is an advantage to the defence. 
Turning to the other sector — that of the Piave, we must 
remember that if the enemy has any hope of getting through 
in the mountains, it is actually to his advantage that the 
Italian line on the Piave should not break. It is to his advan- 
tage to hold as many Italians there as possible by perpetually 
menacing the river crossings. We must further note that 
he has njt yet mad? his chief effort to cross the river at all. 
How long it will take him to bring up hi^ heavy artillery and 
its great weight of munitionment (for this is the slow business, 
much more than the mere bringing up of the guns), we cannot 
tell. He has the most excellent communications l>ehind him 
—three main railways from his bases and three railways, 
two of them main railways, across the plain to the Piave. 
with three great m^in roads and innumerable good cross 
roads. 
We know from experi^ice that it is not the habit of the 
enemy to begin a bombardment until he has a very great head 
of munitionment ready, and that when his heavy pieces are 
working at all in these efforts of his, they begin all together 
and suddenly. He counts on that for one of his elements of 
surprise. 
Now until this use of heavy material begins, all the actions 
against tiie Piave line, all the attempts, successful or un-. 
successful, to establish bridgeheads are secondary matters. 
For what they are wortli it may be of advantage to examine 
them in detail, but only after the proviso that we must not 
regard tl^em as main actions or even as parts of a main opera- 
tion as yet. 
The places attacked are marked upon Map I. with the 
figures I. 2. 3. 4, 5 and 6. Of these (i) represents the crossing 
over the mouth of the Piave in the marshes of Grisolera : (2) 
represents the crossing at Zenson. which does not concern the 
actions of this week, but where a solid, though restricted, 
bridgehead has been established by the Austrians : (3) repre- 
sents the crossing at Fagare : (4) that of Folina ; and (3) 
and (6) the abortive and defeated attempts at Feme and Ouero 
on the Upper Piave, just below the point where the moun- 
tains sector joins on to the' river sector. 
We are concerned this week only with what the enemy is 
doing at the mouth of the river at"(i), and what he has tJeen 
doing at (3) and (4). ■ . ; 
His action at (i)' just above the mouth at Griso.lera is 
obviously so far little more than a containing movement to.draw 
Italian forces as far down the stream as possible. The last ten 
or eleven miles of the Piave between the bridges of St. Dena and 
the sea run between artificial embankments and are separated 
from the old course of the river by a great belt of hollow land 
three to five miles broad intercepted by innumerable dyKes, 
along which run narrow, primitive roads very bad for any form 
of military transport. Behind the old course of the Piave 
is, first of all, to the north, a very marshy district, impassable 
to an army ; ne.xt a canal with" high dykes leading away to 
