'iNovember 
1917 
LAND iS: WATER 
solved after the German fashion, that is, with the Polish State 
wholly within the German orbit, and organised as Germany 
desires. Let iis see what follows : 
In the first place,the largest and certainly the most intensely 
cultured of all tlie Slav States would then be a German thing. 
The lesser Slav States to the south, where Orthodox in religion, 
would conceive of azl the Slavs as part of the Centnd European 
group and would yield necessarily to that group. As for 
the Catholic Slavs, whose difi'ereutiation within Austria- 
Hungary is so powerful a factoB in favour of the Allies, thet^ 
position would be fixed permanently oujthe old lines, when 
the great mass of Poland had fallen into line and appeared as 
an example to them of the wa\' in which the greatest of Cath- 
olic Slav nations could form part of the Germanic scheme. 
We ou2;ht always to remember that the German faces east 
as well as west. At least half his energy, more than half his 
historical tradition, is concerned with meeting, arid if he can do 
so. with Colonising or subjugating the Slav. There is hardly 
any loss upon the west or the south which, if he still retains 
his sense of Empire over the Eastern Slavonic marches, would 
not seem to the German a fair price. 
A German Poland 
Next let us remark that with Poland organised in a German 
fashion, and at Germany's bidding, all the East is under 
German influence. The high Polish civilisation would work 
as an outlier of Central Europe. It dominates mentally just 
as it outflanks geographically the Germanic movement towards 
the East. A German Poland, how-ever veiled the German 
influence might be, would render secure the road to the East 
through Constantinople for "\'ienna and for Berlin. Such a 
dependent Poland would mat:e of the Baltic a completely 
German sea closed at the (Jerman pleasure. 
Lastly, let as note what modem people usually exaggerate 
So much as to make it cover the whole held, but what has 
none the less a very important aspect ; I mean the industrial 
effect, of such a settlement. Already the manufacturing 
centres of Poland are largely in German hands. Let Ger 
many organise and establish the new Poland after her own 
plan and it will become largely industrialised, and the wealth 
s<) produced will be part and parcel of the general Central 
European industrial system, which is the economic foundation 
■^i modern Prussia. If Germany wins, the Poland she will 
make will be a Poland economically and industrially one 
with Westphalia and Bohemia. It will probably lie within one 
customs wall ; it will certainly be arranged to follow all the 
lines of German industry, upon the Gorman model. 
Contrast such a picture with the picture of a Poland which 
tlic victorious Western Allies might establish, and see what 
the effect of such action upon their part would be. 
The culture of Poland has hitherto been Western. It 
has formed a great outlier of Western influence beyond Cen- 
tral Europe. It is curious to note how, the moment you 
leave the influence of Berlin, going eastward, when you come 
to the Posnanian Polish countryside, you leave behind you the 
Prussian vulgarity and insufficiency in architecture, in furni- 
ture, in painting, and are once more m the air of the W est. It 
is true of nearly all externals, and of the profounder spiritual 
things as well. You might almost say that spiritually Poland 
was in that distant and isolated Eastern march a colony of 
the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Nor has anything more 
affirmed Prussian power than the Prussian claim to reverse 
such an influence of civilisation upon the further borders of 
the German group. 
Polish Independence 
Geographically again, the establishment of a strong and 
independent Poland, singularly diminishes the Germanic 
ijifluence. It would act with sovereign power to within uo 
great distance of Frankfurt upon the Oder ; it would be a sol- 
vent to the German influence that has beea spreading eastward 
for so long. It would join hands through Moravia with 
Bohemia, and far to the south, right up to the Carpathians 
and in places beyond ; to the north upon the Baltic, eastward 
through the marches where the Polish touches the Russian 
culture, it could form a great State, the rival to its former 
masters in \'ienna and 'Berlin. It would certainly be stronger 
than the Magyar State. It would be the one great counter- 
poise on the east, and a most efhcient one, correspcmding to 
any western settlement and supplementing it. A strong 
and independent Poland at once creates a national feeling 
among the Catholic Slavs, not only of Bohemia, but of the 
south near the Adriatic. It is a wedge driven into ihe Ger- 
manic hegemony from the Elbe right away down to Istria. 
There remains the industrial effect : a strong and indepen- 
dent Poland would control the minerals of Silesia; would 
make its own laws forbidding alien influence in its great manu- 
facturing towns. Lastly, and most important of all, from 
the point of view of Britain, it would have an avenue of ex- 
port and import by sea. Danzig is thi> core of the business ; 
and just as Poland will be the test of the Great Wai , so Danzig 
may properly be said to be the test of Poland. If after the. 
war Danzig is still Prussian, Prussia has won. 
A Poland representing the victory of our enemy would beat 
these marks : 
The Polish districts seized by Prussia would remain under 
the tyranny of Prussia. Austrian Poland would remain under 
the milder rule of Austria. Autonomy vvould be confined to 
the Kingdom of Warsaw — above all, there would be no access 
to the sea. 
A Poland great and independent would recover the provinces 
seized by Prussia, including not only the Posnanian belt, but 
Silesia, with its coal and all its mineral resources — but chief 
point of all- it would get to the sea and Danzig, the historic 
sea-town of the Poles, would be its port. If Poland have no 
port the Baltic, after this war, is German. If Poland have a 
port — and Danzig is its port — the Baltic will not be a closed 
but an international sea. The point is of vital importance to 
this country, even on the narrowest issues, and if misunder- 
stood, and its value under-estimated, the effect of that false 
political judgment will run through all our history for genera- 
tions to come. H. Belloc 
Clemenceau 
By J. Coudurier de Chassaigne 
HE last news from France is the Tiest we have re- 
ceived for many a day. The appointment of M. 
T 
■ ( le;nenceau to the Premiership is the turning point 
JL of the convalescence of my sorely stricken country, 
which started under M. Ribot's brave and honest treatment 
of the Vigo-Almereyda affair. The patient improved under M. 
Painleve's naive methods, but was imperilled bv his wrong 
diagnosis of Daudet's patriotic intervention against M. Malvy 
and his traitorous confederates, M. Leymarie and Paix- 
Seailles. Its complete recovery is now assured by the vigilant 
care and energetic remedies which Dr. Clemenceau will apply 
to the body politic. 
The accession of M. Clemenceau to power means so much 
for France, and also for England, that I may be forgiven for 
trying once more to explain the inner significance of the return 
of the Grand Old Man of French politics to the leadership of the 
G<ivernnTMit. First let us render homage where homage is due. 
The President of the Republic has behaved under these cir- 
cumstances, as alwavs. like a true patriot, and on this point I 
should like to remind my readers of my recent article in L.\Nr) 
I.S; W.MiiR on M. Poiucare and M. Painlev(^. for every word 
of it has come true. .M. Painlcve, straightforward and well- 
meaning as he is, had no jiy rliamentary skill. Inthat he could 
not talk and could n(jt act, Ik- had to go. But for M. I'oincare's 
high sense of lovulty, his fall might have been followed by 
another make-shift combination, which might have satisfied 
pwliticians, though still leaving the country in grave peril. 
Nor should we forget that the President of the Republic alone 
has the power to choose and appoint the Prime Minister. 
This choice, easy in ordinary times, was more than difficult 
at the present juncture, for between these two men a political 
feud had-existed, increasing every year since 1912. 
M. Clemenceau was the bitterest opponent of M. Poincare, 
not only during the latter's Premiership, but also at the time 
of his election to the Presidency of the Republic. In spite 
of M. Cl^menceau's violent campaign. M. Poincare was elected 
by the National Assembly at Versailles. But instead of making 
peace with the President after his election, or even since the 
war started, M. Clemenceau remained irreconcilable. He 
looked on the President's policy as a national danger ; and did 
not mince words on the subject either in his articles or in his 
speeches. Up to the last three months a reconciliation between 
the two seemed impossible, though M. Poincare never said 
or did anything in public^ to justify M. Clemcnceau's 
animosity. But both men are before ex'crything patriots. 
l-'or some time the current of parliamentary and public 
opinion had proved to M. Poincare that M. Clemenceau was 
the only statesman who could cleanse France from Boloism, 
and at the same time direct the war with all the energy re- 
quired. Cymnion friends of both statesmen had lately bcea 
